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This thesis examines the attempts of the Christian Wolnammin and Christian 
Saeteomin to construct a catholic community within Younghak Presbyterian Church, 
Seoul. Both groups come from the same region in the Northern territory, yet have 
different identities based on the fact that their exodus to South Korea took place 
during different periods of the last half century. 
Both before and since their arrival in South Korea around 60 years ago, Christian 
Wolnammin were socialized in the context of a deep-rooted anti-Communist ideology. 
In sharp contrast, recent Christian Saeteomin were socialized by Juche (self-reliance) 
ideology (the official government ideology of North Korea) prior to leaving North 
Korea in the last decade. The contrasting ideologies cause tension and even hostility 
between the groups in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, posing significant difficulties 
for creating a space for mutual fellowship and respect.  
Members of the two groups did not perceive the extent of differences between 
them until they met each other in the church. Prior to coming together, both 
communities desired unification, including the sharing of what they assumed was an 
ethnically homogeneous identity. The serious misinterpretation of symbols and 
behaviour patterns caused disappointment and tension. Consequently, examples of 
exclusion began to emerge in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, with at least some 
Christian Saeteomin wanting to return home.    
The present study is a response to their difficulties. It locates, describes and 
analyses the conflicts, reflects on the place of ideology in Christian practice evident in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church, and outlines a route towards a practical and prophetic 
resolution based on the theological concept of reconciliation and embrace.  
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1. Description of the Study 
 
The conflict between North and South Korea has been a dominant concern for 
Koreans since the division of Korea, which began after the end of the Japanese 
occupation in 1945.
1
 North and South Korea, divided at the 38
th
 parallel, established 
their own governments. The gap between the two governments widened as the 
ideological battle between them became intense, and eventually the Korean War broke 
out on 25 June 1950. The ceasefire agreement was finally made on 27 July 1953. The 
three-year war resulted in the death of over two-and–a-half million soldiers and three-
and-a-half million civilians. Three million refugees were created and over ten million 
families were separated as a result of the conflict. During the brief period when one 
side occupied the other’s territory, both parties committed killings, torture and 
kidnapping of civilians, accusing them of being either ‘communist aggressors’ or 
‘collaborators of the American imperialists’.
2
  
The war caused a deep scar of resentment in the hearts and minds of Koreans. 
Since the war, the two Koreas have remained divided for 60 years. The two nations 
currently have a total of more than one-and-a-half-million troops in arms, and bitter 

Sebastian C.H.Kim, ‘Reconciliation Possible? The Churches’ Efforts Toward the Peace and 
Reconciliation of North and South Korea,’ Sebastian C.H.Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg 




conflict and mutually hostile propaganda has continued until recently.
3
Up to the 
present day the profound anti-communist ideological socialization nurtured during the 
Cold War era and reinforced by the South Korean government, continues to thwart 
attempts to create space for a positive reconciliation of Korean citizens. 
In studying something as vast as North-South antagonism and the possibility of 
reunification in Korea, the scholar has three options, following the views of E.H. Carr 
on writing of history. The first concentrates on the deeds and actions of leaders and 
empires, in either an intentionally moralising or more generally descriptive history. 
The second looks at the process of events and trends based frequently on class conflict 
or economic change. The third relies on detailed analysis at the micro-level of 
processes set within a wider picture which may have the capacity to challenge aspects 
of “received history.”
4
 This thesis, in focusing on a small group of North and South 
Koreans, follows the third mode, challenging both general assumptions about a Korea 
uniting as one homogeneous people, and particular assumptions in the church about 
the place of politics and ideology in religious identity. 
Between the years of the liberation from Japan (1945) and the ceasefire of the 
Korean War (1953) many Korean Christians from the northern territory migrated 
South in search of freedom of their faith, establishing their churches in South Korea. 
One of the churches is Youngnak Presbyterian Church which was established in South 
Korea by Rev. Han Kyung-chik and other 27 old migrants on 2 December 1945. 
Unexpectedly, new migrants began to enter South Korea from North Korea on a 
massive scale since 1998 due to the very poor circumstances of North Korea.       
The new and old migrants began to encounter each other in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church in 1998.  While there were a few new migrants in the church 

Ibid., p. 163.
E.H. Carr, What is History?, London: Penguin, 1961 
	
before 1998, the old migrant Christians in the church only began to perceive the 
existence of the new migrant Christians from 1998 because the number of the new 
migrant Christians started to significantly increase in the church.    
It was assumed that the two communities would live together as a reconciled 
community because both of them not only came from the same Northern territory but 
had been one people, one nation and part of the same culture before Korea was 
divided. However, the two communities underwent considerable change as a result of 
different ideological systems embedded in their different social and political situations. 
Over fifty years, these ideological differences have significantly shaped the identities 
of the people in their respective contexts. Both communities simply expected to 
recover their lost identity as one people and one culture once they re-encountered 
each other. Not surprisingly, however, after a few years together, the two populations 
began to find that they had significant differences. After initially embracing one 
another as an apparently reconciled community, over time these differences have 
caused divisions, creating mutual exclusion of the two groups from one another. The 
tension is so acute that it has led me to question the reality of constructing a catholic 
community inclusive of diverse understanding of Korean identity within the one 
church.  
 
2. Migrants Old and New  
 
This thesis will examine concepts related to the identity of old migrants and new 
migrants. The old migrants are those who had been born, grown up and become 
Christians in the Northern territory before they migrated to South to search for 
freedom of their faith after partition (1945) or during the Korean War (1950-1953). 
	
Since migrating they have lived as citizens of South Korea and as Christians. In this 
thesis this community will be identified as Christian Wolnammin. Wolnammin
5
 is a 
combination of the three Chinese characters wol, nam and min. Wol may be translated 
as ‘migration’, nam as ‘the South’ and min as ‘people’ or ‘person.’ Thus, Wolnammin 
literally means ‘people migrated to the South.’ The number of North Korean 
Wolnammin who emigrated to the South is estimated to be approximately 800,000 
(1945-1950) and 600,000 (1950-1953), making a total of 1,400,000. It has been 
argued that 5.15 % of the total number of migrants from North Korea between 1945 




On the other hand, in this thesis new migrant Christians will be identified as 
Christian Saeteomin. Saeteomin
7
 is a combination of three Chinese characters sae, 
5
 Wolnammin are defined as “Refugees displaced from North Korea to the South due to the 
Korean Division and the Korean War.” See Kim Gwi-ok, “The Identities of Wolnammin in 
Resettlement Villages of South Korea: The cases of “Abai Village” at Sokcho and “Yongji 
Farmland” at Kimje.”  Ph. D. Sociology, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999. Gwi-ok 
Kim, The Identity and Life Experiences of Wolnammin, Seoul: Seoul National University 
Press, 1999. Gwi-ok Kim, A Korean Community of Internal Diaspora: The Identities of 
Wolnammin in Sokcho, South Korea, Development and Society, Volume 30 Number 1, June 
2001, pp. 27-50.  
6
 Jo Hyeong and Bak Myeo-seon, “Bukhan Chulsin Wolnammin wa Jeongchak Gwajeong eul 
Tonghaeseo Bon Nambukhan Sahoegujo eui Bigyo”, Bundansidae wa Hanguksahoe, (“A 
Comparison of Social Structure of North and South Korea in light of the process of 
resettlement of migrants from North Korea”, The Partition Era and the Society of Korea), 
Seoul: Kkachi,1985, pp. 150-151. 
It is worth noting how the South Korean people have perceived Saeteomin, calling them 
“Kuisun Yongsa”, “Talbukja” and Saeteomin. In fact, Saeteomin have been allotted different 
identities according to the changing external contexts around them. J. Kang categorizes 
Saeteomin into several periods, each of which is signified along with the concurrent support 
laws and titles. This identifies Saeteomin’ changing identities based on Kang’s timeframe. 
Image of heroic defectors (1962-1993). The image of the first generation of Saeteomin can 
be recapitulated as “ Kuisun Yongsa” (this means heroic defectors). These defectors were a 
remnant of the Cold War between the two Koreas. They were mostly soldiers. 
North Korean “escapees” (1994-2002). A large number of defectors who were mostly 
labourers  crossed the borders to China and chose South Korea as their final destination due 
to the increased instability in the North Korean regime. They were and are still called 
“Talbukja” (this means “people who escaped from the North). 
Residents in a new land (2003-present). Contemporary Saeteomin have increasingly diverse 
reasons for defection, including a longing for a new life and a curiosity about capitalism. The 
	
teo and min. Sae may be translated as ‘new’, teo as ‘land’ and min as ‘people’ or 
‘person.’ Thus, Saeteomin literally means people who live in a new place. This name 
was introduced to refer to these new migrants by the government in 2005.
8
 The 
Saeteomin share many things in common with the Wolnammin because they come 
from the same geographical area and belonged to the migrant category; but, 
significantly, in terms of ideological background, they are diametrically opposed.  
 
Table 1: The number of North Korean Saeteomin arriving in South Korea (11.10.2008)
9
   
 
Christian Saeteomin had been born, grown up and lived in North Korea
10
 until they 
escaped from North Korea. They were not Christians when they lived in North Korea 
and took refuge in South Korea via various countries such as China, Cambodia and 
other Asian countries after 1998. A significant number of these Saeteomin now living 
influx continued from the mid 1990s. See, J. Kang, The Distinction from South Korean 
Society on North Korean minority in South Korea, unpublished Master Dissertation, 2002, 
Seoul: Hanyang University, See, Lee Romee, Locating “Refugees” in the “Elite” Place: 
Analysis of Experiences of North Korean Defectors in South Koreans Universities, Thinking 
Beyond Borders: Global Ideas, Globla Values, 27
th
 National Conference 2008 at the 
University of British Columbia, Janet Groen and Shibao Guo, ed., p. 220. Available from; 
http://www.oise.utoronto.ca; accessed on 5
th
 of November 2008.  
North Korea Defectors, available from; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean_defectors; accessed on 5
th
 of November 2008.  
The Index of South Korea, available from; http://www.index.go.kr; accessed on 11 October 
2008. 
Politically, North Korea was born on 15 August 1945 when Korea was liberated after 
thirty-six years of Japanese colonial occupation. The Korean peninsula was divided by the 
38
th
 parallel according to a secret agreement between the USA and the former USSR as part 
of the Yalta Treaty. Northern Korea indicates also the territory of North Korea before partition 
of Korea in 1945. See, Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the 
Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, vol.1, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
1981, pp. 109-110.
Year 1954~1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Total 876 71 148 312 583 1,139 1,281 1,894 1,383 2,019 2,544 12,250 
Male 778 53 90 180 294 514 468 626 422 510 569 4,504 
  Female 98 18 58 132 289 625 813 1,268 961 1,509 1,975 7,746 
	
as citizens of South Korea became Christians while in other countries or when they 
arrived in South Korea. The number of Saeteomin from North Korea is shown in the 
above table; over 80 % of the Saeteomin are Christians, perhaps influenced by the 
great help they received from Korean missionaries working in the various Asian 
countries when they were escaping to and entering South Korea.  
Until 1997, only a few dozen Saeteomin from North Korea entered South Korea 
annually. In 1998 the number increased to 71 and more sharply to 148 in 1999. The 
pace of entry has accelerated in the past seven years: 312 Saeteomin entered in 2000, 
583 in 2001, 1,139 in 2002, 1,281 in 2003, 1,894 in 2004, 1,383 in 2005, 2,019 in 
2006 and 2,544 in 2007. The total number surpassed 10,000 in February 2007 and 
was 12,254 by the end of 2007. 
 
Diagram 1   Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin 
 
          Christian Saeteomin        Christian Wolnammin  
The Period of Common Background ( to 1945)  
In The Northern Territory 
Liberation (1945) 
The Korean War (1950-1953) 
                                           North Korea 
 
 From 1998 
 
                                           South Korea  
 
 
Encountering in Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
 Born and grew up in the North  Born and grew up in the North 
Migration to the South via other 
countries (1998 -the present) 
Migration directly to the South 
(1945-1953)  
Became Christians in the other 
countries or in South Korea 
Became Christians mainly in the 
North before migration 
 Citizens and Christians in South Korea (The Present) 
 
The reason for the significant increase is that the North Korean Saeteomin 
desperately tried to enter South Korea because they feared repatriation while staying 
in China, Cambodia and other Asian countries. They lived in hiding in order to avoid 


being discovered by authorities linked to the North Korean government.
11
  
Although Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin had a common 
background before the liberation from Japan (1945), this changed dramatically during 
the post-liberation period socio-politically, ideologically, and culturally. 
On the one hand, Christian Wolnammin followed a staunchly anti-communist 
ideology informed by the theological conservatism of the Northwestern territory. They 
have adhered to an anti-communist ideology during the Korean War (1950-1953) and 
the Cold War. On the other hand, the Christian Saeteomin used to live under the 
political system of Communism and Juche (self-reliance)
12
 ideology in North Korea 
and they had been influenced by Juche ideology until they escaped from North Korea. 
The two Christian groups thus have a common background but lived in a very 
different context for over half a century. The perception both groups had of their 
common historical background leads them to expect little difficulty when re-united.    
However, they were disappointed by the conflict discovered during their encounter. 
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of identity on the encounter of 
members of the two communities in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The theological 
implications will also be demonstrated and a solution for a harmonious coexistence 
will be proposed based on critical reflections upon the theology of Juergen Moltmann, 
fulfilment theology, Miroslav Volf and Lim Dong-won. 

Ha Chung-yoube, The Visit to Pyongyang and the Observation of the Route of Escape’s 
Circumstance, unpublished, 2007, pp. 33-35. Current Situation of North Korean Saeteomin, 
available from; http://www.northkoreanSaeteomin.com; and http://hangenie.com; Accessed 
on 11 October 2008.
The word literally means subject, or self-reliance. The definition of Juche will be dealt 
with in detail in chapter 2. 
	




The term kratophany literally rendered is “the appearance of power.”
13
 In common 
understanding, as clearly we all affect each other in countless ways all the time, power 
is said to mean that A in some way affects B, and the underlying concept of power is 
“A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.”
14
 
However, Steven Lukes criticizes such a definition of power as being mistaken 
because it confines the discussion to binary relations between actors assumed to have 
unitary interests and fails to consider the ways in which everyone’s interests are 
multiple.
15
 He defines power as the imposition of internal constraints by which 
people “are led to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or 
adapting to being dominated in coercive and non-coercive settings.”
16
 Andre 
Droogers points out that power emanates from the system and it is used in both the 
structure and process approaches,
17
 which means not that one exercises power over 
the other but that one acts and thinks according to the system in the structure. In this 
thesis the notion of power which should be emphasized is that A may exercise power 
over B not by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but by influencing, 

Mircea Eliade, ed., The Encyclopedia of Religion, New York: MacMillan Publishing 
Company, vol., 11, 1987, p. 467. 
Steven Lukes, Power A Radical View, Published in association with the British 
Sociological Association, 2005, pp. 12, 37.
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
Ibid., pp. 13, 30.
Andre Droogers, Religious Reconciliation: A View from the Social Science, Jerald D. Gort, 
Henry Jansen, Hendrik M. Vroom, ed., Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith 
Ideals and Realities, Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2002, p. 12. 





3.2 Ethnic Identity  
 
The word ethnic, comes from the Greek: ethnikas means nation. Ethos, in Greek, 
means custom, disposition or trait. Ethnikas and ethos taken together therefore can 
mean a band of people (nation) living together who share and acknowledge common 
customs. The second part of the phrase, identity, has Latin origins and is derived from 
the word identitas; the word is formed from idem meaning same. Thus, the word is 
used to express the notion of sameness, likeness, and oneness. More precisely, identity 
means “the sameness of a person or thing at all times in all circumstances; the 
condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else.”
19
 Combining 
the definitions and interpretations of identity and ethnicity it can be concluded that 
they mean, or at the minimum imply, the sameness of a band or nation of people who 
share common customs, traditions, historical experiences, and in some instances 
geographical residence.   
 In common understanding, ethnic identity is the product of deep-seated values 
and ethnicity “refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider 
themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive.”
20
 It is not, 
however, fixed, for the crucial point which must be stressed is that ethnicity is a social 
process shaped both from the inside and the outside: by self-definition of the members 
of the ethnic population and by ascription of other groups. In other word, ethnic 
identity is changeable in accordance with mutual interactions.           

Steven Lukes, Op.Cit., p. 27. 
19
 J.A. Simpson, & E.S. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary (2
nd
 ed., Vol. ), Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 620. 
20
 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives. 
London: Pluto Press, 1993, p. 4. 

4. Limitations  
 
Although seeking to be comprehensive this thesis will be limited in the following 
ways:  
- As regards Christian Wolnammin this thesis does not attempt to cover the whole 
northern territory, but will rather focus on the North-western territory, since the 
founder and its early congregation of Youngnak Presbyterian Church came from this 
region. 
- It will also focus on the Presbyterian denomination, because the North-western 
territory was originally predominantly controlled by the North American Presbyterian 
Mission, under the ‘Comity Arrangement.’
21
 This research will not cover all the 
South Korean churches established by Christian Wolnammin,
22
 but limits its scope to 




 This speaks of the division policy of the mission area between the missionaries in Korea. 
See H. A. Rhodes, ed., History of the Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., volume 1, 
1884-1934, Seoul: The Presbyterian Church of Korea Department of Education, 1984, pp. 
440-443. 
According to Kang In-cheol, in case of the Korean Presbyterian Churches, Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church of Han Kyung-chik, Baul Presbyterian Church of Song Chang-keun and 
Kyoungdong Presbyterian Church were established in Seoul in December, 1945. More 48 
Presbyterian Churches were established in Seoul or Incheon from 1946 to 1948. See, Kang 
In-cheol, Hankukui Kaesinkyowa Bankongjuui (An Anti-Communism and a Protestant of 
Korea), Seoul: Jungsim, 2007, pp. 435-436.  
23
 Here is a summary of chronology of Kyung-chik Han’s life 
- 1902: Born in Northwestern territory, in Korea. 
- 1925: Graduated from Soongsil College, Pyongyang in Korea (BS) 
- 1926: Graduated from College of Emporia in Emporia, Kansas (BA). 
- 1929: Graduated from Princeton Theological Seminary in New Jersey (BD). 
- 1933: Ordained by Euisan Presbytery, Presbyterian Church of Korea. 
- 1933-1942: Pastor, The Second Presbyterian Church in Shinuiju, North Korea. 
- 1945: Migration from North Korea to South Korea. 
- 1945-1973: Founder and Pastor of Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Seoul. 
- 1973-2000: Pastor Emeritus, Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Seoul. 
- 1992: Templeton Award. 
- 2000: Passed away 
See, May the Words of My Mouth, Seoul Korea: Youngnak Presbyterian Church of the Korean 
Presbyterian Church & Sun Media Publishing Co.Ltd.,2002, pp.372-376, published in honor 
of him by the Memorial Committee of Rev. Han Kyung-chik’s 100
th
 Birthday Anniversary, 

- As regards Christian Saeteomin this thesis does not attempt to include all the 
Saeteomin after the ceasefire of the Korean War, but will focus on Saeteomin students 
attending the Bible Study Class for Free People
24
 in Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
who came to South Korea in or after 1998 when the significant increase in the number 
of Saeteomin began.  
 
5. Necessity of Research 
 
There is one PhD thesis in South Korea on the Wolnammin. It is written from the 
perspective of sociology and is entitled The Identities of Wolnammin in Resettlement 
Villages of South Korea: The cases of “Abai Village” at Sokcho and “Yongji 
Farmland” at Kimje (Jeongchakchon Wolnamminui Saenghwalgyeongheomgwa 
Jeongcheseong: Sokcho ‘Abaimaeul’ kwa Gimje ‘Yongjinongwon’eul Jungsimeuro), 
written by Kim Kwi-ok at the department of sociology in Seoul National University, 
1999. The thesis examines the process of identity formation of Wolnammin in 
resettlement villages through field research and in-depth interviews. It argues that the 
identity of an individual is formed by their experiences with their social conditions. In 
the case of Wolnammin, they forged their particular identities in the resettlement 
villages. This thesis reveals that the Wolnammin’s everyday experiences and identities 
are not monolithic, but heterogeneous. In addition, it sheds new light on the unknown 
and forgotten stories of Wolnammin in South Korea. 
However, the thesis does not deal with the identities of Christian Wolnammin and 

Saeteomin have been called ‘Free People’ by Youngnak Presbyterian Church since 1998. 
The Bible Study Class for Free People began in 1999 in Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 
order that the CW teach the Bible to the CS. This class has been gathered in the church every 
Sunday since then. See, The Centre of Mission Toward North Korea, Jayuui Saram 
Seongkyeongban 7nyeonui Baljachwi (7 Years’ Traces of the Bible Study Class), Seoul: 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church, 2007, p. 17. 

Christian Saeteomin. Instead, it focuses on “Abai village,” where those who came 
from the North-Eastern territory lived. In contrast my study focuses on those who 
came from the North-Western territory, and focuses more on ‘religion’, although my 
research shares some of the methodology with Kim Kwi-ok.  
In South Korea there have been excellent achievements in the field of North 
Korean studies in particular in sociology, Korean literature, Korean history, politics 
and economics despite the “government-controlled Cold War ideology.”
25
However, in 
the case of North Korean Saeteomin there have been few studies conducted in South 
Korea. The number of articles written between from 1990 to 2005 is just 24,
26
 
covering political, psychological and economical aspects of settlement and adjustment 
in South Korea. None of them cover theology or identity, and all develop their 
argument on the assumption that North Koreans are essentially the same as South 
Koreans. While the number of North Korean Saeteomin entering South Korea has 
increased sharply, the number of PhD theses on the studies of the North Korean 
Saeteomin in South Korean universities from 1997 to 2005 was just 13; not a single 
one of these was in the field of religion at the time of writing.  
 









Ryu Seong-Min, “A Study of Religion in North Korea”, in Society of North Korean 
Studies ed. Bundan Bameki Bukhan Yeongusa, (A History of North Korean Studies during the 
Half Century of Division), Seoul, Hanul, 1999, p. 483.  
26
 Jeong Eun-mee, Bukhanyeongubangbeopeuroseo Tarbukja Josaui Hwalyonggwa 
Yeongudonghyang, (Application and Trend of Researches on North Korean Saeteomin as a 
Method of North Korea Studies), Seoul: Modern North Korea studies, vol.8, no.3, 2005. pp. 
151-152.  
This distribution of PhD theses is the result of reference which the researcher searched for 
PhD theses in the Website of the National Assembly Library on the 2
nd
 of April 2005. 
Field Politics Psychology Education Sociology Religion 
Theses No. 6 4 2 1 0 

Among the 13 PhD theses, it is worth touching briefly on the one sociological 
thesis. The title of the thesis is A Synthetic Comparative Study on the Adaptation 
Patterns of North Korean Adolescent Saeteomin in South Korea 
(Bukhanitalcheongsonyeonui Namhansahoe Jeokeungyuhyeonge Kwanhan 
Tonghapjeok Bigyoyeongu), written by Kim Hyoung-tae at the department of Social 
Work in Soongsil University in 2004. He studied the relationship between 
geographical characteristics, characteristics which existed before (e.g. motivation for 
leaving) and after resettlement (e.g. relationship patterns with South Koreans) and 
adaptation patterns (psychological, social, adaptive, maladaptive) in Saeteomin 
adolescents. Kim Hyoung-tae found that comprehensive efforts need to be made to 
eradicate prejudice and discriminatory practices towards North Korean Saeteomin in 
South Korea because having positive psycho-emotional experiences in South Korea 
seemed to help North Korean adolescent Saeteomin’s social adaptation. Therefore, it 
is important to accept North Koreans as natural members of society and assist them to 
integrate as quickly as possible. Even though Kim’s thesis did not cover the identity 
of Saeteomin, it supports the necessity for my study insofar as I propose a theological-
biblical strategy aimed at the smooth integration of Saeteomin based on acceptance.  
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the number of Christian Saeteomin has 
increased significantly in South Korean churches and that there are serious 
misunderstandings between Christian Saeteomin and other believers in the churches, 
there has been no research on them in the form of a PhD thesis at all in Korea. On a 
practical level, the lack of research on Christian Saeteomin has contributed to the 
failure of their settlement and adjustment in the churches, resulting in their leaving the 
churches which helped them, sometimes setting up churches of their own. This lack of 
theological studies on North Korean Saeteomin underlines the necessity for this 

research. In other words, a plethora of books and articles are published every year on 
the issue of unification from political, economic, military etc. aspects while the 
difficulties between Christian Saeteomin and other believers in South Korean 
churches is totally neglected. This thesis will be the first to deal with the identities of 
Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin, and their role in intra-church relations.  
 
6. Methodology  
 
This study will utilize a social anthropological methodology in order to analyze the 
content and meaning of the identities of Christian Wolnammin and Christian 
Saeteomin and will utilize a theological approach to reflect on potential exclusion and 
embrace in order to find a practical solution for the construction of a harmonious 
catholic community. 
First of all, this study will have to consider a critique of postmodern anthropology 
when writing ethnography. Postmodernists reject both grand theory in anthropology 
and the notion of completeness in ethnographic description. In a wider sense, 
postmodern anthropology criticizes the creation of the ‘other’ and the consequent 
definition of the ‘self’. In other words, a postmodern anthropologist would claim that 
there is no true, complete statement that can be made about a culture. In Writing 
Culture
28
, a number of contributors examine the intrusion of power relations in the 
ethnographic process. James Clifford, in the introduction to the book of which he was 
the editor, attacks the idea of ethnography as a representation of the wholeness of 
culture and stresses the incompleteness of ethnographic expression, even in the hands 
28
 This book is anthropology’s premier classic postmodernist text, based on a conference 
on ‘The Making of Ethnographic Texts’, held in Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1984, see, James 
Clifford and George E. Marcus, ed. Writing Culture The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986. 

of indigenous scholars, arguing that ethnography is a kind of ‘poetry’. His article 
entitled ‘Ethnographic Allegory’ is decidedly literary in character, and focuses on ‘the 
narrative character of cultural representations’.
29
  
Postmodernists have pointed out that ethnography in the colonial era represented a 
tool in the hands of oppressive colonial governments and multi-national corporations. 
However, some of their opinions appear to be difficult to accept. For example, Ernest 
Gellner challenged postmodernism because of the postmodernists’ misplaced attacks 
on the stated objectivism of European colonial ethnography.
30
 Alan Barnard also 
criticizes James Clifford who insists on the recognition of ethnography as a kind of 
‘poetry’, declaring that anthropology should not dissolve into literary criticism.
31
 
Whatever the anthropological debate, one outcome is clear; the researcher needs to 
place him/herself before the reader.   
I am an indigenous Korean researcher and a descendant of Christian Wolnammin. 
My father and mother made a sudden escape from the city of Pyongyang in North 
Korea when bombs were being dropped during the Korean War, leaving my seven-
year old eldest brother at that time in my uncle’s house in the countryside which was 
located in Shinuiju town and migrating from the North to the South. I was born in 
South Korea and grew up socialized as an anti-communist, expecting the North 
Korean people to have horns on their heads. I worked, as an ordained pastor, in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church from 1998 for 5 years. 
It must be admitted that, to begin with, I was afraid the first time that I met a 
Saeteomin in South Korea in 1998 but I realized that he was a human being like 
myself. On the other hand, as an assistant pastor of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, 
29
 Ibid., p.100. 
Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 22-79.  
31
 Alan Barnard, History and Theory in Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 
173. 
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when I officially visited them to assist in a children’s hospital in North Korea on 10 
November, 2000, I also was afraid of visiting North Korea and meeting the North 
Koreans. However, I came to repent my sin of being afraid of making friends with 
them and then I embraced them and made friends with them in North Korea. After 
that I visited North Korea four more times. Since that first meeting in 1998, I have 
met more over 1,700 Saoteomin in South Korea up to 2002, sharing the Gospel with 
them and hugging many of them. The visits to North Korea and the experiences of 
meeting the Saeteomin made me change my attitude toward the North Korean people 
and Saeteomin.  
In October 2006 I began to undertake field work in South Korea, North Korea and 
China until April 2007. As a participant observer, I joined the Bible Study Class of 
over 80 Christian Saeteomin on Sundays for six months in order to observe issues 
associated with the content and meaning of identity and its acting out in church life. 
During this period I did not preach at all in order to distance myself from the subject 
of my research and I tried to treat the Christian Saeteomin and the Christian 
Wolnammin teachers equally.  
I carried out in-depth interviews with 21 Christian Saeteomin living in South 
Korea and China and with 16 Christian Wolnammin in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. 
 
Table 3: The Statistical Table of In-Depth Interviews with 21 Christian Saeteomin 
  
20-50 Years Old    Over 50 Years Old Age  
            17          4 
Male Female Gender 
            11          10 
Semi-Literate Educated Education 
            0          21 
Baptism  Not Baptism Baptism   





Table 4: The Statistical Table of In-Depth Interviews with 16 Christian Walnammin 
   
20-50 Years Old    Over 50 Years Old Age 
            5          11 
Male Female Gender 
            10           6 
Semi-Literate Educated Education 
            0          16 
Baptism  Not Baptism Baptism   
           16           0 
 
It was still difficult for South Koreans to visit North Korea during that time. 
However, I was able to visit North Korea again with the permission of the two 
governments to support the North Korean hospital, to collect materials, and to observe 
the identity background of the North Korean people.  
Most importantly, I visited North Korea between 24 February to 28 February 2007 
to scrutinize Juche ideology in order to understand the identity formation and 
background of the North Korean Saeteomin. I visited places where the North Korean 
people go for a Juche study visit: Kim Il Sung Square, Grand People’s Study House, 
Mansudae Grand Monument, Chollima Statue, Tower of Juche Idea, Arch of Triumph, 
Monument to Three Chapter of National Reunification, and Old Home in 
Mangyongdae etc., buying and collecting over 40 books and other relevant research 
materials. Essentially, I was able to meet with many North Koreans to help understand 
first hand the impact of Juche ideology in their lives. Clearly, this is not long enough 
for detailed field-work: it was the maximum length of visit possible.        
Moreover, I followed their escape route from North Korea, via China, to 
understand their circumstances and their experiences. At the border between China 
and North Korea I was able to meet a Christian North Korean female. She crossed to 
China to obtain food and was kidnapped and was sold by traffickers to a farm worker 
in rural China. After three years escaped to the border of North Korea, longing to be 
	
reunited with her husband and son who live in North Korea. I was able to interview 
her for two days in a secret location. The interview has proved to be immensely 
helpful in understanding the background of the North Korean refugees through her 
description of her remarkable circumstances and experiences.  
It is important to note that any selection of respondents are based primarily on 
theoretical considerations, in particular keeping in mind that the purpose of 
ethnographic interviews was to obtain a variety of interpretations rather than to seek 
consistencies in responses in order to develop statistical generalizations, as Charlotte 
Aull Davies points out.
32
 After conducting these in-depth interviews, I returned to 
Edinburgh, carried out an in-depth analysis of the ethnography, and put them into each 
chapter of this thesis. 
According to Davies, there are three types of interview: unstructured interviewing, 
structured interviewing and semi-structured interviewing. I combined semi-structured 
interviews with participant observation in my research. The interviews were formally 
bracketed, and set apart in time and space. I made sure that the interviewee was aware 
that I was there as an ethnographer and he or she as an informant. Furthermore, I had 
previously decided on interview schedules consisting of a set of written questions and 
a very informal list of memorized topics. However, in contrast to structured 
interviews, I sometimes had to alter the wording and order of these questions, 
omitting some that seemed inappropriate during the interview. On other occasions 
informants introduced new topics and asked questions not included on the list. 
Respondents were encouraged to expand on a response, or digress, go off topic or 
introduce their own concerns. Most importantly, their responses were open-ended, in 
their own words and not restricted to preconceived notions of the ethnographer. 

Charlotte Aull Davies, Reflexive Ethnography A Guide to Researching Selves and Others, 
London and New York: Routledge. 1999, pp. 98-99.

According to Davies, research based primarily on semi-structured interviewing has 
become very popular, providing an important form of qualitative research across the 




  Charlotte Aull Davies spells out ethical issues in qualitative research and the 
researcher’s obligations to research participants, including informed consent, 
confidentiality and avoiding harm to the participants.
34
 It was important to keep in 
mind the ethical issues involved in research. Research is powerful and can harm or 
exploit people. It was important that the researcher has kept the highest ethical 
standards in carrying out his research and in publishing data. I followed Davies’ 
model of practical ethical responsibilities, one of which is assurances of anonymity to 
guard privacy and personal information and assurances of confidentiality of the 
informants regarding the use of the data.
35
 
   Since the Christian North Korean Saeteomin live in fear of exposure of their real 
name and private information, I, as an ethnographer, have an obligation to protect the 
privacy of interviewees and so invented names for my interviewees. 
Furthermore, I, as an indigenous Korean researcher and simultaneous writer of 
ethnography, have to consider the critique of James Clifford for the complete 
statement of ethnography. Since I am a descendant of Christian Wolnammin I have to 
take into account my bias while writing ethnographic description. This is not an easy 
task, especially striking a balance between being a detached observer and being a 
integrated participant. I need to apply this to myself in escaping from subjectivity to a 
position of objectivity. In this sense, I must listen attentively to the voice of Elizabeth 

Ibid. pp. 94-95.
Ibid., pp. 53-73. 
Ibid., p. 59.

Koepping, she states that “until researchers have worked through an unsure position 
and come out on side or the other, they are still in thrall to the data,” placing 
emphasis on the equality and openness.
36
 She points also out, in terms of her 
reflection on her field work, that if she had refused to open up and share or if she had 
refused to be focus of the Other’s interest and questions or if she had coolly kept her 
ideas out of the exchange as she stayed on her academic high-horse, her ethnographic 
description would have been a manipulative sham.
37
 This indicates that becoming an 
integrated participant and escaping from being a detached observer are of significant 
importance to ethnographic researchers. In addition, I must heed the suggestions of 
Charlotte Aull Davies who outlined the task of the interviewer as follows: it is 1) to 
direct revelations to topics of interest, 2) to avoid unduly influencing their narrative, 





7. Theoretical Frames and Approach 
 
Alan Barnard says anthropologists have shown more and more that they are happy 
to mix approaches and utilize different theoretical traditions.
39
 While considering the 
postmodern perspective of James Clifford, the present study will combine three 
approaches: first, the three dimensional power analysis of Steven Lukes will be used 
to shed light on the formation of the different identities in the target population in Part 
One; second, the thick description method by Clifford Geertz in order to understand 

Elizabeth Koepping, Food, Friends and Funerals: On Lived Religion (Antropology of 
Religion), Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008, pp. 195-196. Italics are Elizabeth Koepping’s
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Charlotte Aull Davies, Op.Cit., p. 96. Italics are mine.
Alan Barnard, Op.Cit., pp. 174-175.

the content and meaning of identities in Part Two; third, the metaphorical lens of 
exclusion and embrace of Miroslav Volf in order to offer a theological solution out of 
exclusion in the context of Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Part Three. At this point 
it is worth describing the three approaches briefly. This will be done in greater detail 
in each Part. 
Three dimensional power is not the nomal exercise of power by which you can 
exercise power over others by getting them to do what they do not want to do, but the 
supreme exercise of power by which you can get others to have the desires you want 
and through which you can secure their compliance by effectively controlling their 
thoughts and desires.
40
 On this perspective, the formation of identity of the CW and 
the CS which has stemmed from the two contrasting ideologies for half a century will 
be analyzed. 
 The two groups socialized by the two contrasting ideologies have mutual different 
material, verbal and behavioural symbols, one result of which is to create exclusion of 
each other unless the symbols are interpreted. A thick description of a human 
behaviour is one that explains not just the behaviour,
41
 but its context as well, by 
which the verbal and the behavioural symbols of the CW and the CS become 
meaningful to each other.  
The two groups need a solution of the problem of exclusion to create a catholic 
community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church because exclusion has been triggered 
by their different identities within Youngnak Presbyterian Church. This thesis will use 
the metaphorical lens of exclusion and embrace which is a theological analysis of the 
process of exclusion that leads to contempt and violence and the process of 

Steven Lukes, Power A Radical View, Published in association with the British 
Sociological Association, 2005, p. 26.
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, London: Hutchinson of London, 1975, p. 
207, pp. 7, 208-212. 





8. Structure and Sources of the Study 
 
8.1. Structure of the Study 
 
This thesis will be divided into three parts and each part will be sub-divided into 
two chapters as follows:  
Part One analyzes the emergence and developments of the contrasting two 
ideologies, anti-communist ideology and Juche ideology, which influenced the 
formation of the different ethnic identities of the two groups. These ideologies were 
imposed on the communities by their respective states.  
 
Chapterwill describe the emergence and socialization of an anti-communist 
ideology of the CW with reference to the process and formation of identity of 
Christian Wolnammin, which made the CW negative toward North Korea, its regime, 
its people, and consequently the CS.  
Chapter  will investigate the emergence and development of Juche ideology 
which influenced the formation of identity of North Koreans, in order to understand 
the contemporary identity of Christian Saeteomin living in South Korea. 
 
Part Two will move on to 1998 when the two groups first encountered each other 
in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The two groups expected to overcome their 
differences soon because they firmly believed that they were unified on the grounds 

Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, 
and Reconciliation Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, p. 29.

of one ethnicity. However, they began to discover that it was very difficult for them to 
live together. The consequence for the two groups was mutual disappointment and 
misunderstandings about the acceptability and interpretations of their different 
identities, which produced potential exclusion in their community.  
 
Chapter  will analyze the Christian Saeteomin’s material and verbal symbols 
and behaviour patterns seen in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and the impact of these 
on both communities.  
Chapter  will describe the Christian Wolnammin’s material and verbal symbols 
and behaviour patterns seen in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and the impact of these 
on both communities.  
 
Part Three is concerned with finding a theological solution for exclusion and will 
offer a practical strategy to create a harmonious catholic community.  
 
Chapter will investigate the missiological position of the text book used for 
teaching Saeteomins in the Bible Study Group for Free People run by Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church. It will be demonstrated that the textbook is based on fulfilment 
theology and as such, reveals a more favourable Christian Wolnammin attitude toward 
the Christian Saeteomin.  
Chapter will describe the fundamental necessity for creating space by 
repentance and forgiveness as described by Miroslav Volf. Once there is space in the 
minds of the members of the two communities for acceptance they will be able to 






Investigative approaches included library and internet research, as well as 
organizing and processing data.  The researcher has gathered data from various 
institutions and sources for the review of literature. Information regarding the nature 
of Juche ideology is more difficult to gather than information related to South Korean 
anti-communism. In fact, previous research of Juche ideology has been a restricted 
subject for South Koreans because of both national security and the lack of original 
data from North Korea. However, the South Korean government has recently 
encouraged scholars to study Juche ideology in preparation for the future reunification 
of Korea. Consequently more sources are available now. In addition the researcher has 
gathered books on North Korean studies during his six visits to North Korea. In 
particular, he could gather various materials through the help of North Korean 
officials during a 2007 visit. 
The researcher’s main sources of literature include the National Assembly Library 
of South Korea, the Library of the Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary, 
the Library of University of North Korea Studies, the Sejong Institute, and the 
Research Institute for National Unification and other sources in South Korea.  
More data was collected through the nationwide interlibrary loan (ILL) system. 
Besides obtaining print media data, the researcher accessed information electronically 
including North Korean internet sites for review of literature. The internet is one of 
the most powerful research methods today, offering up-to-date data. It is arguably the 
best source from which to obtain the most recent news of North Korea. In addition to 
the Daily South and North Korean News sites for the research of Juche ideology, the 

researcher has also collected the latest data through various the internet sites related to 




http://www.cnet-ta.ne.jp/Juche; http://www.dprkorea.com; http://www.kcna.co.jp;  
http://www.kimsoft.com; http://www.korea-up.co.jp; http://www.koreascope.org; 
http://www.okf.org; http://www.fas.org; http://www.darkwing.uoregon.edu; 
http://www.nkhumanright.or.kr; http://www.rini.hally.ac.kr/; http://www.nis.go.kr/; 





The Emergence and Evolution of the Contrasting Ideologies 
in Relation to the Formation of Ethnic Identity of Migrants 
Old and New 
 
Introduction   
    
In Part One I willanalyze the emergence and development of the two contrasting 
ideologies, anti-communist ideology and Juche ideology, which influenced the 
formation of the different ethnic identities of the two groups, the CW and the CS.    
The North Koreans have been controlled by Juche ideology of the state, while the 
South Korean people have been socialized by an anti-communist ideology of the state. 
The formation of self- identities created by the state ideology leave no space to accept 
the other.   
This Part is important to this study because it is necessary that we should 
understand the origins and development of the two ideologies in the society of the two 
groups to understand the background of the formation of the heterogeneous ethnic 
identity of the two groups with which next Part will deal.  
 
1. Theoretical Frame     
 
On the one hand, Christian Saeteomin were indoctrinated with Juche ideology 
until they left North Korea, which influenced their patterned behaviour and perception 
of identity while they lived in North Korea, before they converted to Christianity. The 
patterned behaviour and perceptions are still demonstrated in the everyday life of 


Christian Saeteomin in spite of the fact that they became Christians and citizens of 
South Korea.  
On the other hand, Christian Wolnammin have their structured behaviour 
influenced by the fact that they have remained anti-communist, which influences their 
stance towards North Korea and its people. Their structured behaviour and 
perceptions are revealed while encountering Christian Saeteomin.  
In order to analyze how the structured behaviours of the two groups were formed, 
I will utilize Lukes’ perspective of three-dimensional power.  
Steven Lukes, in his book Power: A Radical View, points out what effects power 
has on actors within the system. The three-dimensional power concept
44
 is the 
supreme exercise of power which secures the compliance of others by controlling 
their thoughts and desires. Accordingly, the socially structured, culturally patterned 
behaviour of groups and practices of institutions leads people to automatic action 
when facing certain circumstances.
45
 The three-dimensional power concept 
represents an almost insidious exercise of power. 
 
to prevent people from having grievances by shaping their perception, cognitions and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either 
because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and 




From the perspective of three-dimensional power, I shall describe and analyze how 

According to Steven Lukes, there are pluralists, which he calls the one-dimensional view, 
the view of their critics he calls the two-dimensional view, and a third view of power he calls 
the three-dimensional view. The pluralists see their focus on behaviour in the making of 
decisions. This definition of power is that A can or does succeed in affecting what B does. 
Two-dimensional power involves examining both decision-making and nondecision-making. 
See, Steven Lukes, Power A Radical View, Published in association with the British 
Sociological Association, 2005, pp. 18-22. 
Steven Lukes expresses it as ‘individuals’ inaction’. See, Steven Lukes, Op.Cit., p. 26. 
Steven Lukes, Op.Cit., p. 28.
	
the patterned behaviour of the CS was formed by Juche ideology before they left 
North Korea. Their patterned behaviour derived from the North Korean government 
achieving the obedience of North Korean people through Juche ideology. The way of 
thinking of the North Korean people was imbued with the principle of Juche ideology.  
For example, when North Korean women who accompanied their football team 
came to South Korea and found Kim Jong-il’s photograph on the ground when it was 
raining, they began to cry because their leader was in the rain. The power of Juche 
ideology makes people conform to the wishes of their leaders. According to the 
testimony of Hwang Jang-yeop,
47
one of the most famous North Korean Saeteomin, 
North Korean people worried about their leader even when they were dying of 
starvation.  
 
Diagram 2 The Perspective of Three-Dimensional Power to Analyze Patterned Behaviour. 
 
The Perspective of         
Three-Dimensional Power
 
On the other hand, the Cold War ideology of the dictatorial South Korean 
government encouraged inflexible anti-communism among the people. The 
government controlled and mobilized people with a national security anti-communist 
ideology. The concepts of freedom of thought and expression were seen as threats to 
47
 He was the former chancellor in Kim Il-sung University, who stated that he became 
Christian when I met him in South Korea in 2001. His sister was a Christian in North Korea 
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national security. This led the South Koreans to having a static perception toward the 
North Koreans. For instance, when one of the women members of the church met a 
Christian Saeteomin, she told me that she was surprised at the fact that he did not 
have a horn on his head: she had been socialized by anti-communist ideology to 
regard North Koreans as monsters.  
It is also true that the CS have tried to adjust to the circumstances of South Korea. 
It is still difficult for the CW to understand the patterned behaviour of the CS, and 
conversely it is not easy for the CS to understand the structured behaviour of the CW. 
Therefore, this study will analyze how the socially structured and culturally patterned 
behaviour of the two groups were formed by the state ideologies, utilizing the 
perspective of the three-dimensional power. 

Chapter The Emergence and Development of Anti-
Communist Ideology and its Effect on the Formation of 




In this chapter I will describe the formation of the identity of the CW before the 
liberation from Japan (1945), and will explore the process of identity formation of the 
CW with reference to the origin of their anti-communist ideology, which was formed 
by 1) motivation behind the migration from North to South, 2) the experience of the 
Korean War (1950-1953) and 3) the sociological interaction in resettlement in South 
Korea (1954- the present).  
The hypothesis of this chapter is that anti-communist ideology was an influential 
factor in the formation of ethnic identity of the CW, and the anti-communist identity 
of the CW created a negative affect on their perception of the other Christian group, 
the CS, in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. 
 




The ethnic identity of the CW is the articulation of their experiences resulting from 
the social conditions that construct their ethnic identity. It is not only the product of 
cultural ideas from their experiences in the Northern territory, but also is a developing 

This study starts from 1874 because John Ross (1842-1915) began to meet Koreans at the 
border between Korea and China that year. He translated the New Testament into Korean, 
which significantly influenced the establishment of the first congregation in the Northwestern 
territory where is today in North Korea. See, Ha Chung -yoube, John Ross and Fulfilment 
Theology as His Missiological Position: Comparative Study of the Theological 
Understanding of John Ross and the Fourth Commission of the 1910 World Missionary 
Conference, and its Relevance for the Missionary Policy of the Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church, Seoul, MTh Dissertation, The University of Edinburgh, 2005.  

ethnic identity that they actively construct from the social relationships they have 
engaged in throughout their whole life. Before the CW migrated from North to South 
after the liberation from Japan (1945), they belonged to Northwestern Conservative 
Christianity.  
In this section I will first examine why Northwestern Conservative Christianity had 
an anti-communist standpoint, through investigating the viewpoints of Christian 
conservatives and communists on this matter and also approaching the question of 
national independence. 
Where did the theological tendency of Northwestern Conservative Christianity
derive from? Why did Northwestern Conservative Christianity grow rapidly 
theologically, culturally and socio-politically? During the rapid growth of 
Northwestern Conservative Christianity, why was it criticized by communists? How 
did Northwestern Conservative Christianity cope with such critique and ensuing 
conflict?
 
1. The Early Missionaries’ Two Theological Tendencies 
 
In order to understand where the theological tendency of Northwestern 
Conservative Christianity derived from, I will describe briefly the socio-political 
circumstances of Northern Korea and identify two different theological tendencies of 




 forms a bridge between the Korean peninsula and China, and 

The Northern territory in Korea, geographically, comprises the Pyungan and Whanghae
provinces in the North-West and Hamkyung province in the North-East. 

has therefore been an important place of passage. For instance, all historical religions 
in Korea, except Tonghak (an indigenous religion) came through the Northern route. 
This is also true for Christianity.  
From the mid 17th century, Northern Korean traders travelled to China, and 
regular markets were developed near the northern borders and harbours in order to 
overcome marginalization in a Korean economy dominated by the South. In the early 
19th century many poor peasants in Northern Korea fled to Manchuria or to Russia 
across the Korean border, because the domestic socio-political and economic situation 
of the Chosun dynasty seemed hopeless to them. For these reasons, Northerners 
developed social mobility, and were generally much more open to engagement with 
foreign civilization than the Southerners. 
Furthermore, politically, the central government closed the borders of Chosun, 
especially after the Opium War (1839-1842). In addition to Western colonial 
competition in China, the earlier spread of Catholicism in Chosun made the 
government fearful of Western colonial powers and so it developed the ‘Closed Door’ 
policy, as a means of protecting Chosun despite continuous pressure from colonial 
powers to open its markets. The policy resulted in several naval collisions. Finally, the 
government locked the door. The ‘Closed Door’ policy was an economic blow to 
Northern Korea, destroying its prospects for international trade.  





-of the Western missionaries who worked in China or Korea. On the 

This study chooses the classification of Alan Race among various classifications. He 
defined exclisivism as follows: “It counts the revelation in Jesus Christ as the sole criterion by 
which all religions, including Christianity, can be understood and evaluated.” See, Alan Race, 
Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions, London: 
SCM Press, 1983, p. 11. 
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 According to Race, “Inclusivism in the Christian theology of religions is both an 
acceptance and a rejection of the other faiths, a dialectical ‘yes’ and ‘no’. On one hand it 

one hand, with regard to ancestral reverence at that time most missionaries working in 
China regarded it as an infringement on the rights of God. However, John Ross
52
 
consistently acknowledged the ancestral ritual, denying that idolatry is an essential 
constituent of ancestral reverence, through both accepting the good in it and denying 
the idolatrous elements in it.
53
 This indicates that the missiological position of John 
Ross was inclusivism in terms of the definition of inclusivism of Alan Race
54
 that is 
both an acceptance and a rejection of the other faiths. Furthermore, Ha Chung-yoube 
insisted that the missiological position of John Ross was inclusivism in comparison 
with Commission of World Missionary Conference of 1910 Edinburgh.
55
 However, 
Ross could not have a very strong theological influence on Christianity in the northern 
territory because he failed to enter Korea due to the ‘Closed Door’ policy before the 
missionaries of the United States came to Korea.  
On the other hand, conservative Presbyterianism dominated Korea because the 
Presbyterian Church in the USA sent many conservative missionaries to Korea from 
1884.
56
 Most of the early American Presbyterian missionaries, including Horace G. 
accepts the spiritual power and depth manifest in them, so that they can properly be called a 
locus of divine presence. On the other hand, it rejects them as not being sufficient for 
salvation apart from Christ, for Christ alone is saviour.” See, Alan Race, Op.Cit., p. 38. 
John Ross (1842-1915), a missionary of Scotland, the father of Protestant churches in both 
Korea and Manchuria, deserves to be remembered as one of the most effective missionaries of 
his generation. Serving as an overseas missionary for almost four decades (1872-1910), Ross 
was fluent in several languages; made significant contributions to translating the Bible into 
Korean; was a pioneer in the theory and practice of missions; and possessed an in-depth 
knowledge of the history, culture and religions of China and Korea. See, Bae Ahn-ho, Three-
Self Principle and the Mission Method of John Ross: A Study of the Formation of Early 
Korean Presbyterian Church (1874-1893), PhD Thesis, Aberdeen University, 1995, p. 6.
53
 Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, held in 
Shanghai, May 7-20, 1890, Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1890, pp. 631-
700. 
Alan Race, Christian and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of 
Religions, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1983, p. 38. 
The Missionary Message in Relation to Non-Christian Religions, World Missionary 
Conference, 1910, Report of Commission , pp. 39-47. 
Before 1910, there were 49 Presbyterian (38 missionaries from U.S.A, 8 from Canada, 1 






 They were trained in conservative 
theological seminaries: Underwood at the New Brunswick Theological Seminary, and 
other early Presbyterian missionaries, S. Moffett, C. Clark, and G. Lee at McCormick 
Theological Seminary. Most American seminaries in the second part of the 19th 
century placed a profound emphasis on personal piety over social responsibility, 
insisting, for example, that “ancestor worship” is idolatry and must be destroyed 
completely. In that sense, the missiological position of the early American 
Presbyterian missionaries was exclusivism in terms of the perspective of Alan Race. 
Their theological position remained dominant in Northwest Korean Christianity until 
they left Korea in 1942. This resulted in a significantly different theological approach 
to mission between the American Presbyterians in Northern Korea, and John Ross 
from Scotland in the border region between China and Korea. 
It is clear that the theological tendency of John Ross who worked in the North was 
more flexible. However, he did not influence the northerners in spite of his numerous 
achievements. Rather, the conservatism of North American Presbyterian missionaries 
influenced the northerners while the missionaries were there from 1885 to 1942. This 
gives a hint that the theological tendency of Northwestern Conservative Christianity 
was conservative, which is related to an element of Christianity’s growth in Northern 
Korea. 
Anglican missionaries in Korea. See, Sung-tae Kim ed., The List of Foreign Missionaries in 
Korea, 1884-1984, Seoul, Institute for Korean Church History, 1994.
57
 Gerald H.Andreson, ed. Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions, Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, Cambridge, U.K: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998, p. 689.  
“The typical missionary of the first quarter of the century after the opening of the 
missionary work was a Puritan. He kept the Sabbath as our New England forefathers did a 
century ago. He looked on dancing, smoking, and card playing as sins in which no true 
follower of Christ should indulge. In theology and biblical criticism he was strongly 
conservative, and held as a vital truth the premillerian view of the Second Coming of Christ”. 
A. Brown, The Mastery of the Far East, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1919, p. 540. 
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2. The Significant Growth of Christianity  
  
 In this section I will examine how various factors in Korea’s history influenced 
the growth of Korean Christianity and the resulting growth of Northwestern 
Conservative Christianity, in order to understand the background of the emergence of 
anti-missionary hostility.  
 
2.1. Various Factors Related to the Growth of Northwestern Conservative 
Christianity  
 
This section will show how the four Korean religions linked with Christianity in 
the Northwestern territory. The Northwestern territory has long been a border zone in 
the cultural interchange with China as mentioned above. It was marginalized 
politically, and the disaffected intelligentsia resisted the exploitation and pressure of 
the central government.
59
 They were also linked to Tonghak and the Korean 
traditional religions of Shamanism, Buddhism and Confucianism.  
Firstly, Shamanism is a religion which acknowledges many types of invisible 
spirits and employs special exercises performed by the mudang (a Korean-style 
shaman), in order to heal sickness related in a way acceptable to invisible spiritual 
forces.
60




 for a supreme being. 
59
 Kim Sang–tae, “Geunheondae Pyeongando Chulsin Sahoe Jidocheung Yeongu” (The 
Social Leaders of the Korean Society who hailed from the Pyeongan-do province during the 
20
th
 century), (Ph.D. Thesis., Seoul National University, 2002), pp. 13-19. 
60
 Ibid., p. 30. 
The transcendent dimension of Ruy Young-mo’s understanding of God is emphasized in 
the second part of the compound, ’u, which he later wrote as ’uh, to indicate ‘that which is 
above’, or heaven. This is connected with the Shamanistic and Confucian concepts of Heaven 
which the Protestant missionaries were unwilling to embrace for fear of pantheism. See 
Myung-woo Park, “Building a Local Christian Theology in the Context of Korean Religious 
Pluralism: A Critical Analysis of the Theology of Ryu Yongmo(1890-1981)”, (Ph.D. Thesis., 
The University of Edinburgh, 2001), p. 117. 
Hananim() is the term most widely used by Korean Protestants to convey the 

Christianity retained the term Hananim to refer to ‘God’.
63
 For centuries Korea had 
been ploughed by Shamanistic efforts to communicate with higher beings, and when 
the seeds of Christianity were placed in this rich, ploughed soil, they flourished and 
produced the numerous fruits of Christian disciples.
64
 In this sense, we can say that 
Shamanism actually prepared the way for Christianity. 
Secondly, Buddhism came from China to the Korean peninsula in about 300 A.D. 
From 935 A.D. to 1392 A.D., during the Koryo era, it flourished to such an extent that 
the period is called “the Golden Age of Buddhism.” As Buddhism began to pervade 
politics and control it, this priest-ridden government became thoroughly corrupted. In 
1392, when the Yi Dynasty came into power, it overthrew the Koryo government, 
curbing the power of Buddhist priests and taking over much of the property held by 
the great temples. Buddhism never recovered from the blow
65
and then retreated from 
the world of politics into monasteries, and planted conservatism into the underlying 
structure of Korean consciousness.
66
 When Protestant Christianity arrived in Korea, 




Thirdly, Confucianism was the favoured ideology of the Yi Dynasty in 1392. Its 
high ethical system deeply influenced the culture of Korea, but more as a philosophy 
than as a religion. One of the chief religious aspects of Confucianism was the 
governmental sacrifice which has been offered to heaven and earth at the Sajik shrine 
in Seoul. The King was to fulfil the demands of Heaven as a vicegerent of God.  
concept of ‘the One’. See, Ibid., p. 117. 
63
Lee Byong-sun, “Chogi Hanguk Gaesin Gyohoe Seongjang eui Munhwa, Sahoejeokgchal” 
(Socio-Cultural Accounts of Growth of the Early Protestant Church in Korea, Department of 
Theology) (Ph.D. Thesis., Hoseo University, 1999), p. 56. 
Shearer, Op.Cit., pp. 30-31. 
65
 Shearer, Op.Cit., pp. 26-27. 
Baek Nak-jun, Hangukgaesingyosa (The History of the Korean Protestant Christian), 
Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1973, pp. 13-15.  
67
 Lee Byong-sun, Op.Cit., pp. 56-57. 
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Before undertaking any important business, he would sacrifice to the Supreme Ruler. 
In the event of a national crisis, he always acknowledged in public that he caused it by 
his sinfulness and by neglecting some of his duties, which provoked the anger of 
Heaven. The King was God’s representative on earth, whose purpose was to carry out 
His justice and mercy among mankind. Hence the king was named the Son of Heaven. 
There was the continuity between Confucianism and Christianity.  
The other religious aspect of Korean Confucianism is its doctrine of filial piety. The 
Korean tradition has especially emphasized the filial piety of the eldest son who is 
responsible for the reverence to his family’s ancestors.
68
 This “ancestor worship” in 
Confucianism is still present today. Confucianism led the Korean people to have a 
profound ethical philosophy of filial piety.
69
 The ethical philosophy is similar to the 
fifth Commandment in the Old Testament to honour one’s parents, which made it 
easier for Korean people to accept Christianity in a natural way. 
Finally, Tonghak which literally means “Eastern Learning,” was founded by Choi 
Jae-woo (1834-1863) in the South and developed as a revolutionary movement in the 
1890’s. Its aim was to strengthen an eastern tradition of learning against the “Western 
Learning” that was advocated by Roman Catholic elites. Its main ideas were the 
coming of a heavenly utopian kingdom and that humanity is heaven. It provided a 
utopian vision of an equal society, leading to social innovation and teaching the 
equality of human beings. The religious discourse of the Tonghak combined a form of 
Korean messianic Buddhism and Christian theism.
70
 The Tonghak was rapidly 
popularized among the marginalized people in the late 19
th
 century. However, it was 
68
 Shearer, Op.Cit., p. 27. 
69
 Lee Byong-sun, Op.Cit., p. 57. 
70
 For details concerning Tonghak, see, Kim Yong-bock, Historical Transformation, People’s 
Movement and Messianic Koinonia: A Study of the Relationship of Christian and Tonghak 
Religious Communities to the March First Independence Movement, PhD Thesis, Princeton 
Theological Seminary, 1969. 
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not strong in the Northern territory because its peasant army had been defeated by the 
Japanese Army before it spread into the Northern part of Korea. The serious social 
fragmentation in the late 19
th
 century Chosun, which was the cause of the Tonghak 
Rebellion, formed a fertile soil for Protestant mission in Korea even in the Northern 
part of Korea. Furthermore, such a mental awakening linked to the ideas of 
Christianity, emphasizing the equality of people in the love of God. These various 
religious factors of Northwestern part of Korea prepared many people to embrace 
Christianity. Besides, the brutal Japanese colonialism led the Korean people to have 
favourable attitudes to the Western missionaries.  
This background is important for my study because the successful settlement and 
growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity had a great influence on Korean 
Christianity. As a result, Northerners expected Northwestern Christianity to 
participate in the national issues concerning the independence movement against the 
Japanese occupation, which will be dealt with in the next sections. This section is also 
important because the fact that the four Korean religions influenced the process of 
Christianity in the North can be linked to the later development of religious Juche 
ideology. This influences the acceptance of Christianity by the North Korean 
Saeteomin which will be dealt with in Part three.  
    
2.2. The Beginning and Result of the Significant Growth of Northwestern 
Conservative Christianity 
 
There are two perspectives from which one can look at the growth of 
Northwestern Conservative Christianity. Kim In-su
71
 insists that the Great Revival of 

He is former professor at the Department of Korean Church History in the Presbyterian 
College and Theological Seminary in Korea and the president at Presbyterian Theological 
Seminary in America. 

1907 marked the beginning of growth. Through the wave of the Revival which swept 
over the whole Korean Church, churches began to grow through the believers’ earnest 
endeavours to spread the Gospel.
72
 This perspective is widely known in Korean 
Christianity. 
However, Roy E. Shearer
73
, in his book Wildfire: Church Growth in Korea, insists 
that soon after the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894, the Presbyterian Church in Korea 
began to grow rapidly.
74
 He adds that the Revival did not herald the start of great 
church growth; rather it was in the centre of a period of amazing church growth.
75
 
Yet if we look at the figures carefully, we can see a significant change in the rate of 
church growth around 1907. Comparing the statistics of 1906 with those of 1910, the 
number of communicants increased from 12,500 to 32,500 and the total number of 
adherents from 44,000 to 110,000, which was about a 150% increase.
76
 
Both perspectives may be right, but what is more significant and surprising is 
that both the China-Japan War of 1894 and the Revival of 1907 took place in the 
same Northwestern territory. After the War broke out, the percentage of Presbyterian 
adherents in the Northwestern territory was 79.3% out of the whole Korean 
Presbyterian adherents in 1898.
77
 6 out of 7 pastors of the first pastors in Korea came 
from the Northwestern territory. Furthermore, when the first Presbytery was held in 
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242. 

the first Presbyterian General Assembly was held in 1912, 62.4% of the 
representatives were from the Northwestern territory.
79
 The growth continued until 



























































































Abbreviation: C: Communicant, T: Territory, R: Rate, S.E: Southeastern, S.W: 
Southwestern, N.W: Northwestern. N.E: Northeastern! 
 
The above chart shows that in 1938 the Presbyterian communicants made up 
about three quarters (76%) of all Protestants in Korea. Looking at the distribution of 
these Presbyterians, more than half of them (55%) were concentrated in the 
northwestern territory. This was in contrast to all the other Protestant churches whose 
main congregations could be found in the middle territory. Because of their number, 
Northwestern Conservative Christianity had an effect on the entire Korean Church. 
Their influence prevailed until Shrine Worship was pressed on the Koreans in 1938. 
The Northwestern Conservative Christianity adhered to their strong conservative 
theology which regarded such an act as idolatry: this curtailed their growth. 
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 Kim Gwang-su, Hanguk Gyohoe Seongjangsa (A History of the Korean Church) (Seoul: 
Gidokgyomunsa, 1979), pp. 209-210. 
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 The 1938 General Assembly, which was held in September 10, decided to follow Shinto 
shrine worship which the Japanese government began to press in 1903. Services were 
prohibited and many churches were closed. 
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Having outlined the rapid growth of Northwestern Conservative Christianity both 
in number and influence which began with the War against China in 1894 and the 
Revival of 1907, I will now investigate how the Korean people understood the great 
growth of the Northwestern Conservative Christianity under the influence of Western 
missionaries in the Japanese occupation period. This saw the emergence of the anti-
missionary hostility because it is closely related to the emergence of anti-communism 
of Northwestern Conservative Christianity .    

3. Two Perspectives toward the Attitude of Missionaries 
 
There are two perspectives from which one can understand the missionary 
influence: political and national ideology vs. a religious and missionary perspective.
82
  
The political national perspective focuses on the change of the attitude of 
missionaries under Japanese colonialism. When the Eulmisabyeon
83
 took place in 
1895, the missionaries tried to rescue the Korean King and find an alternative 
residence for him outside the royal palace because he was threatened. This shows that 
the King trusted missionaries very much in that he relied on them for his security.
84
  
On the other hand, missionaries adhered to the principle of separation between 
state and church. When Japan strengthened its control over Korea after defeating 
Russia in 1905, missionaries visited Japanese leaders and explained that they did not 
want to be involved in the political problems of Korea but attempt to promote spiritual 
82
 Park Jong-hyun, ‘Hanguk Gyohoe eui Sinang Naeyeon gwa geu Oeyeon Gujo eui 
Sanggwan Gwaye Yeongu – 1903-1910 Buheungundong gwa Iljemal Hanguk Gyohoe 
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Japanese Rule), PhD Thesis, Yonsei University, 1999, p. 30. 
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and moral revival. In that sense, from the political national perspective, the 
missionaries covered up the misbehaviour of Japan’s colonizing Korea.
85
  
At that time, Koreans were not sure whether the missionaries stood loyal to them 
or to the conquering Japanese. Most of the missionaries came from the United States, 
which showed no critical or aggressive attitude towards the colonizing Japan. This 
neutral attitude of the U.S. raised some doubts in the hearts of the Korean intellectuals. 
The indifference of the missionaries to any revolutionary movement against Japan led 




In reality, the religious missionary perspective emphasized that the ultimate 
objective of missionaries was the mission of Christianity and they were ready to 
compromise or cooperate with any governments within the principle of separation 
between state and church as they saw it.
87
 They felt able to ignore any orders of the 
Japanese government in order to accomplish their missionary aims but they were not 
in a position to decide and nor, as foreign nationals, did they have to bear the full 
consequences of opposition to the state.  
For example, when Korea was annexed into Japan in 1910, missionaries started 
the “Million Souls to Christ” movement, describing ‘mission without getting involved 
in the political situation’. However, when in 1930 the Japanese government began to 
impose the worship of the Shinto shrines upon the Church, the missionaries strongly 
resisted because they claimed that it was a religious act. Many Korean Christians took 
the Shinto shrine according to the Japanese rulers’ declaration that bowing to the state 
shrine was not a religious act. However, when students and teachers of all Korean 
85
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Christianity in Korea), Seoul: Duresidae, 1998, pp. 193-200. 
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schools, including Christian schools, were required to go and bow before a state 
Shinto shrine, conservative missionaries chose to close their schools rather than to 
follow it. They preferred to let their seminars be closed than engage in the worship of 
the shrines. Their resistance proves that they were not pro-Japanese, but nor does their 
support suggest they were against Japan. 
 
In sum, from the religious missionary perspective, the missionaries behaved 
consistently towards the Japanese rule. Nevertheless, their neutrality regarding any 
revolutionary anti-Japan movement made the common Korean people hostile to them. 
 
4. Various Reasons for the Emergence of the Anti-Missionary 
Movement 
 
In this section I will also investigate the reasons why the anti-missionary 
movement was prevalent among the communists in order to understand how 
Christianity reacted against it. This is important because it will help us to understand 
the emergence of anti-communist standpoint within Northwestern Conservative 
Christianity. 
 
Kang In-cheol emphasized that the socialists were behind the anti-missionary 
movement because the missionaries rigidly adhered to a conservative faith which did 
not emphasize socio-politic issues.
 88
 On the other hand, Kim Sang-tae stressed that 
socialists resented a capitalist America and believed that the recession of the world 
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economy of 1929 would bring the end of capitalism.
 89
  
Initially, as mentioned in the previous section, through a politically neutral policy, 
the missionaries tried to avoid friction with Japan in order to freely carry out their 
mission. However, Korean Christians who suffered from the colonialism of Japan 
would have welcomed a religious message that prioritized the ‘independence of the 
nation.’ Such a confrontation of two different views became the cause of the feud as 




Through the March First Independence Movement,
91
Protestant Christianity in 
Northern Korea emerged as a sign of hope for national independence and 
modernization. In the same period, Communism was introduced to Korea from China 
and Russia.
92
 Both Protestant Christianity and communism were attractive to the 
suffering Korean people and spread rapidly among them.  
However, the emergent Chosun Communist Party in Korea (1925) espoused a 
very dogmatic interpretation of Communism influenced by the Chinese communist 
party in the mid-1920s.
93
 Most Communists in this period were atheists and took the 
Marxist view that “religion is the opium of the people.”
94
 As a result, a serious anti-
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The Independence of Korea was declared on 1
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 March 1919. A crowd gathered in the heart 
of Seoul and heard the Declaration of Independence. Then the crowd began to march through 
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Christianity movement was organized from 1924 onwards. At the assembly meeting 
of the Seoul Communist Youth Association (Kyungsung Shinhing Chungnyun 
Dongmaeng Hoe), the delegates officially announced their anti-Christian position.
95
 
In 1925, the Young Communists organized a programme of anti Christianity lectures. 
The National Conference of Sunday School Leaders in Korea, Seoul, 22nd-28th 
October 1925, was confronted by a counter-conference, the Communist Conference 
on Anti-Christianity.
96
 Amidst the heightening of tensions between Christians and 
Communists, the latter declared the 25
th
 of December as “Anti-Christian Day”.
97
 The 
Northwestern Conservative Christianity was thus threatened not only by Japanese 
colonial rule, but also by the atheist ideology of Marxism. As a result of this 
polarization, most Christians in the Northwest developed or adhered to an anti-
communist standpoint.  
 Furthemore, Japan tried to get over the effects of the world economic crisis of 
1929 by invading China, while it exploited masses of Koreans by putting the burden 
of its economic troubles on Korea. Against this backdrop, the Japanese colonial rule 
in Korea was at its worst. The Japanese owned about 85 percent of the industries, 25 
percent of the best land in the country, and took over 10 million seom (a rice bag 
equivalent to 5.12 US bushels) of rice to Japan every year. In its place, minor 
foodstuffs such as beans produced in Manchuria were given back to the Koreans. The 
Japanese Governor-General ruled with an iron fist. No voice of opposition was 
permitted. On average, the number of prisoners convicted of “thought crimes” grew 
by a thousand every year.
98
 The situation of Korea in the early part of the 1930s went 
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from bad to worse. That is when Korean socialists made a declaration to fight against 
capitalism. They believed that Korean Christianity was part of imperialism. They built 
up an anti-Christian and anti-missionary movement, insisting that religion does not 




In sum, Northwestern Conservative Christianity faced both internal criticism for 
being dependent on and, thus, accepting of American capitalism, and external 
criticism by socialists and communists for not getting involved in the independence 
movement. Furthermore, Communists started a serious anti-Christianity Movement. 
These factors resulted in the fact that the Northwestern Conservative Christianity 
embraced an anti-communist standpoint.  
 
The Migration of Northern Christians into South Korea 
 
North Korean Christians migrated to South Korea between 1945 and 1953 with 
their faith shaped by the Japanese occupation and their experience of communists’ 
persecution following the liberation of 1945.
100
 The migrating Christians were known 
as the Christian Wolnammin in South Korea. 5.15 % of the total number of migrants 
from North Korea between 1945 and 1953 claimed to have suffered religious 
persecution by the Communists.
101
 One researcher estimates that the number of 
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immigrant Protestants was approximately 61,200~100,000.
102
 The Protestant 
refugees gathered again into church communities in South Korea. Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church was a typical case and was established by Christian Wolnammin.     
 
1. The Establishing of Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
 
On 2 December 1945, the inaugural worship service of Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church
103
was attended by 27 refugees from the North. The church records show that 
within three weeks, the size of the congregation doubled. It continued to grow faster 
than any other church in the country.
104
 From 1946, the second wave of refugees 
reached the South, in the wake of the Shineiju Student Uprising.
105
 Most nationalists 
who could not tolerate the regime of Kim Il-sung sought their freedom in the South. 
Faithful Christians who abhorred atheism and becoming entrenched in the Soviet zone 
crossed over to the South to enjoy religious freedom. Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
became and remained a very important spiritual home for the CW.
106
 More and more 
of them flocked to the church, which began to hold two Sunday morning services, the 
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first time this had happened in all of Korea.
107
 The church had one thousand members 
by the early part of 1946.
108
 They had to establish a ‘Tent Church’ since the number 
of attending members was over two thousand by 1947.
109
  
In the society of South Korea there was a serious political realignment as the 
conservative sect was gaining more and more strength. Since Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church served as the home for North Korean refugees, many of its young members 
were very active in right wing organisations
110
 such as “The League of North Korean 
Students” and “the Northwest Youth Association.” These organisations were involved 
in violent physical fights which often occurred between the Communist youth and the 
conservative groups.
111
In the South at that time, there was a radical political 
realignment of the extreme camps of the right and the left. In the conservative camp, 
the Korean Democratic Party emerged as the strongest rallying point of the well-to-do 
segments of the society. In the left-wing camp, the South Korean Communist Party 
was advocating drastic reform policies to win the poor segments of society. The 
moderate forces tried to unite their group into a strong progressive political force. 
However, violent physical fights often broke out between the Communist youth and 
those of the conservative groups. The CW were reorganised and assimilated into 
South Korean conservative Christianity; politically they belonged to the conservative 
camp linked to the Korean Democratic Party. In short, Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
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2. Reorganization and Assimilation 
 
Our question here will be how the CW were reorganized and assimilated into 
Southern Korean Christianity, in order to keep and develop their faith and succeed 
their resettlement in South Korea. 
First, 20 pastors from the North who were living in Seoul at the time started ‘The 
Representative Association of Northern Christians’ (Chairman Han Kyung-chik) in 
August, 1947. The establishment of the ‘Refugee Church’ rapidly progressed with the 
help of huge finances from the North American Presbyterian Mission. The 
Association made the CW the most powerful group, with a lot of churches and 
numerous members, 180-190 pastors, run their own theological seminary, educational 
institutions, all generously financed by the North American Presbyterian Mission.
112
  
Second, in April 1947, the second Southern Division of the General Assembly 
agreed that pastors originally from the North could be admitted to the Presbytery and 
serve churches on the recommendation of three pastors of the local Presbyteries. As a 
result, a great many refugee pastors joined each Presbytery and by enthusiastic 
evangelism founded many new churches.
113
 Most of the ‘Refugee Churches’ 
established by Northwestern pastors in Seoul or Inchen in South Korea after 
independence but before the Korean War belonged to the Kyunggi Presbytery which 
was the largest Presbytery in Korea. They, along with pastors belonging to the Seoul 
Presbytery, represented two major powers.
114
 The CW criticized the liberal Han-Sin 
Seminary,
115
 and started the movement to establish a conservative Presbyterian 
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 Consequently, the CW not only dominated Kyunggi Presbytery but also 
the Seminary, Chang-Sin Seminary, which as PCTS, has remained at the heart of 
conservative Protestant Christianity, clearly linked to Youngnak Presbyterian Church. 
Third, the 37
th
 General Assembly in 1952 passed an emergency act recognizing 
the existence of Northern Presbyteries that migrated to South Korea from North Korea. 
The General Assembly members accepted as full members several hundred thousand 
Northern Korean Christians and about 400 Northern pastors who came to the South. 
Accordingly, some Presbyteries were called ‘Refugee Presbyteries.’
117
 After the 
Liberation the significant church growth of South Korea was influenced by the 
activities of the CW. Over 90% of new churches were established by them in the 




The Formation of Characteristics of Anti-Communist Ideology  
 
In this section, I will not discuss in detail the national division through the 
partitioned occupation by the United States and the former Soviet Union and the 
subsequent establishment of two separate governments. Rather, I will focus on how 
the characteristics of the ethnic identity of CW were formed after the liberation related 
to their past experience of injuries by the Communists, the South Korean anti-
Communist education and their conservative-evangelical faith.  
Kwon Hyeok-beop insists that anti-Communism has been embedded in South 
Korean people and automatically acts inside the mind of South Koreans.
119
 Those 
led by liberal groups+ See, available from; http://www.hs.ac.kr/campus/history.html; accessed 
on the 9
th
 of December 2008. 
116
 Kim Yang-sun, Op.Cit., pp. 214-253. 
This was not an official title but an informal expression. 
118
 Kim Yang-sun, Op.Cit., p. 100.  
Kwon Hyeok-beop, “Reading the circuit of anti-communism in my body,” edited by 

whom I interviewed are from the generation who personally experienced harm at the 
hands of Communists and received an anti-Communist education in South Korea. 
This section will deal with their persecution by the Communists, focusing in 
particular on the suffering experienced by Rev. Han, the founder of Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church, who influenced the anti-Communist attitudes of the CW. It will 
be divided into three periods: first, the post-liberation; second, the Korean War; third, 
after the War.   
 
1. The Post-Liberation Period 
 
In moving back to liberation of 1945, there emerged two political parties ‘the 
Christian Socialist Democratic Party’ and ‘the Communist Party’ in Shineiju city, 
North Korea, where Rev. Han lived. There was a power struggle between them. 
On the one hand, the Communist Party appealed to the people in the lower strata 
of society. The Communists insisted on a society of perfect equality in which nobody 
would be rich or poor, and in which everybody would have an equal opportunity to 
receive an education and enjoy the same quality of life.
120
 On the other hand, the 
Christian Socialist Democratic Party
121
 also emerged. When it announced its policies, 
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Kim Il-sung’s primary target for elimination was the Christians. Detaining church 
leaders was the first step, which began around this time. Kim Il-sung had quickly 
taken political power in North Korea, taking advantage of Russian support, and he 
became the First Secretary of the North Korean Communist Party after the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was officially proclaimed on 
September 9, 1948.
123
 He organised local Communist Parties in the country, knowing 
that the Christian church was a bastion of anti-Communist forces, and the Christian 
Socialist Democratic Party was in direct competition to the Communist Party. In this 
circumstance, the rapid growth of membership of the Christian Socialist Democratic 
Party alarmed Kim Il-sung and his party and he began suppressing Christian leaders 
in order to consolidate his position in the northern territory of the Korean peninsula.
124
 
The press was under tight government control, and any religious group which had had 
a history of links to foreign churches or missionaries was suppressed, as was any 
religious group which attempted to interfere in or even comment on political affairs. 
In this situation, Rev. Han escaped from Communist persecution just before he was 
due to be arrested.
125
 The conflict between communists and the Christian Socialist 
Democratic Party resulted in the massacre of students in the city of Shineiju in North 
Korea. Although the Soviet Command did not close down the church immediately in 
the North, they rapidly tightened their grip on ecclesiastical affairs. On 16 November 
1945, there was a convention of the Christian Socialist Democratic Party at 
Yongampo. The Communists attacked the meeting with stones and clubs, injuring 
many Christian youths and killing one of the party leaders on the spot.  
Furthermore, the Communists broke into the churches in the area and destroyed 
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the pulpits and windows. This news infuriated both Christian and anti-Communist 
students and on 23 November in the city of Shineiju, where anti-Communist 
sentiment with a Christian influence was exceptionally strong, over 5,000 students 
rose up and attacked the head office of the Communist Party, the Police Station, and 
the HQ of the People’s Committee.
126
 This resulted in over 70 high school students 
being killed in one day by Communists. Many Christians escaped to the American 
zone, leaving behind their homes and families.
127
 Most students and Christians who 
fled to the South during this time later became members of Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church. It is not surprising, then, that the foundation ideology of Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church was based on strong anti-Communism. 
The CW who serve with the Bible Study Class for Free People after 1998 had also 
experienced persecution by Communists in the post-liberation period. Two prominent 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church members talked about that period. The grandfather of 
Elder Goh Jong-taet, the former head of the Mission Centre for North Korea, who 
served at the Centre for seven years (1999-2006), was executed by communists at 
Haeju Prison in 1948 because he opposed the placing of his own nation under the 
trusteeship of Soviet Union. After that, his family left the North and his father joined 
the South Korean Army in order to take revenge for the execution of his 
grandfather.
128
 The father of Kim Nae-young, the head of the Mission Centre for 
North Korea from 2006 to 2007, had to hide in an underground room with his 
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In the North, a Communist state was built, which largely tried to purge the 
northern half of Korea of all who had possessed lands. The northern regime had also 
immediately implemented a social revolution. In 1946, as part of a land reform all the 
land which had been held by the Japanese Government or Japanese landowners or 
corporations, together with the land owned by Korean landlords, was confiscated. 
Many of the dispossessed took the opportunity to flee to the South. Three of the 
sixteen families interviewed experienced direct persecution by Communists during 
this time. One is the family of the team leader of the BSCFP. 
 
My grandfather was suddenly dispossessed of his land by the leaders of the 
Communist Party and their relatives. He died of a nervous disorder caused by his 
unexpressed resentment. My grandmother suggested that my family should leave the 
North for the South because the North was dangerous. Following her recommendation, 




Another is a teacher at the BSCFP saying that “My grandfather was a landowner, a 
Christian and a collaborator with the Japanese occupation. Due to these factors the 
People’s Army of Communists put him in prison. The Army set fire to the prison, 
where he died. The rest of my family left for the South.”
131
 Another team leader in 
the BSCFP said that “When the Communists killed and persecuted landowners, they 
killed my pregnant younger grandmother while she was trying to stop her husband 
being beaten by the Communists.”
132
  
The Communists faced strong opposition from Christians when they insisted to 
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hold the election a Sunday, a result of which was another exodus.
133
 The senior 
minister of Youngnak Presbyterian Church described the main members of the church 
as ‘victims of the Communists’:  
 
In North Korea most Christians rejected a Sunday election. Nevertheless, the 
Communist Party conducted the election on Sunday. It was the Sunday Election which 
brought the North Korean Christians to a realisation of the hopelessness offered by 
Communist government. So, many Christians escaped from the Communist 
persecution by going to the South and later joined Youngnak Presbyterian Church. 
They were victims of the Communists. Personally, my father was shot by Communists 




One of the interviewees says that “Since my Christian aunt did not vote on Sunday, 
her son was victimized by the Communists and was unable to go to primary school. 
So he migrated to the South.”
135
 
  Consequently, the CW memory of the persecution and suffering which they 
experienced in North Korea - caused by conflict between the Christian Socialist 
Democratic Party and the Communist Party, land reform, and the Sunday election - 
led them to migrate to the South and resulted in their adherence to an anti-Communist 
viewpoint. The interviewees may think that they need to defeat an enemy so that they 
can regain the land which they lost,
136
 which may motivate their anti-Communist 
activities: they may just still be bitter. Be that as it may, these experiences have 
influenced and strengthened their anti-Communist consciousness and have been 
carried over into their attitude to the CS. 
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2. During the Korean War 
 
Before dawn on 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army launched an all-out attack 
on the South. This is presented as the most tragic event in Korean history,
137
 in the 
martyrdom monument to Elder Kim Ung-nak in Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
grounds which again reminds us of the anti-Communist standpoint of the CW. Had 
the North Korean army defeated South Korea, the sector of the South Korean 
population to suffer most would have been the Christians, for the Kim Il-sung regime 
regarded Christians as its arch enemy. At the outbreak of the war, Christian leaders in 
the north were executed or put into labour camps as American collaborators. After 
capturing Seoul, the Communist forces tried to create a group of apostates among 
Christian leaders, and anyone who opposed them was put into prison or executed.
138
  
At the same time, an Elder of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, Kim Ung-nak, was 
executed by the Communists while resisting the use of the church as an armoury. 
When the Communist police arrested him, he pleaded with them to give him five 




The memorial stone of Kim Ung-nak still stands at the front of the main building 
of the sanctuary in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, reminding people of the 
communist persecution. Furthermore, leaders of the BSCFP have strong memories of 
how their families suffered during the Korean War. Elder Koh Jong-taek, the former 
head of the Mission Centre for North Korea in the church, said: 
 
When I was in my second year at primary school, the Korean War broke out one 
137
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Sunday. A private came to call my father who was a military officer. After my father 
left for the battle field, we had to avoid my house as it belonged to an officer and 
would be dangerous for my family. Commies came to the house to capture my father 
and my family. If we had been in the house, we would have been executed. 




An interviewee who serves at the BSCFP as a teacher as well as a team leader in 
2006, says that “When the Communist Army came to my town to catch my father, he 




Another team leader of the BSCFP says: 
 
My father was a South Korean soldier when the War broke out. At that time those who 
married to men serving in the South Korean Army were regarded as reactionary 
elements. My mother tore up the wedding photographs before she escaped to her 
mother’s house.
142
   
 
When members of the church see the martyrdom monument of Elder Kim Ung-
nak they are reminded of the sufferings inflicted upon their fellow Wolnammin from 
the liberation onwards. Many prominent elders and church members, as I have shown, 
directly experienced the ruthless persecution of the Northern regime, which affect to 
this day their feelings about communism.  
 
There are three other churches whose function strengthens their anti-Communist 
views. These churches, which were established by members of Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church, provided shelter for the refugees of the Korean War. Rev. Han 
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and his fellow believers undertook relief work for refugees. They established churches 
such as Busan Youngnak Church, Daegu Youngnak Church, and Jeju Youngnak 
Church which not only to provide shelter for the refugees, but also to strengthen their 
faith because they enthusiastically believed that, in order to defeat Communism, 
Korea had to become a Christian nation through the establishment of churches in 




In short, the anti-Communism of CW was heavily influenced by Communist 
persecution, by the martyrdom monument of Elder Kim Ung-nak and the three 
churches Youngnak members established during the Korean War. 
 
3. The Post-Korean War Period 
 
In the post-Korean War period, there are two significant elements which 
strengthened the Christian Wolnammin’s anti-Communism. 
Members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church participated in the expansion of the 
national evangelical campaign initiated by Rev. Han in order to curb any influence 
communism may have had. The wider political backdrop was also in favour of strong 
anti-communist sentiment which was reflected in South Korea’s education policies as 
well. It is worth describing these in more details because both the evangelical drive 
based on curbing communism and the government’s anti-communist education policy 
impacted heavily the way on the CW relate to the later refugees, that is, the CS. 
Indeed it might be suggested the strength of Youngnak Presbyterian Church as an anti-
communist bastion paralleled (or risked outweighing) its existence as a stronghold for 
Christ. 
143
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3.1. The National Evangelical Campaign  
 
Rev. Han declared that Korea will be unified when it becomes a Christian 
nation.
144
 This argument implies that nobody in a unified Korea will be communist, 
because communism is antithetical to Christianity, as evidenced for him by the efforts 
of the former to eliminate the latter. Evangelism is necessary in order to defeat 
communism and this thought was the driving force beneath Rev. Han’s campaign.  
The first huge assembly of the 1970s was part of such a revival campaign. The 
organisers invited Billy Graham in 1973. The campaign was held under the slogan of 
‘Fifty Million to Christ’ with 516,000 participants, led by Rev. Han.
145
 The campaign 
was a response of conservative Christianity to ‘The 7.4 Joint Statement’.
146
 When the 
principle of peaceful reunification was proclaimed at first, it was natural that the CW 
should express ‘shock’ and ‘fury,’ and respond with such a Christian (and therefore 
for them anti-communist) campaign.  
The new situation was summarised by Rev. Han as follows: “Before the 7.4 
statement we were in an era of confrontation without dialogue, whereas after the 
statement we are faced with an era of confrontation along with dialogue”, and he 




 is pierced, we will collapse and die if our 
ideological arms are reckless.”
148
 This sense of reality adequately represents the anti-
Communist view of the CW, repeated in the revival campaign in 1973. On the first 
day of that campaign Rev. Han paradoxically spoke in his opening address as follows: 
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 parallel indicates the partition line between South Korea and North Korea. 
148
 Hanguk Gidok Gongbo (The News of Christianity in Korea), 16. 9. 1972. In Cheol Kang, 
Op.Cit., p.522. 

“The fifty million Korean people love each other and try to begin a new history of the 
Spirit through this campaign in order to establish the beautiful reunification of 
Korea.”
149
 What did ‘the beautiful reunification’ mean? It seemed to mean a 
reunification achieved by Christianity fighting against and overcoming Communism 
and is consistent with his response to the statement in 1972. This address shows us 
that the campaign was imbued with and depended on anti-Communism. Rev. Han 
claims that if South Korea is to achieve stability as a democratic nation, it is necessary 
for over fifty percent of the South Koreans to be Christians:
150
for it to achieve unity, 
Communism must be eliminated and Christianity become the faith of all. This echoes 
pre-millennial thinking in the early church.
151
 This is not an attribute of 
Presbyterianism, though it is present in some American Evangelicalism.  
The CW and Rev. Han established not only three churches during the Korean War 
but they also planted 150 churches after the Korean War as part of the national 
evangelisation mission,
152
aimed at fighting Communism as well as spreading the 
Gospel. The two are not coterminous, but Rev. Han’s writing comes close to 
conflating them. The national evangelical campaign brought about continuous church 
growth. In 2004, Youngnak Presbyterian Church had about 50,000 members, 16 active 
departments, 10 auxiliary facilities, 4 church affiliated educational institutes, many 
small groups involved in various activities, 19 parishes and 1,090 house groups,
153
 
and was the largest church in Korea for 20 years. In other words, Youngnak 
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Presbyterian Church, established by those who migrated from North to South to 
escape from the communist persecution, gained strength through the national 
evangelical campaign during and after the Korean War in order to defeat Communism. 
Koh Jong-taek, the former head of the Mission Centre, also testified as follows: 
 
Anti-Communism was naturally embedded in the congregation’s mind if people 
attended the church. Most members were refugees from North Korea. The atmosphere 
of the church was anti-Communist. Rev. Han fundamentally hated Communism 




Rev. Han argues that the ideological threat of the Communist philosophy is rooted 
in materialism, nihilism and atheism. For the sake of true peace, Christians must fight 
against these evil forces.
155
 They regarded the Communist ideology as the 
embodiment of Satanic power, and Kim Il-sung as the iconic figure representing the 
Devil. For those who live in South Korea, he says, the greatest adversary is the 
Communist ideology and its devotees because people believe that it would take away 
their freedom.
156
However, evil is in our heart while we are pointing out other’s evil.  
Rev. Han also insists that South Korean Christians must spread the gospel to the 
people in North Korea.
157
 For him, there is no freedom of belief, speech, association, 
residence and occupation in North Korea, for North Korea is one big prison. The 
ordinary people of North Korea, he continues, are the prisoners of the Communist 
party and Kim Il-sung.
158
 A few churches operate in the larger cities but they are just 
shop window churches pretending to convince the few tourists of the evidence of 
$&.
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“religious freedom.”  
However, the faithful remnants among the ordinary North Koreans are hidden 
underground as in Nero’s time. Rev. Han and others were confident that if and when 
pressure on the church by the Communist government is removed, a large and 
devoted body of believers would emerge. He believes that when Korea is unified, 
Korea will certainly be a Christian nation.
159
 Therefore, in order to remove the 
pressure of the Communist government and to become a Christian nation, South 
Korean Christians must try their best to preach the gospel to the North Koreans.
160
  
Moreover, he depicts ordinary North Koreans as slaves, “who have mouths, yet 
they cannot speak, who have ears, yet they cannot freely listen…Therefore, we must 
spread the gospel to the people in North Korea”. 
161
 One of the practical 
implementations of this imperative was the “Rice of Love Movement.” The two 
Koreas, up until the early part of the 1960s, were among one of the poorest nations on 
earth. Until that time, many people suffered from starvation. Toward the end of the 
1980s, the South Korean economy improved remarkably, so much so that there was a 
large amount of rice surplus every year. On the initiative of Rev. Han, the Christian 
Council of Korea inaugurated the Rice of Love Campaign and started sending a large 
amount of rice to North Korea.
162
Rev. Han ministered and preached to the congregation of Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church for over half a century, and he deeply influenced the perspective of the CW.     
   
Since the church has placed emphasis on the National Evangelical Movement, I have 
firmly perceived that the Communist ideology had to be completely destroyed, 
whereas ordinary North Koreans are to be shown compassion to because they have 
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Kim Chang-mae, one of the teachers of the BSCFP argues: 
 
The North Korean Saeteomin had no human rights in North Korea. In addition, they 
were hungry and without hope. I feel compassion for the ordinary people of North 
Korea in spite of the fact that I dislike the system of North Korea as well as the 
leaders of North Korea. It is Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and the People’s Army who 
exploited the ordinary people of North Korea. I am sure that they are really bad. 
However, we should welcome those who believed that Kim Il-sung was able to do 




These statements indicate that those Wolnammin who are involved with the 
BSCFP hated the leaders of North Korea while they had compassion for the ordinary 
North Koreans including the CS. In addition, the CW regarded the North Korean 
Saeteomin as targets for evangelism, and tried to spread the gospel among them. They 
also firmly believed that the power of the gospel can truly change the North Korean 
Saeteomin. Lee Chul-shin, the senior minister of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, 
believed that the spirit of the North Korean Saeteomin should be changed to the spirit 
of Christianity
165
as understood by the CW. All interviewees shared the same hope.  
However, if the “spirit of Christianity” is solely that envisaged by the CW in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church, that is, “anti-communist,” the likelihood of the 
“replacing” being done in the CW’s image, as early missionaries tended to make 
Koreans in their own image, may still be a problem.  
Despite their great effort to differentiate between the CS and the ruling elites of the 
163
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regime of North Korea, between poor brethren and core communists, the CW may 
have demonstrated negative feelings towards the CS when they interacted with each 
other. In his book Stigma, Erving Goffman points out that there are blemishes of 
individual character perceived as weak will.
166
 The routines of social intercourse in 
structured settings, he says, lead us to categorize others without reflecting on them 
individually. Their appearance, or other external attributes, leads us to certain 
automatic conclusions which may be incorrect. He continues, when a stranger is 
present before us, we may assume he possesses an attribute that makes him different 
from us. For example, because we have decided all North Koreans are two-headed 
devils, when we meet one, we interpret his speech or appearance in a way which 
fulfils our pre-existing assumption. This is stigmatization.
167
 These are not his actual 
attributes but only his attributes which are in line with our stereotype of what a given 
individual of that “type” should be.
168
 In the context of Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church, when the CS possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention, the CS 
possesses a stigma, undesired differences from what the CW had expected. It is very 
easy for the CW to stigmatize the CS as spies, liars, domineering, treacherous and 
rigid belief, and dishonesty etc., when the CW encounter the CS. One of the teachers 
of the BSCFP had doubts about the CS and was afraid that he might suffer harm 
through them. 
 
One of the most important Communist strategies is to conspire to infiltrate our society 
and to set up cell organisations. North Korean spies used to come to the South through 
foreign countries and across the 38th parallel. Nowadays, however, they can spread out 
amongst the North Korean Saeteomin. I am wondering why so many young North 
Korean Saeteomin come to the South. If one of them died while demonstrating against 
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In addition, in 2005 the New York Times commented on South Koreans working 
with North Koreans at a South Korean owned industrial park at Kaesong in North 
Korea: “Some South Koreans say they may have trouble working with the North 
Koreans because South Korea's fiercely anti-Communist education taught them for 




In short, the memories of the CW combined with anti-communist education made 
it very difficult for the CW to maintain that actual ordinary North Koreans are honest 
and decent people, despite a shared faith. They seem to feel threatened even by the CS, 
a problem which needs to be addressed within the church.    
 
3.2. Anti-Communist Education 
 
Rev. Han’s anti-Communist approach was underlined by that of the government of 
South Korea, which used education to reinforce the anti-Communist position. In the 
post 1953 context, the urgent task of the South Korean society was to cope with the 
ever-possible threat of invasion of the Communists. Immediately after the cease-fire, 
there was a widely developed idea that the South needed strong leadership in order to 
cope with the threat. Consequently, Rhee Syng-man’s
171
government placed emphasis 
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on anti-Communist policies up to 1960.
172
 An anti-Communist law was promulgated 
and all socialist countries, North Korea most especially, were declared to be enemy 
states. At the same time, a programme of anti-Communist education began in schools, 
aimed at fostering an anti-Communist attitude in the students.  
In March 1960, the Liberal Party managed to reelect Rhee and to elect Yi Ki-bung 
vice president by the blatant use of force. Rhee was reelected by default because his 
principal opponent had died while receiving medical treatment in the United States 
just before the election. The fraudulent election touched off civil disorders, known 
and celebrated as the April 19 Student Revolution, during which at least 115 students 
were killed and nearly 1,000 were injured by the police.
173
 As a result, Rhee resigned 
on April 26, 1960. During the revolution, conservative leaders of the Korean churches 
were silent, preaching that we must fight communists with the National Evangelical 
Campaign.
174
 Rev. Han also was silent in spite of the fact that one of the students 
killed was Kim Chi-ho who was a leading figure among college students at Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church.
175
The churches said nothing. That is the outcome of anti-
communist thinking. To be silent when sin is committed is to collude in it: that means 
sharing responsibility for sin. If killing “communists” is not counted as sin, the faith 
has been highjacked by society. “Giving into culture” is usually, in theologically 
conservative circles, counted as sin. In this context, drinking and smoking are counted 
incompatable with Christian faith, but killing “communists” is not. This is a 
fundamental problem for the conservative Korean Christian.   
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 who ruled from 1961 to 1979 banned all political activity, 
dismissed the parliament and adopted a truculent official anti-Communism. He 
continued the implementation of an anti-communist curriculum,
177
 which Rhee Syng-
man had already used 0 The primary schools used text books issued by the Ministry 
of Education to promote anti-Communism explaining the reasons for unification. The 
content emphasised that children should understand the reasons for the war and the 
anti-Communist point of view and should fully participate in supporting the Cold War. 
The book contained pictures and illustrations to aid understanding. Anti-Communist 





 testified as follows: 
 
During my school days, unification was hoped to be achieved through Seunggong (a 
victory over Communism). When I became a business man, I produced the textbook 
named ‘Seunggong Tongilui Gil’ (it means ‘The Way of Unification Through a Victory 




North Korea, its leaders, and its political system were demonized. From the mid 
1950’s to 1970’s primary school students had to attend anti-Communist education 
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classes. The content made reference to how the children in North Korea were required 
to report their parents to the security police if they rebelled against the “Dear Leader”. 
Young students must have imagined the North Koreans as monsters sporting large 
horns. Indeed one of the teachers in the BSCFP testified as follows: “The content of 
anti-communist education seemed accurate to my mind because I accepted it 




The team leader of the BSCFP states, 
 
I was taught that North Koreans were liars, sporting large horns, whom we could 
never trust and who were bent on the invasion of South Korea. When we drew posters, 
North Koreans were depicted as monsters sporting large horns and South Koreans as 




The unordained pastor of the BSCFP speaks about the same content. 
 
For me, nothing but evil existed in North Korea. While I was at primary school, 
disastrous scenes of North Korea were painted. Those made the strongest impression 
on my mind. North Koreans were embedded in my perception as monsters and I 
believed that human qualities did not exist in the Communist Party.
184
  
One of the teachers of the BSCFP states, 
I regarded North Koreans as my enemies. I read the textbook of my school days which 
was talking about the story of Lee Seung-bok, a boy, who was killed by Communists. 
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Communists tore up his mouth when he said that he disliked Communism. 
Furthermore, I remember that North Korean spies would throw bombs at the area 
where I lived, near the Korean Presidential residence. I began to think that I might be 




Lee Chul-shin, the senior minister of the church, spoke about witnessing an attack 
by Communist spies, which formed part of his anti-Communist education. 
 
Of course, anti-Communism was embedded in my mind through anti-Communist 
education during my school days. When I was in primary school, I saw the bodies of 
some spies, of our policemen and of our military men together which were covered by 
worn-out straw bags. The spies came to the Korean Presidential residence called ‘the 
Blue House’ from North Korea to kill the president. I realised that North Koreans such 
as these killed people and the Communist Party was thoroughly inhuman. I recognised 
that Communists were violent and uncivilized. I came to believe that it would be 




The government never stopped emphasising the importance of ideological 
education and the effects have been substantial on the formation of South Korean 
consciousness. Furthermore, anti-Communist education in particular was perverted by 
the authoritarian regime's exploitation of it as a form of political socialisation to 
perpetuate their grip on power. For example, in the past, the so-called “North Wind,” 
which denotes the impact of an abrupt North Korean action on a major South Korean 
election, worked to the advantage of conservative candidates because a majority of 
voters were more concerned about the security threat from the North than other issues 
such as democratization.
187
 The Presidential Election campaign was used by the 
South Korean authorities for the fabrication of the “North Wind” case– the 
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conservative power’s strategy to use the military threat from North Korea to its 
advantage. The “North Wind” was believed to have been effective in helping the 
election of conservative candidates in the South's presidential polls. The intention to 
use North Korea as a tool in South Korean politics was wrong; yet we must admit that 
the South’s attitude toward the North in the past made Northern Wind effect possible. 
The former team leader of the BSCFP explains: 
 
Much of the anti-Communist education I received was through movies and news. For 
me North Korea was entirely evil. This was embedded in me through the experience 
of migration, anti-Communist education and negative stories about North Korea. 
When the presidential election came, I worried about the invasion of North Korea and 
used to vote for the candidate who was able to keep this country safe.
188
    
 
So far the anti-Communism of conservative Christians who were originally from 
the North has been explained by personal experience of the Communist regime in the 
North and the Korean War both of which produced the martyrdom of many and led to 
mass migration from the North to the South. To this mix is added the Southern state’s 
anti-Communist education and its misuse, which was extensively promoted through 
the education system. The role of these factors in the lives of Christian Wolnammin 
was made obvious through the interviews presented. Their anti-communism was 
continually reinforced and strengthened, and was used to fuel the national evangelical 
campaign which could be seen by others as an unholy alliance of religion and politics.  
Yet the formation of a strong anti-Communist conviction seems inevitable in light 
of both their personal experience and the governments’ effort to demonize North 
Korea through the education system.  
 
$11
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In the post-liberation period (1945-1950) many Christians experienced 
persecution and suffering in North Korea as a result of the pre-war conflict between 
the Christian Socialist Democratic Party and the Communist Party, land reform, and 
the Sunday election. Most of them migrated to the South and developed a trenchant 
anti-Communist viewpoint. The CW who had escaped from Communist persecution 
to the South not only built up Youngnak Presbyterian Church ecclesiastically but also 
collaborated socio-politically with the anti-Communist conservative side. This 
indicated how strong atmosphere of anti-Communist feeling was in the church’s early 
period. 
During the Korean War (1950-1953) the anti-Communism of CW was further 
intensified by Communist persecution, one martyr being the Elder Kim Ung-nak, 
whose large statue is visible in Youngnak Presbyterian Church to every one who goes 
to church each Sunday. Youngnak members planted three more churches to help the 
refugees.  
In the post-Korean War Period (1953- the present) the anti-Communism of 
conservative Christian Wolnammin has been continually strengthened by the state 
through ideological education against Communism, and propagated in the National 
Evangelical Campaign.  
These factors act inside the mind of the CW in encounters with the CS. In other 
words, this anti-Communism has considerable self-perpetuating capability in any 
interaction between the CW and the CS. It has become a power of its own. As the CW 
has experienced injuries by Communists and has received heavy anti-Communist 
education for over half a century, it is understandable that some consider anti-
Communism nomal and proper for a South Korean Christian. In the context of long-
standing division and hostile confrontation, the CW has consolidated their own self-

perpetuating structure. The place of Christ in all this would need to be demonstrated.    
 
Conclusion 
                    
In this chapter I investigated the hypothesis that anti-communist ideology was an 
influential factor in the formation of the ethnic identity of the CW, and that this 
created a negative effect on their perception of the other Christian group, the CS in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church, whom they stigmatised either consciously or 
unconsciously. 
   The first hostilities between Northwestern Presbyterian Christians and 
communists began during the Japanese rule. The apolitical stand of the missionaries 
was resented by ordinary Koreans who expected the missionaries to take part in the 
independence movement. When they refused, they were labelled as uncooperative and 
were criticized by the Korean socialists and communists. When Korea was liberated, 
the communist party became dominant in the North, backed by the Soviet Union.  
The Christian in the Northern Korea pushed their social and political agenda 
which resulted in their persecution by Communists. A lot of them escaped to the 
South but with bitter memories. The Korean War was a further catalyst: by the end of 
the war many who escaped to the South, who are now the CW, hated communism and 
communists. When they established Youngnak Presbyterian Church a key principle 
was to spread the gospel in order to defeat communism. This stand can be seen clearly 
from the speeches of the founder, Rev. Han. Moreover, during the dictatorship times, 
the CW consistently supported the state whatever it did and welcomed anti-
communist education and the government’s emphasis on the North Korean threat. 
Amid these intensely hostile feelings towards Kim Il-sung and his regime, Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church viewed ordinary North Koreans in theory from a Christian 

perspective as equally good people as themselves. However, as soon as the CS began 
to arrive among them, they could not view the newcomers with an open mind. The 
CW believe some CS to be spies or agents and have a very hard time accepting them 
as will be shown in subsequent chapters. Over fifty years of division, memories of 
suffering and lack of contact has led to a situation in which the CS are treated 
“differently,” revealing the CW assumptions distorted by state and church reinforced 
anti-communism.     
Steven Lukes pointed out the three dimensional power concept which makes 
people act and think automatically because power controls their thought and 
desires.
189
 In looking at the context through his perspective, the role of anti-
communist ideology of the CW is the supreme exercise of power which secures the 
compliance of the CW to view the CS negatively or dangerously, even to regard them 
as spies or agents, and even to act in ways which conflict with their Christian faith.  
In quest of the characteristic of the ethnic identity of the CW, it has been 
established that the CW see themselves as conservative Christians and strongly anti-
communist. Their theological tendency, far from favouring inclusivism, is influenced 
by the founding American missionaries and their anti-communism is influenced by 
their place of origin, the Northwestern territory where Christianity was first brought 
and where communism became especially strong following the end of the Second of 
World War and the liberation of the Korean Peninsula. The persecution of Christians 
instilled in the CW the belief that Christianity is the antidote to communism and the 
reunification of the Korean Peninsula can only be achieved through the faith. 
Christianity is seen as the sole means of defeating communism, though we might 
wonder what form such a politically motivated Christianity is really taking.             
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Chapter The Emergence and Development of the Juche 




The Christian North Korean Saeteomin interviewed were very familiar with Juche 
ideology, the monolithic official system in which all North Koreans were required to 
participate on a daily basis. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the 
evolution of Juche ideology made the North Korean people act and think in 
accordance with the instructions of the leader in order to maintain a state of 
mobilization. Juche was devised as a means to counter foreign powers, to purge Kim 
Il-sung’s political rivals,
190
and to mobilize the North Koreans. It evolved from the 
simple requirement of autonomy into philosophical, religious ideology. As a result, 
this process created a monolithic ideological system, which has resulted in no space in 
the life of North Koreans for otherness.  
 
 1. The definition of Juche                               
             
First of all, Juche ( in Korean;  in Chinese) is the official government 
ideology of North Korea,
191
 set out in Article 3 of North Korea’s Constitution ‘Juche 





Thomas J. Belke, Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea’s State Religion, Bartlesville, 
OK: Living Sacrifice Books Co, 1999, p. 173.
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Article 3 in Chapter 1 Politics in Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic 
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 of September 1998 by the first session of the 10
th
 
Supreme People’s Assembly. See, http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/, accessed 10 October 2007. 
See, Article 3 in Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

The literal meaning of the word Juche is often translated as ‘self-reliance’ or ‘self-
determination.’ When the word is broken into its two Chinese character, the meaning 
of the first character Ju ( in Korean,  in Chinese) is ‘owner,’ ‘master,’ ‘lord,’ 
‘the main principle,’ ‘subject,’ or ‘the self as actor’ and the meaning of the second 
character che ( in Korean,  in Chinese) is ‘the body,’ ‘the whole,’ ‘the 
substance,’ ‘object,’ ‘thing,’ or ‘material.’
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Juche can be viewed as the expression of being in charge of one’s own self or the 
system that one is part of
194
 and further, the sense of being in charge of one’s own 
destiny or being the subject rather than the object of it. 
 
According to Kim Il-sung’s explanation, the meaning of Juche is as follows:  
Juche is a Korean word. The revolution in each country should be carried out 
responsibly by their own people, the masters, in an independent manner, and in a 
creative way suitable to the country’s specific conditions. It raises the fundamental 
question of philosophy by regarding humans as the main factor, and elucidates the 
philosophical principle that humans are the masters of everything and they decide 
everything.
195
According to the above quote, Juche proclaims that man is the master of everything, 
decides everything and is the master of his own destiny. Kim Il-sung created Juche 
ideology from a pre-war term in order to emphasize the importance of developing the 
nation’s potential in using its own resources and reserves of human creativity, for the 
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achievement of Jajusong (sovereignty). 
Kim Jong-il, according to his father Kim Il-sung’s words, cultivated the seed of 
Juche into a forest of trees bearing fruits. He explained the meaning of Juche ideology 
as follows: “The Juche ideology defined man as the master who dominates the world, 
not merely as part of it, and thus established a new world view which, unlike 
preceding ones, regards man as being in the centre of the changes and progress made 
in the world.”
196
 According to Kim Jong-il, Juche ideology contains two basic 
elements: world and human being. Human being transforms the world with the new 
world view of Juche because humans are the masters of society, and masters over 
their own destiny.  
 
Interpretively, according to Cheong Seong-chang
197
, the basic core of Juche has 
come from Stalinism, while the Juche idea has been traditionally interpreted as a 
“Marxist-Leninist political ideology.”
198
 However, Shin Eun-hee insists that, 
although Juche idea captures some essential elements of Marxist-Leninist concepts, 
Juche deviates from Marxist-Leninist philosophy through its alternative interpretation 
of history in which people’s subjectivity is placed in a higher category than class-
struggle.
199
 The two scholars give us a hint that the interpretation and application of 
the Juche idea have varied depending on the historical context.  
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In sum, the core idea of Juche is thoroughly based on a human-centred view of the 
world from Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, as well as developed from ideas prevalent 
in the colonial period.  
     
2. The Emergence of Juche in the Korean Peninsula               
 
The term Juche was initially used as a term supporting Korean independence 
against foreign powers in the Korean Peninsula. 
 
First of all, it is necessary to review briefly the history of Korea during the last 
century; especially the division of the North and the South in 1945, in order to 
understand the origin of Juche ideology in the Korea Peninsula, and to demonstrate 
the significance of the concept of Juche, of self-reliance and self-determination. 
Korea’s modern socio-political history, marked by the interventions of foreign powers 
in Korea, has been one of the most influential factors in the emergence of Juche 
ideology. The Korean people’s desire for self-reliance became extremely strong as the 
Japanese rule tightened its grip on the nation, disregarding the needs of the Korean 
people. During the oppressive period of the 1930s and 1940s, Juche or the spirit of 
independence became a socio-political concept.
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The world powers made the Korean Peninsula their arena of competition, agreeing 
that Japan occupied Chosen, that is, Korea. When Korea was finally annexed by Japan 
in 1910, some Koreans committed suicide to express their ultimate spirit of 
independence as people of Korea, an independent country from Japan. The Korean 
people’s struggle to regain their country’s political independence from Japan 
continued throughout the whole occupation period. One very distinctive example of 
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this struggle was Korea’s Declaration of Independence on 1 March 1919. The 
declaration, proclaimed by 33 national leaders who were largely Christian and 
Tonghak, stated as follows: “We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and 
the liberty of the Korean people. We tell the world to witness the equality of all 
nations and we pass it on to posterity as their inherent right…The old world of force is 
gone and the new world of righteousness and truth is here.”
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 All the 33 leaders 
voluntarily subjected themselves to arrest after the declaration. Massive 
demonstrations broke out all over Korea, and Korean flags were displayed openly. 
This was a shock for the Japanese people because the whole incident broke out at the 
very height of Japanese military rule. The Japanese people expected that Koreans 
would become obedient after a decade of the militant occupation. Numerous Korean 
people were killed, beaten, burned to death, arrested, tortured, imprisoned, executed, 
or forced to leave their own country permanently.
202
  
Organizations, mostly secret groups, were formed among Koreans to fight for the 
country’s independence. Though most of them were independent of one another, these 
organizations almost unanimously supported the Korean Provisional Government-in-
Exile. In April 1919, immediately after the declaration, the Korean Provisional 
Government had been established in China. In December 1941, it declared war on 
Japan. During the Pacific War, the Korean army under the provisional government 
fought along with the Chinese army against the Japanese army.
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The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China had a 
conference in Cairo, Egypt in November 1943. Japan’s future after the war was one of 
the main issues of the conference. This was a historically significant meeting for 
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Korea, because the future of Korea after the war was discussed for the first time. 
Delegations from the three countries agreed to grant Korea its liberation without 
further specification. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the United States 
proposed a multi-power trusteeship and the Soviet Union concurred. No further 
commitments were made at the meeting. The United States, the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union had another meeting in Potsdam in July 1945 where they decided to 
divide Korea into two regions, North and South, 38 degrees north latitude being the 
dividing line. “For purposes of military operations,” reads a later statement of James 
Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State, “the occupation of Korea was divided north and south 
of latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas”
204
. 
 A few days before Japan surrendered, on 2 August 1945, 125,000 troops of the 
Soviet Union under Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov entered the northern part of 
Korea. On 8 September, 72,000 U.S. troops, under Lieutenant General John R. Hedge, 
landed in the southern part of Korea.
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 In December 1945, delegations from the three 
countries met in Moscow and decided to put Korea under a UN trusteeship for the 
following five years which would have been “a provisional step for Korea to prepare 
to rule its own territory as an independent country.”  
The Korean people took a stand against the trusteeship, they expressed their desire 
by using the concept of Juche or the spirit of independence which opposed outsiders 
who deemed Koreans as not mature enough to rule a country by themselves. The idea 
of a trusteeship was directly opposed to the Korean people’s wish for their future. In 
no time, massive demonstrations broke out all over the Korean peninsula. 
Demonstrators insisted that Korea should have its political independence back after 
the long period of Japanese occupation, and that Koreans must never give it up again. 

Cho Chung-kyung, Op.Cit., pp. 184.
Kim Seok-hyang, Op. Cit., p. 23.

The demonstrations were so serious that the decision was withdrawn by the same 
international delegation almost immediately. As Koreans protested against the 
trusteeship, the word Juche or the spirit of independence could be heard repeatedly in 
the Korean Peninsula.  
 
In short, the concept or the word Juche itself was first used in protest against the 
world powers who interfered with the establishment of an independent country in the 
Korean Peninsula. However, the intent behind the use of Juche changed in accordance 
with the socio-political circumstances in North Korea.     
  
3. The Emergence of Socio-Political Juche in North Korea          
 
Juche emerged from the result of two socio-political experiences in North Korea. 
On the one hand, Juche was a reaction to past political subjugation, economic 
dependence, and the need for military assistance from China and the former Soviet 
Union, which impacted on the North Korean people’s consciousness. On the other 
hand, Juche was a product of struggle for political power in North Korea. These two 
elements combined to create a state ideology following the communist history in the 
North. 
Initially, Kim Il-sung’s political power as leader of North Korea was unstable. 
First, people were suspicious of him. Everybody knew about the great hero, who 
fought bravely against the Japanese occupation, but people did not know what he 
looked like.
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 Consequently, the authenticity of Kim Il-sung’s identity was widely 
questioned in the public sphere. According to Nam Koon-woo, if Kim had not had the 
Soviet Union’s support, he might never have become a political leader in North 
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Second, Kim Il-sung, who had many political rivals, removed some significant 
political opponents and eliminated the native communist group. Nevertheless, the 
political situation was not yet totally favourable for him because the two political 
groups in the ruling party and in the government still identified themselves either as 
Soviet returnees or Yenan Koreans,
208
 rather than as Kim Il-sung’s followers. They 
did criticize Kim Il-sung’s policies.
209
 Most importantly, in terms of the background 
of the political powers, they relied on foreign powers, that is, the Soviet Union and 
China.  
Third, Kim Il-sung’s economic policy for the post-war reconstruction was 
controversial. On the one hand, he promoted heavy industry, disregarding the fact that 
Korea did not have enough resources to sustain a heavy industry. He presented a basic 
policy of economic reconstruction as soon as the Korean War ended. The main goal of 
the policy was “the priority development of heavy industry with the simultaneous 
development of light industry and agriculture.”
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 However, for the North Korean 
people the practical meaning of the policy was the development of heavy industry 
without importing foods, consumer goods, and the necessary production facilities 
because North Korea had virtually no production facilities due to the Korean War. In 
other words, this policy was not feasible unless Kim Il-sung’s regime could force 
people to produce more and consume less at the same time. Understandably, the 
policy met with widespread dissatisfaction among the public and Kim Il-sung’s rivals 
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blamed him for its failure. 
The promotion of heavy industry was coupled by the nationalization of small 
farms and private businesses which Kim Il-sung launched in early 1954. In fact, he 
had already nationalized big farms and businesses during the Democratic Reform 
(1945-1948). The nationalization of small business and farms was the last step in the 
establishment of the socialist economic system. Kim’s regime was especially eager to 
mobilize small farmers to join the cooperative farm movement.
211
 The availability of 
food was the most urgent matter after the war. However, Kim Il-sung’s hasty 
mobilization eventually turned out to be a serious source of resistance among the 
small farmers, who were once his main support. 
The Soviet returnees argued that the cooperative farm movement was moving too 
swiftly compared to the Soviet Union’s 1920-30 revolution, and it needed to be 
slowed down. The Yenan Koreans also argued that Mao’s China compensated those 
who voluntarily joined the nationalization movement, and argued that Kim’s regime 
should do the same thing for its small farmers.
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 From their point of view, Kim’s 
mandatory policy, without proper compensation, did not take into account the 
people’s wellbeing.  
The important point here was that the Soviet returnees and the Yenan Koreans not 
only criticized Kim’s policy of nationalization but also highlighted the deterioration of 
Kim’s formerly well-managed relationship with farmers and workers. Considering the 
regime’s limited popularity, this was a serious threat to Kim and his followers.  
Finally, internationally, after the death of Stalin during the aftermath of the Korean 
War (1950-1953), the de-Stalinization movement started to rage within the Soviet 
Union. Criticism of Kim Il-sung was growing in North Korea because Stalin had 
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helped Kim Il-sung seize power and Kim failed to win the Korean War.
213
 These 
added a heightened sense of instability to Kim Il-sung’s rule.  
      
In sum, the domestic socio-political and international circumstances led Kim Il-
sung to face criticism from the Soviet returnees and the Yenan Koreans for failing to 
secure popular support, for his rushed nationalization movement and his enthusiasm 
for heavy industry.   
 
3.1. The Official Emergence of Juche 
 
Kim Il-sung was alert enough to separate people in North Korea from his 
opponent groups and gave a flat warning to those inner-party factions in a plenum of 
April 1955. Kim stressed that both the Soviet returnees and the Yenan Koreans had to 
realize that they were already in North Korea, which means North Korea was, 
according to Kim, neither the Soviet Union nor China. On 28 December 1955, Kim 
gave a speech, entitled “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing 
Juche In Ideological Work,” to the propagators of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party.
214
 
Most importantly, he used the word Juche for the first time in his speech.
215
 He 
declared the idea of Juche as an indigenous expression of the Korean way of 
sovereignty and autonomy. Kim’s speech set forth the core idea of national self-
reliance and pride, emphasizing that a person without Juche is worthless; a state 
without Juche is a colony. Juche in this period is primarily directed against the 
political influence of the Soviet Union and China. The aim of the speech signalled the 
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beginning of Kim’s campaign to purge his political rivals, especially those in the 
Soviet and Chinese factions of his party. Marxism-Leninism was regarded as imported 
and in contrast with the authentic communism. Ideographs such as formalism, 
dogmatism, and revisionism originated outside of North Korea. This formulation 
might have been influenced by the ideological battle between the Soviet Union and 
China that was going on around that time: The Soviet Union called China “dogmatist” 
in the early 1950s. China then called the Soviet Union ‘revisionist.”
216
  
However, Cheong Seong-chang insists that North Korean leaders not only 
considered Stalinism the only and unique orthodox Marxist-Leninist line but 
emphasized that Juche ideology was just as “creative” in applying Stalin’s version of 
Marxism-Leninism in the Korean context. According to him, Juche began acquiring 
independent albeit superficial features that distinguished it from the imported 
Stalinism and Kim Il-sung himself was claimed to be “the great Marxist-Leninist of 
our time” after the official emergence of Juche.
217
 However, Shin Eun-hee maintains 
that the early ultra-nationalist quality of Juche served Kim’s regime well during the 
Soviet-Chinese rivalry. According to Shin, Kim Il-sung not only strongly criticized 
the imitation of foreign ways which eventually led the people into a slavish culture 
but attempted to create a Korean nationalism in his own way.
218
           
Nevertheless, Cheong continues to insist that the understanding of even the 
nationalism of North Korea was influenced for a long time by the Stalinist.
219
 
According to him, the new Soviet constitution symbolized the restoration of the state 
in 1936 and the rehabilitation of the nation was another essential feature of Stalinism. 
Compared to Stalin, Kim Il-sung demonstrated even less flexibility in regard to the 
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problems of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
220
 In addition, according 
to him, the first amendment to the official definition of ‘nation’ in North Korea was 
made when “shared bloodline” was added to the list of elements that constitute the 
nation.
221
 This indicates that North Korea regarded itself as a homogenous nation.   
It is obvious that there is a debate on origins of the the Juche ideology, Cheong 
placing much emphasis on the influence of Stalinism upon the emergence of Juche 
ideology while Shin emphasising the Korean nationalism Kim created. Kim Il-sung 
proposed the Juche ideology officially first in order to eliminate the political rivals 
and ideologies of foreign powers. As a result, a monolithic ideological system inside 
the Korean Workers’ Party was created, leaving no room for those who believed in 
any alternative. After Kim Il-sung had established the ideological system inside the 
party, his son, Kim Jong-il significantly developed and reinforced it.  
   
4. The Development of Juche Ideology      
Following the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan in1965 
the content of Juche changed dramatically. In accordance with the analysis of Nodong 
Sinmun in Kim Seok-hyang’s thesis, the annual number of articles on Juche in North 
Korea dramatically increased between 1965 to 1970,
222
 which resulted from the 
following fact among others: when Park Chung-hee’s regime (1961-1979) and his 
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ministries signed a treaty with Japan in 1965, North Korea interpreted the treaty as a 
sellout of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula to Japan and demonstrated that 
Park Chung-hee could not be self-reliant (e.g. Juche) unlike Kim Il-sung. The treaty 
also reinforced the belief of North Korea that they could only count on themselves. In 
order to remain an independent power, Kim Il-sung expressed the urgent need for 
more workers, including women.
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Juche ideology was recruited once again in order 
to mobilize the nation in the quest for economic and political self-reliance 
independent of foreign influence. From 1970 to 1980s, according to Shin Eun-hee, 
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il made Juche a more distinct ideology and philosophy, 
different from the Marxist-Leninist social ideology in spite of the fact that the initial 
meaning of Juche as a political ideology remains a philosophy of pre-war Korean 
humanism.  
In spite of the fact that there is a debate between Chang and Shin regarding the 
origin of the philosophical foundations of Juche ideology, it is clear that diplomatic 
development between South Korea and Japan impacted on the reinforcement of Juche 
ideology in North Korea, which made Juche not simply a political ideology but a 
philosophy of North Korea. This philosophical shift will be described in the next 
section. The philosophical underpinnings of Juche followed the treaty between South 
Korea and Japan, just as the evangelising crusades of South Korean Christians 
followed the 7.4 agreement of 1972. 
           
4.1. Juche Ideology of Kim Jong-il  
 
As shown in section 2 of this chapter Juche originally applied to the whole of the 
Korea people. Once the South was seen to be betraying this principle by making 
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peace with Japan, Kim Jong-il restricted loyalty to the North Korea state and its 
leaders only.  
Kim Jong-il, in his book On the Juche Idea, points out that the philosophical 
principle of the Juche ideology is that man is the master of everything and decides 
everything.
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 The four socio-historical principles of the Juche idea are as follows: 1) 
the masses of the people are the subject of social history, 2) human history is the 
history of the people’s struggle for chajusong (independence), 3) the socio-historical 
movement is a creative movement of the popular masses, 4) the people’s 
consciousness of independence plays the decisive role in revolutionary struggle. 
These are called “philosophical and socio-historical principles” by Kim Jong-il. 
The three guiding principles of the Juche idea are as follows: 1) the stand on 
independence must be maintained; Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-
sufficiency in the economy and self-reliance in defence, 2) creative methods should be 
applied, depending on the popular masses and appropriate for the actual situation, 3) 
the main stress should be placed on ideology, giving priority to ideological 
remoulding and giving precedence to political work.
225
 
The high regard for “human being” and “the masses” was applied not to the 
individual, but the community. Kim Jong-il describes the leader, the party and the 
masses in his theory of the socio-political organism of Juche ideology as structurally 
one body.  
The core of this theory of socio-political organism is that the leader, the party and 
the masses share one inseparable integrity. First, the leader is understood as the brain 
of the organism which controls all thoughts and activities. Next, the party functions 
like blood vessels in the body to deliver the leader’s guidance from the centre. It is the 
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nervous tissue of the organism. Finally, the masses, i.e. the people, who are the 
subject of revolution, receive life through their loyalty to the leader. As the body they 
faithfully carry out their duties.
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The instructions of the leader provide the North 
Koreans with criteria for their thinking and acting. Paradoxically, the most unique 
characteristic of the North Koreans was their loyalty to Kim Il-sung.  
A noble revolutionary spirit to fight for the freedom and liberation of the people, 
boundless loyalty to the party and the leader, a peerless self-sacrificing spirit and 
mass heroism which are expressed in willingly giving up one’s youth and life for the 
sake of the country and revolution, revolutionary comradeship between men and 
officers, their inseparable links with the people, and voluntary military discipline—
these are the characteristics of politico-ideological superiority peculiar to a people’s 
army, a revolutionary army.
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According to this logic, the only genuine subjects of North Korean politics were 
the party and the leader, while the masses merely represented the object of their 
politics. In other words, the “philosophical and socio-historical principles” of Juche 
ideology can be understood as a proposal addressed to the “popular masses” to 
automatically participate in the campaigns set up by the party and the leader.  
This can then be taken as a fundamental substitution of the dictatorship of the 
party for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such distinctive features of the Juche 
ideology demonstrate that the proletariat is subject to the party and its leader. This, 
importantly, may represent “the supreme and most insidious exercise of power”
228
 if 
it prevents the North Korean people from even considering discontentment by so 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences that acceptance is unquestioned. 
In this way, they accept their role in the existing order of things because they see it as 
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natural and unchangeable. There is no way for the North Korean people to accept 
anything other than their loyalty to the leaders on the ground of the philosophical and 
socio-historical principle of Juche ideology.  
 
In sum, the philosophical Juche ideology moulded the North Korean people into 
one inseparable integrity in order to strengthen loyalty toward the leaders of North 
Korea, causing them to act and think automatically in accordance with the system of 
integrity. The next section will go on to describe ideological remoulding in order to 
show how it encouraged the North Korean people to hate their enemies as means of 
strengthening their integrity. 
 
4.2. Ideological Remoulding  
               
The theory of ideological remoulding is one of many theories which form the 
basis of society of North Korea, significantly impacting on the lifestyle of North 
Koreans and on the formation of “no space for otherness.” According to Kim Jong-il, 
his major revolutionary task in modelling the whole society on Juche ideology caused 
him to set the objective of revolutionizing all members of society for the purpose of 
transforming them into communist human beings of a Juche type.
229
  
The transforming of human beings in essence means ideological remoulding 
because thoughts define a human being’s worth and quality. Ideological remoulding is 
more difficult than changing people’s conditions of material life or the enhancement 
of their cultural and technical standards. It is a struggle to eliminate the remnants of 
the old society and arm all the working people with North Korea’s communist 
ideology. The most important goal of ideological remoulding is the establishment of a 
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revolutionary world view: what the Party members and working people in North 
Korea should possess is the Juche outlook whose core is loyalty to the party and the 
leader and hatred of the enemy. According to Kim Jong-il, those who display burning 
hatred for the enemies of the revolution become genuine revolutionaries 
themselves.
230
 Kim Chang-ha, a North Korean writer, wrote The Immortal Juche 
Ideology, dealing with the ideological remoulding. 
 
The behaviour of all men are (sic) dictated by their ideological consciousness. 
Whether a man acts the patriot or the quisling is determined by his ideological 
consciousness. Those who love the country and the people will be patriots, whereas 
those who have no thought of the country and the people but only seek a life of 




Ideological consciousness based on binary thought classifies people into only two 
types: patriots and traitors, genuine revolutionaries and enemies. There seem to be no 
intermediate possibilities. It is all or nothing; you are either with me or against me. 
That kind of extreme thinking is used in wars for dehumanizing other people or those 
who are different from us. Kim Jong-il says whether one has a correct outlook on the 
revolution or not is revealed particularly at a time of severe trials.
232
According to his 
book entitled Kim Jong-il On The Juche Philosophy, there are three ways to 
strengthen true revolutionaries in North Korea: revolutionary studying, revolutionary 
organizational life and revolutionary practice.  
There are three processes underlying the formation of a communist revolutionary 
with a correct revolutionary outlook. Studying equips people with revolutionary 
ideologies, theories, strategy and tactics. The revolutionary organizational life means 
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the training of people to be ardent communists in the crucible of ideological struggle. 
Revolutionary practice makes a revolutionary hardened ideologically and in will 
power who in turn acquires revolutionary qualities and traits. In the course of class 
struggle people heighten their class consciousness, become able to tell friend from foe 
correctly and acquire an uncompromising fighting spirit against class enemies.
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The more the Party members and working people of North Korea are trained 
through revolutionary studying, revolutionary organizational life and revolutionary 
practice, the more they become revolutionary fighters who view people 
dichotomously as either friend or foe. One Christian Saeteoin explains that “North 
Korea’s logic is one of black and white. North Koreans must hate bad things and must 
take revenge on enemies ten million times. The brain of the North Korean is filled 
with the logic of black and white so they can never accept diversity and strangers.”
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Furthermore, Juche ideology is considered as politico-ideologically superior to the 
imperialist war while the North Korean people are convinced that imperialism is a 
continual source of war. This conviction leads them to identify themselves as 
revolutionaries to counter the imperialist war of aggression.
235
 
In fact, in order to defeat imperialism, North Korea set up an all-people, all-nation 
defence system, arming all the people, fortifying the whole country with the cadre 
army and modernizing the whole of the army: as the DPRK Constitution puts it: 
“arming the populace and turning the entire country into a fortress.” In a citizenry of 
23 million, one million are in the military, six million in the reserves, and almost all 
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That indicates that the North Koreans have been educated to identify themselves 
as fighters and armed revolutionaries. Juche ideology has helped the North Korean 
people maintain hostility not only against the Japanese and the United States, outsider 
powers but also against South Korea.   
The ideological remoulding resulted in a dichotomous view of people: patriots 
versus traitors or friend versus foe. North Koreans are trained as fighters against 
enemies such as the United States, Japan and South Korea, creating no room for 
accepting persons of these three nations. This finds an echo in the attitude of these 
nations, especially South Korea, towards both North Korea and Juche ideology, 
ignoring the fact (though admittedly with more choices) that all systems of education 
limit perceptions of self and otherness.              
 
5. Juche Ideology and Christianity 
                 




The socio-political Juche ideology has a religious character; in particular, Kim Il-
sung irreversibly committed himself to the transformation of Juche from a Marxist-
Leninist ideology into a new embryonic religion. In this section I will investigate how 
the religious character of Juche ideology emerged.  
It is useful to understand why North Korea put its people in quarantine from the 
world. There were at least three important socio-political factors that affected Kim Il-
sung’s regime during the 1980s and early 1990s. First, this era was marked by a long-
term economic stagnation in North Korea. The structure of Juche functioned to 
articulate some immediate socio-political issues including the economic slowdown for 
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the North Korean people, providing them with a significant motivation for hard work. 
They had become used to the non-competitive economic system that Kim Il-sung’s 
regime manufactured for a long time. However, the North Korean economy was 
slowing from the late 1960s,
238
 which made Kim Il-sung mobilize the people by 
providing another type of motivation. Second, the international system underwent 
profound changes from the late 1980s. The Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen 
separate countries and the demise of the bipolar structure signalled the end to the Cold 
War.
239
 These changes made North Korea promote strong national solidarity. Third, 
Kim Il-sung needed to give Kim Jong-il heirship. In particular, the issue of Kim Jong-
il’s heirship seemed another motive for Kim’s regime to develop a facet of Juche 
ideology,
240
 and Kim Jong-il himself assumed a significant role in the Juche theory of 
revolution.  
In these circumstances, North Korea needed something stronger than before in 
order to integrate the North Korean people and to mobilize them. It is interesting that 
Juche ideology was newly associated with “our style of socialism”
241
 in 1991, 
considering the ever-growing economic gap between the North and South. “The 
superiority of our style of socialism” has been constantly emphasized since then. 
Wherever I visited in North Korea, I found the slogan “The superiority of our style of 
socialism” written on the streets or on the walls inside or outside of buildings.  
The very notion of “ours is superior” may function as a foundation for the North 
Korean people to maintain self-pride in a situation of economic slowdown, especially 
compared to the South Koreans’ remarkable economic progress. The well-established 
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Juche strongly supported the notion of “the superiority of our society” by 
manufacturing a contrasting characterization between the North and the South. 
Viewed from the notion, I heard it several times from those whom I met in North 
Korea that North Korea was a society that sticks to each person’s political 
independence whereas South Korea was a corrupted society of the rich-get-richer and 
the poor-get-poorer. In spite of the fact that the notion of “the superiority of our 
society” does not seem to be related to the religious aspect of Juche ideology, it 
signalled the change toward a religious ideology of deification with both Kim Il-sung 
and Kim Jong-il as its heart, indeed its saviour.  
                   
5.1. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s Encounter with Christianity 
 
It is necessary here to consider the experiences of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in 
order to understand links between Juche ideology and Christianity.  
Kim Il-sung was born in Mangyongdae
242
 on 15 April1912 as the eldest son of Kim 
Hyong-jik and Kang Pan-sok. His father seemed to be a Christian because, according 
to Kim il-sung’s reminiscences, he had attended Soongsil Middle School where the 
Bible was taught and had many Christian friends whom Kim il-sung had opportunities 
to meet.
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 His mother’s father was an elder of a church and she was his second 
daughter and a Christian. Her first name Pan-sok is unusual in Korea because it came 
from Peter’s nickname,
244
 meaning ‘the rock.’ This implies that Kim Il-sung grew up 
in a Christian family. Moreover, he attended a church which his mother would go to in 
Songsan in Northern Korea. He recalled in his book that her mother often dozed off 
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
during prayers and he would shake her to tell her that the prayer was over when she 
did not wake even after the amen.
245
  
Furthermore, he received great help from Rev. Son Jong-do while in prison in 
China. He visited Rev. Son Jong-do’s house to express his gratitude after he was 
released in 1929.
246
 According to his reminiscences, he frequently went to the chapel 
in which Rev. Song worked as a minister in order to play the organ and guide the 
activities of the choir as a director.
247
 He confessed that “the minister loved me as if I 
were his own son.
248
 It is obvious that Kim Il-sung experienced and learnt about 
Christianity: whether he was baptised is unclear. He says that his father was an atheist 
and that even his mother did not believe in God despite attending Sunday service. He 
also confesses that he seldom went to church because he became tired of the tedious 
religious ceremony and the monotonous preaching of the minister.
249
 
Nevertheless, he received a great deal of humanitarian assistance from Christians 
even though he insists that he was not affected by religion. Yet he took that faith to 
some extend as a yardstick, stating: “I do not think that the spirit of Christianity which 
preaches universal peace and harmony contradicts my idea of advocating an 
independent life for man.”
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   It is said that Kim Jong-il was affected by Kim Il-sung’s attitude toward 
Christianity, in terms of the relationship between the two leaders. He mentioned 
briefly in his article titled Juchesasangui Kibone Daehae (About the Basis of Juche 
Idea) that “su-ryong (leader or head) did not denounce religions and its believers but 
only the machination of imperialists who abuse religions. Religion is not totally 

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wrong but has good elements. It is good to teach that human beings love each other 
and live in peace.”
251
  
These indicate that the experiences of Christianity of both Kim Il-sung and Kim 
Jong-il could have influenced the development of religious Juche ideology.  
 




Kim Byoung-lo points out three common essential elements of religions: doctrines, 
rituals and community.
253
 In the case of North Korea, Juche ideology satisfies all the 
three essential religious requirements: 1) doctrines of deification of Kim Il-sung and 
Kim Jong-il, provided by the two Kim’s writings, teachings, and on-the-spot 
guidance; 2) enshrined rituals and behaviour patterns concerning the veneration of 
these two leaders; 3) one inseparable integrity of the leader, the party and the masses 
as one socio-political organism. Indeed, despite the fact that Juche ideology does not 
seem to be deeply rooted in religion, Kim Jong-il and the deceased Kim II-sung are 
effectively worshipped as God incarnate in the Juche religion.
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North Korean people believe that Kim Il-sung will be with them forever, giving 
his followers eternal life: he, as God in Christianity, is immortal. Human beings are 
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North Korea’s 1998 revised constitution, the late Great Leader Kim Il-sung, after his 
death, was anointed “eternal President of the Republic.”
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 I observed at various 
places in North Korea the slogan “Kimilsung Dongjineun Uriwa Yongwonhui 




“Kim Il-sung is indeed the saviour who revived our nation and led the Korean people 
in a sacred revolutionary struggle.”
257
 The religious Juche ideology holds that North 
Korea’s ultimate salvation will arrive after Kim Jong-il has brought about the eventual 
defeat of their enemies: the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Spreading Juche 
across the world will mark the subsequent arrival of paradise on earth.
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 In other 
words, the two leaders are saviours who have defeated the enemies of North Korea, 
bringing salvation to North Korea and paradise. Moreover, the arrival of paradise will 
be on earth when Juche spreads across the world. This is clearly a millennial 
movement with Kim Jong-il and his father as Messiahs. 
In Christian theology, ‘salvation’ is the most widely used word to express the 
provision of God for our human plight. It can be used for any kind of situation in 
which a human being is delivered from enemies (Ps. 44:7) or from some danger etc. 
In particular, in the Old Testament the verb ‘save’ expresses God’s actions in 
delivering his people. In this sense, there is strong if restricted similarity between 
Juche and Christianity, although in the New Testament, the sense of rescue or 
deliverance is still uppermost, but the reference is to deliverance from sin (Rom. 5:9-
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 This is not found in religious Juche ideology. It would be interesting to 
explore further the extent to which the premillennial leanings of Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church echo this aspect of Juche ideology. On the one hand, as described 
in the previous chapter, Youngnak Presbyterian Church is very much influenced by 
premillennial ideology with a belief that spreading the Gospel and defeating 
Communism by means of the “National Evangelical Campaign” will lead Korea to 
become a good Christian nation, in the expectation that there will be only Christianity 
in the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, religious Juche ideology has also strong 
premillennial ideology with a belief that after Kim Jong-il defeats all his ememies, 
paradise on earth will arrive, in the expectation that there will be only communists on 




The leader is likened to the brain and heart of an individual person, the Korean 
Workers Party as the leader’s organization is likened to the backbone and blood 
vessels, and the masses, i.e. populace to the body. In terms of this theory, the leader 
gives the masses life. It is eternal life or immortal life of socio-political organization 
as Kim Jong-il describes:  
  
Great Leader Kim Il-sung clarified for the first time in history that there is eternal 
socio-political life distinct from the physical life of the individual. Just as a man’s brain 
is the centre of his life, the leader is the top brain in the socio-political community 
because he is the focal point which directs the organism…we must understand that and 
believe that the leader is the centre of life of the socio-political community and it is 
only when we are linked to the leader organizationally, ideologically, and as comrades 
can we acquire eternal socio-political life. Uniting around the leader into one 
organization with a single ideology…the masses form a socio-political organism which 

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is eternal as an independent being. The physical life of a person is finite, but the life of 
the masses rallied as an independent organism is eternal.
260
     
  
   The eternal socio-political life is given to those who are in a strong relationship 
with and united with the leader. This is similar to Christianity. In the biblical view, 
eternal life means ‘the life of the age to come,’ it implies not only everlastingness but 
a quality of life derived from relationship with Christ (Rom. 6:23; Jn. 17:3).
261
                   
In terms of the similarity of these doctrines of immortality, salvation and eternal 
life, it can be viewed that the religious character of Juche ideology has echoes of 
Christianity which may derive from it, given the background and experiences of 




Juche ideology has unique ritual such as Sun Day, Kim Il-sung’s birthday and the 
practice of Juche Era, Kim-Il-sung’s birthplace etc.  
First of all, when Juche ideology became a religion, Kim’s 1955 speech faded into 
insignificance together with his guerrilla past activities in the 1930s. Instead, 
Mangyongdae, a small village near Pyongyang, where Kim Il-sung was born in 1912 
was defined as a special place. Kim Il-sung’s birthplace became the birthplace of 
Juche and subsequently became a holy site. When I visited Mangyongdae, I heard the 
following from a North Korean female guide in 2007: “this is the place where our 
leader Kim was born and grew up for the future of our fatherland. Many foreign 
visitors and North Koreans visited Mangyongdae to learn about the root of Juche 
ideology.” Kim Il-sung began to transform Juche ideology into a personality cult to 
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strengthen his authority. This process culminated in Kim Il-sung declaring himself 
and his family to be divine. 
Kim Il-sung’s deification was a long-term process. In spite of the fact that it is 
difficult to identify an exact line of demarcation, the full-scale deification of Kim Il-
sung seems to have started around 1966, when his birthday was made a national 
holiday.
262
 15 April is the most important public holiday in North Korea, and is 
commemorated as the “Taeyangjeol” (“Day of the Sun”).   
According to my interviewees, North Koreans celebrate Kim’s birthday with extra 
food rations and new clothes, gifts given by both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. This is 
analogous with the Christmas tradition of giving gifts to loved ones, though that 
exchange usually assumes both donor and recipient are alive. Furthermore, North 
Korean people consider 1912 to be the first year of Juche Era since Kim Il-sung was 
born in 1912.
263
 Kim Il-sung’s birthday marks North Korea’s indigenous modification 
of Anno Domini: the year of the Lord Kim Il-sung. North Korean computation of time 
and date is based on the eternal President’s birthday. This calendar was used so 
extensively that I never once came across dates denoted according to the Christian 
calendar alone during my visits, contrary to South Korean practice. 
Kim Il-sung’s pictures and statues are another symbol of his successful deification. 
Everyone wore a portrait of the round-faced, unsmiling Kim Il-sung on a gold-framed, 
enamelled badge. Larger portraits and statues of the leaders were everywhere. Every 
room had a picture of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, implying a devotion which on the 
face of it seems much stronger than that of Christians.  
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The doctrines and rituals endow Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il with super-human and 
semi-divine attributes. Subsequently, there is a strong community termed the socio-
political body or organism or the socio-political community, which strives for socio-
political integrity and socio-political immortality.  
According to Kim Jong-il, the North Korean socio-political body is familial.
264
  
It is a true feature of our society that all its members form a large harmonious family. 
In our country, everyone regards and supports the leader as they would their own father. 
They trust and follow the Party, regarding its embrace as that of their own mother’s. 
The leader, the Party and the people form one socio-political organism, and share the 
same destiny. The whole of the society overflows with communist morality.
265
     
The society of North Korea is viewed as one big family led by a benevolent father 
to whom unconditional respect and gratitude are owned. Su-ryong is revered like 
parents by the whole society. Kim Jong-il says that  
children love and respect their parents not because their parents are always superior to 
those of others or because the children receive benefits from them, but because the 
parents are benefactors of their lives who gave birth to them and have brought them 
up…All the communist revolutionaries of Korea have been accorded immortal 
political integrity by the fatherly leader…Therefore, the loyalty of our party members 
and working people to great leader is unconditional.
266
   
   
This became crystallized to me as I sat in a restaurant watching a North Korean’s 
performance singing. “ …as your mother I am proud of my son keeping the big family 
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of our nation beyond a fence of a family…I am the happiest as my son is called to be 
a solder of our leader…”
267
  One Korean scholar notes that “Nowhere in the history 
of political theory has this level of rationalization for collectivism been articulated.”
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It is possible for the North Korean people to perform the Arirang stadium spectaculars 
or mass games in which tens of thousands of participants march and twirl in precise 
harmony. Thousands of persons lining the stadium bleachers lift colour placards in 
perfectly timed unison, displaying symbols of praise to Great Leader Kim Il-sung and 
Kim Jong-il. It is clear that religious Juche ideology has created a large familial 
community which can be mobilized to praise their Leader. Thomas J. Belke stresses 
that North Korea is not a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in which religious practices are 
virtually non-existent but Juche’s has approximately 23 million adherents who 
worship their visible and less visible leaders.
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Juche ideology as a religion leads the North Korean people to accept Kim Il-sung is 
divine. They value the instructions of the leader as divine, ordinances which are 
naturally to be obeyed. This is the expression of strong power in terms of Lukes’s 
concept: “they accept their role in the existing order of things because they value it as 




6. Influence of Juche on North Korean Life 
  
All kinds of theories maintaining the current society of North Korea are based on 
the core of Juche ideology, impacting on the life style of the North Koreans.  As the 
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supposed creation of Kim Il-sung himself, Juche has taken on defining roles in 
virtually every aspect of North Korean life.
271
 Kim Jong-il is claimed to be the 
legitimate interpreter of the Juche system and its implementation in all areas of state 
function, for it applies in every possible area in North Korea: Juche education, Juche 
science, Juche medical science, Juche philosophy, Juche architecture, Juche farming 
methods, Juche poultry, Juche fisheries, Juche art, Juche movies, Juche literature, 
Juche gymnastics, and Juche athletics etc.  
Every nation holds a socio-political ideology but its flavour is unique to each one of 
them. However, a crucial difference between Juche and most other religious systems 
at the present time is that Juche is proclaimed by the state as a monolithic value 
system whereby diverse interpretations of socio-political events are strictly 
prohibited.
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 Kim Jong-il explicitly proclaims that nothing except for Juche ideology 
can be tolerated in North Korea, and pluralism can never be acceptable.
273
 The 
monolithic doctrine of Juche ideology leaves little room for freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion or belief. In the contemporary world, some Islamic countries 
such as Saudi Arabia prohibit any other religious practices other than Islam. In 
European history, particular versions of Christianity were insisted upon, all other 
traditious being prohibited. 15
th
 century Spain expelled all Jews and Muslims and so 
the insistence on total uniformity is not new. However, the capacity to demand and 
achieve uniformity is not common. 
Suh Dae-sook points out that the political socialization process to indoctrinate the 
North Korean people with Juche ideology seems to have been so intense that a self-
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reliant attitude toward each other and the outside world appears to have become a part 
of the culture. The stronger they have been armed by Juche ideology, the more 
difficult they accept those who are socialized by other ideologies. The converse of this 
we shall see in the following chapter on the CW learning in South Korea.    
 It is not surprising that Juche ideology is such a pervasive part of North Korean 
life and thinking when one realizes the extent to which citizens are required to study 
and even memorize authoritative teachings and messages. Officially, North Koreans 
are on a daily schedule to work for eight hours, study messages sent by the authorities 
for eight hours and sleep for eight hours.
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 Although this regimen may not be strictly 
followed by the average citizens, there is still a daily requirement for children and 
adults to have political study sessions in which Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s works 
are read and discussed. Such study sessions begin at the kindergarten level and 
continue throughout the rest of one’s life. In particular, Party-led weekly obligatory 
small group discussions are held either at work or in residential neighbourhoods that 
were called “Summation of All Daily Life” (Saenghwal Chonghwar) and “mutual or 
reciprocal self-criticism” (Hosang Bipan), through which the population would be 
kept on the correct path of revolutionary thought. All North Koreans have to conduct 
such reviews of their life once or twice a week, based on the instructions of the leader. 
As religions have sacred books, so North Koreans have the instructions of the leader 
which are used by them as criteria for their thinking and acting. Wherever I stayed at 
places in North Korea, I could see the core words of the instructions of the leader, 
which are either carved in stone or framed, in full view on the inside and outside of 
buildings in North Korea. 
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6.1. The Power of Juche Ideology   
  
It is clear that Juche is a mechanism by which the North Korean leadership 
maintains legitimacy and demands strict obedience from the people. The following 
example demonstrates the extent of loyalty felt by another person called Kim:  
Kim’s work unit decided to finish an electric railroad before the 15th of April, the 
birthday of the fatherly leader. A few days after the unit started to work, Kim had a sore 
finger on his right hand. Kim may have needed surgery for the finger. Kim’s boss 
ordered him to rest and not to work. Nevertheless, Kim sneaked into the work place. 
The boss found Kim and scolded him for not resting. Kim replied, “I am doing what I 
really want to do. If I take a rest today, what would I say to the fatherly leader when 
my friends finish the electric railroad on the coming on 15 April and present their 
loyalty to the fatherly leader? Shall I report to the fatherly leader that I took rest 
because of my sore finger? You know I can not do that…Do not worry about me. I will 
find something I can do without using my finger.” The boss was deeply touched by 
Kim’s loyalty toward the Leader Kim and reluctantly permitted Kim to return to work. 
Then Kim pulled a cart, full of soil, up a steep slope by using his shoulder. This was 
the attitude of Juin who was full of the Juche blood.
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It was neither because they needed to earn money nor because someone forced 
them to work. They wished to work hard because they wanted to work for the fatherly 
leader Kim Il-sung. The North Koreans are obliged, and feel committed, to 
understand Juche, and think and act strictly in accordance with its requirements. 
Through the socialization, Juche ideology exercises power over the North Korean 
people leading them to obey the instruction of the leader automatically. It is the 
supreme exercise of power to secure the compliance of the North Korean people by 
controlling their thoughts and desires in the light of the three dimensional power of 
Steven Lukes: “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not 
want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or 
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determining his very wants.”
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 Thought control takes more mundane forms through 
the processes of socialization, he says, and the most effective and insidious use of 




Conclusion      
 
The hypothesis with which this chapter began is that the evolution of Juche 
ideology made the North Korean people act and think in accordance with the 
instructions of the leader who could mobilize them any time. In conclusion we must 
return to this hypothesis and ask whether or not it is confirmed by the evidence that 
has been examined that the evolution of Juche ideology led to a socio-political, 
philosophical and religious ideology. When the word or concept Juche first entered 
the common consciousness, it referred to the desire of the Korean people to become 
independent and self reliant as opposed to being subjected to outside political powers.  
The socio-political characteristics of Juche ideology emerged officially in 1954 in 
order to strengthen Kim Il-sung’s political power, using it to purge his political rivals, 
in particular, Soviet returnees and Yenan Koreans who were dependent on foreign 
powers. It also eliminated ideologies of foreign Marxist powers such as formalism, 
dogmatism, and revisionism. As a result, a monolithic ideological system inside the 
Korean Workers’ Party was created, leaving no room for those who have other 
ideologies.  
The philosophical aspects of Juche were developed and brought very clearly to the 
fore following South Korea’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan. Kim 
Jong-il declared North Korea to form one inseparable integrity consisting of a single 
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socio-political organism instructed by the brain i.e. the leader who provides the North 
Koreans with criteria for their thinking and acting. This strengthens the hypothesis of 
this chapter, that Juche had become a quasi-religious system in the light of the 
working definition of James L. Cox: “Religion is a varied, symbolic expression of that 




In particular, it was shown that ideological remoulding significantly impacted on 
the life style of North Koreans: the leader of North Korea set the objective of 
revolutionizing all members of society for the purpose of transforming them into 
communist human beings of a Juche type. North Korean people learnt to distinguish 
friend from foe, and to maintain a burning hatred for their enemies such as Americans, 
Japanese and South Koreans.  
In turning Juche ideology into religion, Juche ideology was proclaimed to 
originate from Mangyongdae where Kim Il-sung was born in 1912. Through the 
comparison of Juche ideology and Christianity, similarities in the doctrines of 
immortality, salvation and eternal life and in the community of the socio-political 
organism have been identified. In particular, eternal socio-political life is given to 
those who are firmly united with the leader in a strong relationship. The North Korean 
people are obliged to act, think and obey in accordance with the instructions of their 
Saviour in order to receive salvation from their leader.  
In demonstration of the influence of Juche ideology on the North Korean life, all 
kinds of theories establishing the society of North Korea based on the core of Juche 
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ideology impact on the formation of a patterned life style of the North Korean people. 
These not only made North Korea’s system to be a monolithic ideological one but the 
features of Juche were used as criteria for the thinking and acting of its citizens, who, 
as far as can be ascertained, automatically follow the leader’s instructions.  
 
Conclusion to Part One         
               
  The purpose of Part One of this thesis was to describe the emergence and 
development of two contrasting ideologies, anti-communist ideology of the CW and 
Juche ideology of the CS, which influenced the formation of the ethnic identities of 
the two groups.      
The anti-communist ideology of the CW began in Northern Korea as a reaction to 
the emergence of a serious anti-Christianity Movement of communists which was in 
turn related to the anti-missionary movement. The anti-missionary movement 
originally arose against these missionaries who rigidly adhered to a conservative faith 
which excluded socio-politic issues in the period of the Japanese occupation although 
there was an anti-missionary movement in China at the same time with a solely anti-
Western orientation. 
On the other hand, while the word Juche emerged after the liberation in 1945 as an 
expression of yearning for independence from foreign powers, socio-political Juche 
ideology emerged officially in 1954 to strengthen Kim Il-sung’s power against his 
foreign backed rivals, developing into a fully-organized religio-philosophical system 
in the years following. 
In considering the development of the two ideologies, Northwestern Conservative 
Christians were persecuted by communists and migrated to South Korea. Since then 
the anti-communist ideology of conservative CW developed further and was made 
	
stronger by various factors: the suffering caused by communists in post-liberation 
years and during the Korean War. In particular, anti-communist education by the 
South Korean state and the national evangelical campaign continually strengthened 
the anti-communist ideology of the CW. Conversely, in North Korea, Juche ideology 
developed a philosophical aspect. Its main elements were the creation of one 
inseparable integrity through the concept of a socio-political organism which consists 
of the leader, the Party and the masses. Later on Juche transformed North Korea into a 
nation of monotheism that had its own doctrines, rituals and community, which 
created the monolithic ideological system. 
With regard to the formation of the unique behaviour and perception of the two 
groups formed by contrasting ideologies, the CW, fully socialized by anti-communist 
ideology to perceive the CS automatically as monsters, liars etc. and stigmatize them, 
assuming them to be spies, unfaithful persons and so on. Similarly, the CS, 
indoctrinated by socio-political, philosophical and religious Juche ideology, were 
fully socialized to act and think automatically in accordance with the principles of 
Juche ideology. In particular, the practice of “ideological remoulding” impacted on 
their perception of fellow human beings, teaching them to distinguish friend from foe, 
and maintaining a burning hatred for their enemies such as South Koreans etc. 
It may be concluded that the contrasting ideologies created two unique sets of 
perception patterns and behaviours among an originally similar people as they lived in 
different societies for over half a century. Moreover, the differences between the 
identity of the two populations seem extremely stark. However, the CW assume that 
the CW and the CS still share homogeneity and if there appears to be heterogeneity, 
the CW assume the recovery of homogeneity will be completed soon. However, all 
the CS interviewed think that their identity is significantly different from the CW one 
	
and feel that it is tremendously difficult to unlearn their world-view which is deeply 
embedded in all aspect of their lives. This makes it difficult for the CS to live together 
with the CW and adjust in Youngnak Presbyterian Church when the two groups 
encounter each other. Therefore we should understand how much both differ 
profoundly different from each other, which will be the focus of Part B, and how they 
can be integrated harmoniously, which will be proposed in Part C.   
	
Part Two   
 





There has been a general consensus that the people of both North and South Korea 
form one ethnic group. The South Korean churches have also been in no doubt that 
the people of the two Koreas form one ethnicity, expecting them to welcome each 
other when they come together. However, if the perception of Korea’s myth of 
homogeneity will create difficulties for both North Koreans and South Koreans were 
the two Koreas ever to be reunified, the relations between the CW and the CS in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church can perhaps be seen as a foretaste of those problems.  
The aim of Part 2 is to demonstrate that the ethnic identity of both the CW and the 
CS is not homogeneous but heterogeneous and it affects their interaction with each 
other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The differences are most marked with 
reference to material symbols, verbal symbols and behavioural symbols.  
The use of these symbols in encounters points to the differences between the two 
communities although the existence of these differences has not fully been 
acknowledged by the church. Thus, the CW and the CS tend to exclude each other 
from their smaller social circles as they are unable to bridge the gap between them, for 
they did not expect to exist in the first place. However, as shown in Part 1 the 
differences in their experiences are indeed significant: the CW have learnt by 
experience or education to be anti-communists, and the CS have learnt to follow the 
state ideology of Juche and be anti-capitalist. 
	
Moreover, these differences would be just as marked if a reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula happened; therefore instead of wishing them away it is paramount 
that these differences are dealt with, preferably by superseding them, finding a 
common ground that both groups are willing to stand on. The dangers of inaction are 
apparent even at present as the CS might even consider leaving the church whose 
primary aim is to help them adapt to life and church in South Korea. Evidence was 
presented in Part one which shows that the CW were not ready to receive the CS in 
light of their apparent difference. Is it possible, then, that the two communities can 
still maintain the same ethnic identity, even after living under the circumstances of 
different ideologies for a period lasting over half a century? Surprisingly, no academic 
thesis on this issue has yet been published. 
North and South Korea shared the same 5000-year history up to the last century. 
From partition in 1945 to the present, the two Koreas have essentially taken divergent 
paths politically, ideologically, economically and socially. The contrasting two 
ideologies occurring in the two Koreas because of the imposition of Juche ideology in 
the North and anti-communist ideology in the South highlights that each country in 
fact is evolving to a different kind of ethnic identity from that are described in Part 
One. With the development of North Korea’s unique Juche ideology, a unique set of 
behaviours were learnt and exhibited by North Koreans, which they could not simply 
unlearn just by crossing into the South and becoming Christians. Further, South 
Korea’s anti-communist ideology established behaviour patterns and perceptions 
which made it difficult to accept new migrants from the North.   
I will not attempt here to deal with all the Korean Christians who attend Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church. I will focus my attention on Christian Saeteomin and Christian 
Wolnammin, who attended BSCFP in the church at the time of my field work. As 
	
discussed earlier in the methodology section of this thesis, I will evaluate data which I 
collected in South Korea and North Korea, including both in-depth interviews and 
participant observation in the BSCFP run by Youngnak for Christian Saeteomin. 
Having presented the argument for dissimilar identities through describing the state 
ideologies in Part 1, it is now time to turn to the evidence collected during the 
research period. 
 
1. Ethnic Identity 
 
1.1. Perspectives on Ethnic Identity 
 
Frederick Barth, in his book Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, argues that ethnic 
identity is malleable and strongly emphasizes the fact that the primary feature of an 
ethnic group is that this is a category of ascription by others and identification by the 
members themselves.
279
 According to Barth, the word ethnic group in the 
anthropological sense is generally understood as a population which: ‘1. is largely 
biologically self-perpetuating 2. shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt 
unity in cultural forms 3. makes up a field of communication and interaction 4. has a 
membership which identifies itself, and it is identified by others, as constituting a 
category distinguishable from other categories of the same order’.
280
  
For Barth the crucial term in examining the phenomenon of ethnic groups is 
ethnic boundaries. The boundaries define the group, not a culture that it encloses.
281
 
Firstly, they establish the internal criteria of membership in order to recognize insiders 
and outsiders; secondly, the social life of the group takes place within the ethnic 
279
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boundaries, which define the relations and the patterns of behaviour of the fellow 
members. In other words, ethnic boundaries help to identify a person as an insider of a 
particular ethnic group (a fellow member), and at the same time, they constitute the 
barriers to distinguish the others as strangers (outsiders, members of another ethnic 
group). From this perspective, if the CW and the CS have differing self-recognized 
patterns of behaviour, against which they measure each other, this means that there are 
two distinct groups with distinct identities. 
Boundaries are not fixed, or unchanging, and there will usually be a variety of 
practices and attitudes within a given group. Moreover, as Anthony Cohen stressed in 
his book ‘The Symbolic Construction of the Community’, the group boundaries may 
have different natures:  
some like national or administrative can be statutory and enshrined in law, some 
may be physical, expressed, perhaps, by a mountain range or sea, some may be 
racial or linguistic or religious. But not all boundaries, nor all components of 
any boundary, are so objectively apparent. They may be thought of, rather, as 




Cohen’s main argument is that whether or not the structural and territorial 
boundaries have influence, the reality of the community lies in its members’ 
perception of the vitality of its culture. People construct community mainly 
symbolically and the consciousness of community is, therefore, strictly related to the 
perception of these boundaries. In this perspective, if the CW can recognize their 
verbal and behavioural symbols as properly Korean whereas the CS cannot, and each 
sees the symbols of the other as wrong, the two groups do not share the same identity.  
The concept of ethnic boundaries, therefore, effectively indicates lines, or perhaps 
less sharply defined fissures, which distinguish populations, allowing us to contrast 
282
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the two and assess the relations between them. It is against this basis that the verbal 
and behavioural differences of the two groups will be analyzed in this study, focusing 
on interaction between the CW and the CS.  
The CW and the CS strongly believe that South Korean and North Korean are one 
ethnicity-at least thought so before living together in Seoul. This is because they 
assume that 1) they share the same blood, fundamental language, and traditional 
culture etc. 2) they have similar emotions 3) they still keep a strong sense of unity 4) 
they are still closely related by family ties: father and son, brother and sister ready to 
burst into tears when they meet each other.
However, I argue that there is a different ethnic identity between both in terms of 
the definitions and interpretations of ethnic identity by Anthony Cohen and Fredric 
Barth. I contend that the differences are due to recent history. The two groups have a 
drastically different ethnic identity formed over half a century of limited or no contact. 
Only when they meet in church do they begin to realize that they are not the same. 
Their identity was modulated and moderated while they were divided for half a 
century. The theory of the two anthropologists is very relevant as it explains how this 
can happen.   
 
1.2. Two Contrasting Perspectives in Korea Regarding Ethnicity 
 
In analyzing the contributions to Hankuksa Siminkangjwa
283
 (The Citizen’s Forum 
on Korean History) two contrasting perspectives become apparent with regard to the 
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understanding of Korean ethnicity.  
One view, by Lee and Han, argues that Koreans have been and still are 
homogeneous, using words and phrases such as ‘the history of five thousand years,’ 
‘one descent,’ and ‘one race.’ These have been used both as symbolic and realistic 
expressions among Koreans. The myth of homogeneity means not only that Korea has 
been one nation from the old ages without amalgamating with any different nations 
but also that Koreans belong to a tribe of one lineage.
284
 
In contrast, the other texts, by Lee and Ahn, argue that ‘one stock’ and ‘one race’ 
are modern concepts and no nation could have survived and exist as a genuinly 
homogeneous nation without cultural and racial mixture with other cultures and 
nations. Thus notions that Korea is a “biological kinship community” coming from 
one ancestor are historically unsupported.  
Lee Ki-dong and Han Woo-keun both insist that Koreans follow the production and 
reproduction of historical narratives of continuity and homogeneity. Lee Ki-dong says 
that Korea is one of the very rare homogeneous nations,
285
 adding that the “Korean 
nation can be proud of the fact that it was formed before the modern era, maintained 





Blood and language are the main shared components in the 
Korean nation. Han Woo-keun, in his book The Korean Full History, insists that blood 
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and language were treated as unchangeable components because there has been no 
immigration on a massive scale to the Korean Peninsula from outside since the three 
kingdom period.
288
         
On the other hand, Lee Seon-bok and Ahn Seong-mo insist that Koreans can be 
characterized as producing and reproducing historical narratives of discontinuity and 
heterogeneity. Lee Seon-bok says that “it can be neither scientific fact nor a historic 
one if we Koreans believe that we are one nation that has the history of 5,000 years as 
an offspring of Tangun in spite of the fact that it inspires historical and national 
consciousness for Koreans.”
289
 The myth is a falsehood imparted with education, 
claiming that “that kind of genuine nation has not existed up to the present in Korean 
history, and it is meaningless to argue the time and extent of immigration and mixing 
of races.”
290
 Ahn Seung-mo also insists that no nation can survive and exist as a 
genuine homogeneous nation without cultural and racial mixing with other cultures 
and nations.
291
    
According to the latter historians, the insistence on continuity and homogeneity 
has been used as a means both to teach Koreans to forge a national consciousness and 
to plant pride in Koreans when they were victims and became weak such as the period 
of Japanese occupation etc. The frequent usage of words such as ‘one race’, and ‘one 
people’ is the product of modern times, especially from the late 1800s, states Ahn.
292
  
In other words, the reason why the idiomatic expressions such as ‘one stock’ and 
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‘homogeneous nation’ were reemphasized in the Korean Peninsula was to fight the 
invasions of neighbouring countries. Lim Hyeon-jin also points out that the idea that 
Korea has been a “homogeneous nation since the pre-modern era” is still a problem 




Eric Hobsbawm points out in The Invention of Tradition, that ‘invented traditions’ 
are related to the ‘nation’ with its associated phenomena such as nationalism, the 
nation-state, national symbols etc.
294
 He says that ‘invented traditions’ have three 
overlapping types: ‘a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the 
membership of groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or 
legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main 
purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions 
of behaviour.’
295
    
Hobsbawm’s clarity is echoed by Park Cheol-hui, who insists that the textbooks 
for Primary Schools in South Korea were expressly written on the basis of ‘Danil 
Minjokjueui’ (Homogeneous Ethnicity).
296
 In other words, this indicates that an 
‘imagined community’ has been created in South Korea, which has encouraged the 
Korean people to firmly believe that they are ‘one race’ and ‘one people.’  
Benedict Anderson points out, in his book ‘Imagined Communities’, using the 
term ‘nation-ness’ in place of the terms ‘ethnicity’, the following definition of nation: 
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‘it is an imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign.’
297
 It is imagined because members will never know most of their fellow-
members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is limited 
because it has finite, though elastic boundaries beyond which lie other nations. It is 
sovereign because it came to maturity at a stage of human history when freedom was 
a rare and precious ideal. And it is imagined as a community because it is conceived 
as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
298
 According to him, nationality, nation-ness, and 
nationalism are cultural artifacts whose creation toward the end of the 18th century 
was the spontaneous distillation of a complex “crossing” of discrete historical forces; 
but, once created, they became “modular,” capable of being transplanted to a great 
variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a variety of political and 
ideological constellations.
299
This well reflects the Korean context, where many in the 
South at least still feel that both Koreas are one people in spite of all the differences 
that have come about over the past forty years. They firmly believe that unification 
will recover Korean cultural and national identity and homogeneity which were 
ruptured by the years of division. This means unification is often glossed over as the 
“recovery of homogeneity.”
300
This is bound to lead to a disappointment, given the 
socio-cultural divergence of the last sixty years.         
   Most importantly, the expectation of homogeneity hinders progress in the 
construction of community shared between the CW and the CS, because they are ill-
prepared for difference and even alienation. Both groups suffer from the problems of 
misinterpretation of their verbal symbols and behavioural symbols during interactions. 
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This chapter will propose that there is a need for both groups to understand one 
another’s verbal and behavioural symbols, moving beyond the myth of homogeneity, 
‘invented traditions,’ and ‘imagined community.’  
Nothing has been published about this subject in South Korea. Roy Richard 
Grinker points out in his book Korea and Its Futures, ‘no one has yet figured out a 
way to talk about north-south differences without appearing to somehow justify the 
status quo of division or being accused of offering justification for those who might 
want to keep divided.’
301
    
 
2. Theoretical Frame  
  
In Part 2, I will utilize Clifford Geertz’s ‘thick description’, in order to describe and 
interpret the symbolic structure formed by the respective ideologies among the CW 
and the CS. There can be different material symbols, verbal symbols and behavioural 
symbols among them, which mark the boundary of their identities.
302
 Symbols 
without a shared interpretation can often lead to misunderstandings.  
In The Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz criticizes scholars working in various 
traditions who propose numerous answers to the question of how ideology forms 
complex social conditions. According to him, the main defect of the traditional 
theories of ideology is that they go directly “from source analysis to consequence 
analysis without ever seriously examining ideologies as systems of interrelating 
symbolism, as patterns of interworking meanings”
303
 Ideology for him is rather an 
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independent science called “symbolic action”.
304
 Studies of ideology for Geertz, 
therefore, must deal with the question of how symbols symbolize, how they function 
to mediate meanings. Geertz’s approach does not focus either on causes of ideology or 
on symptoms of ideology. Rather, it focuses on the symbolic structure of the ideology 
itself. The intent of Geertz’s theory, in other words, is to examine shared meaning at a 
societal level. Without shared meaning, to use Geertz’s famous example,
305
 one 
cannot tell a wink, which is a meaningful action, from a twitch, which is a 
meaningless motion. The “symbolic structure of ideology” conveys meaning through 
analogy, irony, ambiguity, etc.  
Furthermore, he insists that the sociology of knowledge ought to be called the 
sociology of meaning, for what is socially determined is not the nature of conception 




In a community that drinks its coffee black, Henle remarks, to praise a girl with 
“You’re the cream in my coffee” would give entirely the wrong impression; and, if 
omnivorousness were regarded as a more significant characteristic of bears than their 
clumsy roughness, to call a man “an old bear” might mean not that he was crude, but 
that he had catholic tastes. Or, to take an example from Burke, since in Japan people 
smile on mentioning the death of a close friend, the semantic equivalent 
(behaviourally as well as verbally) in American English is not “He smiled,” but “His 
face fell”; for, with such a rendering, we are “translating the accepted social usage of 
Japan into the corresponding accepted social usage of the West.” 
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In similar way, for example, on the one hand, the CS recognize the word ‘grace’ as 
something that the political leader gives because they had been systematically 
socializesd by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il into the Juche ideology. On the other 
hand, for the CW ‘grace’ comes from God because they have established everything 
upon the ruins left by the Korean War by relying on the help of God. In another 
example, when the colour of a publicity poster was chosen as a material symbol, the 
CS liked the colour red whereas the CW hated it. This was because the CS regarded 
red as a positive symbol of revolution, whereas the CW who adhered to anti-
communism regarded it as a communist symbol. The notion of grace and the meaning 
of the colour red are two examples of the misunderstandings present in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church between the CW and the CS.  
Therefore, in Part 2, I will use the method of Geertz’s thick description in order to 
highlight the differences in identity brought about by Juche ideology and anti-
communist ideology respectively. The analysis will focus on material symbols 
(artifacts), verbal symbols (myths and discourse) and behavioural symbols (rituals and 
practices). 
 
Diagram 3 The Perspective of Thick Description for the Analysis of Symbolic Structure. 
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Chapter  Christian Saeteomin Identity Expressed in 
Material, Verbal and Behavioural Symbols    
Introduction 
 
Both the CW and the CS express their ethnic identity in various forms, but the CW, 
as the more powerful group in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, assume their approach 
is “normal Korean” and anything different is “deviant behaviour.” By discussing 
details of the CS life, it may seem as if I am also taking the CS ways as normative for 
Korean life. Certainly it is for South Korean life, but, as I shall argue, where the CS 
behaviour differs, it does not mean (as so often expressed by the CW) that the CS are 
rude, crude, crass and vulgar by their own intentional decision, but rather they express 
the socialized norms of their North Korean ethnic group.  
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the CS ethnic identity is very 
different from the CW ethnic identity in terms of material, verbal and behaviour 
symbols which evolved under non-shared political systems and ideologies. While the 
ancestors of the CW and the CS communities lived in Northwest Korea they were 
influenced by the same political systems and ideologies. Following the partition and 
the arrival of the CW to South Korea, however, different conditions were created for 
those who stayed in and those who left North Korea. After the partition two distinct 
political systems evolved which caused tension and hostility between the two nations. 
One of them was a communist collectivist regime while the other went through a 
period of non-democratic leadership and industrialisation before democracy was 
established. It would be very difficult to accept that these conditions left the 
communities immune to change. What happened instead, in fact, was the contrary. In 
the following I will highlight the extent and depth of changes through analysing 
	
symbols, supporting and strengthening the argument of Frederick Barth and Anthony 
Cohen who maintain that ethnic identity is a fluid and changing phenomenon, 
The expression of the ethnic identity will be analysed based on 1) interviews with 
twenty Christian Saeteomin, 2) participant observation in the BSCFP in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church, 3) material collected during trips to North Korea.  
In the following section I will present results of a pilot study which demonstrate 
that the ethnic identity of the CS and the CW is not monolithic but heterogeneous. 
The meaning of a selection of material, verbal and behavioural expressions of identity 
will be explored in order to illustrate the chances for misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation when members of the two communities interact in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church. 
There are many kinds of symbols (signs, indices or symbols proper), and this section 
will deal with these in order to demonstrate that the ethnic identity of the CS is 
different from that of the CW. First, material symbols will be described followed by 
verbal symbols and finally behavioural ones.    
  
1. Material Symbols 
 
Juche ideology prohibits the use or possession of items or materials that are devoid 
of national character and/or are capable of infecting the people with bourgeois 
ideology.
307
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and from South Korea
308
 because North Korea perceived that these two nations are 
enemies of North Korea. The CS bring whatever possessions they can when arriving 
in the South. Some of them keep using these items of which the most obvious is 
clothing.  
 
1.1. Clothing  
 
The North Korean government provides clothing for the people. These clothes look 
like uniforms and are symbols themselves: symbols of the Socialist way of living as 
prescribed by the Leader. To be specific, men wear so-called Lenin jackets or overalls 
while women wear Korean traditional costume (white upper garments and black 
skirts). In the early 1990s, some young North Koreans including university students 
began to wear blue jeans and mini skirts due to an influx of Western culture. However, 
the authorities cracked down on these young people for fear of the spreading of 
capitalist ways of thinking.
309
 
Visiting North Korea, I saw a lot of North Koreans wearing some hats or head 
scarves. This is an extract from my daily record: “Pyongyang city centre is 24 km 
from Sunahn Airport. Through the window I can see men on the road wearing dark 
brown Lenin hats and women wearing head scarves.”
310
   
While I was observing approximately 80 Christian Saeteomin and 15 teachers in 
the BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, I noticed that some Christian 
Saeteomin men still wore Lenin hats in the BSCFP although no Christian Saeteomin 
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women wore head scarves. I asked one Christian Saeteomin man the reason for this. 
He replied:  
North Korean men like wearing the Lenin hat and women like head scarves. I told 
my wife, though, that she should not put on a head scarf because South Korean 
women do not wear it. In North Korea women do not wear a cap at all, and actually I 




It is still comfortable for him to wear the Lenin hat as he did in North Korea. 
However, he is uncomfortable seeing women putting on a cap in South Korea because 
he associates it with the style of western countries. 
Second, Christian Saeteomin females thought that their clothes were unfashionable 
compared with the South Korean females. The reason for this is that the North 
Koreans were accustomed to dressing in accordance with the taste of Juche ideology, 
which linked clothes and appearance to the wearer's ideological and mental state. This 
is important in order to repel the enemies’ manoeuvres to infiltrate the country with 
their corrupt capitalist ideas and lifestyles and also for establishing the socialist 
lifestyle.
312
 The verbal evidences of females of the CS are follows: 
Other people look at me as a stranger when I dress according to North Korea style. I 
cannot walk in high heels like the South Koreans. Wearing blue jeans feels strange to 
me. So the hardest thing for a woman is to buy shoes and clothes in South Korea. I 




South Koreans buy beautiful clothes whereas I do not like them. If I buy them, they 
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Minju Choson, a North Korean government daily newspaper, writes that hair style 
is a very important issue in that it shows people's cultural standards, mental and moral 
state. For party papers such as Nodong Sinmun, the struggle against foreign and anti-
communist influence is being fought out in the arena of personal appearance. The 
Nodong newspaper says that people who dress differently adapting the styles of others 
(i.e. not North Koreans) are fools and that nation will come to ruin because of them.
315
 
The verbal evidence of a Christian Saeteomin female is as follows: 
In South Korea the clothes which I used to wear in North Korea feel unfashionable, 
so I have changed my style…North Koreans could not wear clothes in a way they 
wanted and even hair style was controlled. Those who chose the wrong way were 





As far as the CS are concerned, items such as stilettos and blue jeans are labelled as 
enemy materials. This still affects their thinking in spite of the fact that they have 
already become citizens of South Korea. 
On the other hand, the CW females teaching the Bible to the CS in the BSCFP said 
that the CS could be easily distinguished by what they wear, even when they try to 
dress like CW: it is not just matter of the clothes, but how they wear them, how they 




In Pyongyang city, flowers symbolise certain aspects of the Juche ideology. I 




 of February 2007 in 




 Interview with CS18, Seoul, 06 February 2007. 
	
Pyongyang city: 1) maehwa flower, 2) common sunflower, 3) azalea, 4) magnolia, 5) 
a hybrid cultivar of orchid, 6) a hybrid cultivar of begonia. 
First, many flowers adorned the walls of the Nation Restaurant. Members of staff 
explained to me that all the flowers had a specific meaning: maehwa flower, which is 
a kind of apricot, is the symbol of patriotic pride. Sunflower is the symbol of people 
looking at their leader. Kim Jong Il’s flower, called Kimjongilia,
317
 is the symbol of 
the sun.
318
 There was a stage located at the front of the restaurant, on which these 
symbolic flowers lay. A Kimjongilia lay in the centre surrounded by sunflowers 
looking up to it.  
Second, many potted azalea blossoms were seen in the lounge of Yanggakdo 
International Hotel where I stayed and also at Pyongyang Sunahn Airport. The azalea 
blossom symbolises the liberation of Korea,
319
 because the flower blooms in spring 
after winter in Korea. Spring means the liberation of Korea and winter means 
Japanese occupation period. 
Third, the Arch of Triumph is situated in front of Kim Il-sung Stadium at the foot of 
Moran Hill. The dates 1925 and 1945 refer to Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese struggle 
which culminated in the liberation of Korea in 1945. The four pillars contain carved 
images, one showing a little girl holding a bunch of azalea blossoms. When I asked a 
317
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guide why the girl held flowers, the guide explained it to me that the girl was waiting 
for Kim Il-sung as the emancipator who defeated Japanese imperialism.  
Fourth, when visiting Pyongyang University of Medicine, I saw Kimjongilias on 
the desks of all the doctors and nurses. In fact, Kimjongilias could often be seen on 
the roads in Pyongyang city. Before I came to the United Kingdom to study, I made 
five visits to Sinuiju city
320
 in North Korea between the 10
th
 of November 2000 and 
the 31
st
 of May 2002 to help with a children’s hospital. In my accommodation I saw 
Kimjongilia placed below a large painting depicting Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and 
also on the desk of doctors and nurses in the hospital.  
Fifth, magnolia is the national flower of North Korea. While travelling to various 
places: Mansudae Grand Monument,
321
Tower of Juche Idea,
322





 are decorated with magnolia blossoms drawn on 
the gates, walls, stones. Even on the streets in Pyongyang city there are lamps shaped 
like magnolias which remind the people of their own nation.  
320
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 The restaurant, a Korean style building standing on the Oknyu Rock on the River 
Taedong, serves traditional Korean food, of which Pyongyang cold noodles are most famous.  
	
Finally, there were special flower arrangements depicting Kimjongilias and 
Kimilsungias
325
. In one of them, a Kimjongilia and a Kimilsungia were situated in the 
centre-top of the pictures surrounded by sunflowers looking up to them. This 
arrangement reminds the people of the Juche ideology in which Kim Jong-iI and Kim 
Il-sung are understood as the brain of the socio-political organism who control all 
thoughts and activities of North Koreans.  
In North Korea the most important national holiday is the Day of the Sun 
(Taeyangjeol) which is the 15
th
 of April, the birthday of Kim Il Sung. If a common 
sunflower is given to a South Korean, he would see it as simply a flower; however, a 
North Korean would see it as himself and his homage towards his leader.  
 In short, the six flowers are symbolic of patriotic pride, the leaders of North Korea, 
the liberation and reverence for the CS. These flowers are present everywhere in 
North Korea among other powerful symbols (such as pictures of the leaders) to 
constantly remind people of their leader, the organism they share and the driving 
ideology. The association between symbol and meaning stays with the CS even when 
they leave the North for the South: none of these meanings are known in any way in 




The CS and the CW have conflicting concepts of the meaning of the colour red and 
the colour blue. Red is the symbol of Communism and is widely used in North Korea 
as a symbol depicting something good or positive as opposed to bad or negative. 
325
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The CV of a North Korean is written with red and blue ink. The positives things 
were red and the negative things blue. If one has a lot of blue in their CV they aren’t 
allowed to join the Army. My CV is generally in red ink, so I could join the army. On 
the map of military operations the army of North Korea is coloured red but the army 




Shim Ju-il, one of the CS, wrote it in his book titled Bukhanui Bunggoe Sigan (The 
Time of Collapse of North Korea) that all things under the sun are given a class 
characteristic in the philosophy of Kimilsungism in North Korea.
327
 According to him, 
things must manifest a revolutionary class character; otherwise they are eliminated.  
In the above sections I demonstrated the deep seated differences of meaning of 
objects and materials between the two groups. In some cases the differences are so 
profound, and the two opinions are antithetical despite the fact that the North Korean 
Saeteomin left North Korea and wished to live in the South. 
 
2. Verbal Symbols 
 
Every verbal symbol evokes meaning in people who encounter it. The meaning is 
shaped by experience and education. Since the education and life experience of the 
CW and the CS are very different (see Part A) it is expected that a number of verbal 
symbols contain different meanings and speaker’s intent for the different groups.  
 
2.1. 'I Can Do It' (Naneun Hal Su Issda) 
 
In South Korea “I can do it” means that I know how to do something and I will do it, 
whereas in North Korea “I can do it” means that, even though I do not know how to 
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
do it, I will still try my best. The latter meaning of “I can do it” is the expression of an 
indomitable will which knows no barriers.  
In North Korea if someone gives this order ‘do it’ you must immediately respond by 
answering ‘I can do it’, which means that you try to do it and you do not question 
whether you are able to do that thing or not. However, in South Korea the 
Wolnammin may have a condition or questions in that situation. The Wolnammin 
seem to think that the North Koreans are lying when they say ‘I can do’. In North 
Korea there is an unshaken faith that ‘Dangi gyeolsimhamyeon naneun handa’ (‘4
5
 6789 :; <=’, ‘I do if the Party decides’). North Koreans have become 




When I visited North Korea I often saw the slogan of ‘I do it if the Party decides’. 
This expression of an indomitable will cultivated by Juche ideology causes the CS 
trouble when encountering those who have been brought up in South Korea: 
In North Korea people always say ‘I can do it’ whenever the Party orders them to do 
something. However, due to that phrase I was in trouble in South Korea. I got a job 
and went to my work. The head of the department intended to teach me how to do 
my work and asked ‘can you do it?’. I immediately answered it to him “I can do it”. 
He said, “Really? It took me ten years to learn this skill, but you obviously won’t 
need tuition,” expressing his disapproval toward me. I did not intend to say that I 
could do the work as well as him, I just automatically responded with the expression 
of ‘I can do it’ because I was very used to saying that. But he did not understand me, 
he just told me that then he won’t have to teach me the skills. It would have been 
very difficult for me to restore the relationship between me and him. I thought at that 
time that I would not say even one word any more to the South Koreans in the style 
of North Korean speech. That day, I was going to give up my work first but instead I 




The CW do not know that North Koreans never say no when ordered to do a task 
and the CS find it very hard to break out of the North Korean mindset.  
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When James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of the State Department of the United 
States, went to Pyongyang in October 2002, he tabled evidence of renewed nuclear 
activity of the North Korean regime. The United Stated believed that North Korea had 
a uranium enrichment programme with the view to developing nuclear weapons. 
According to him, the North Koreans at first denied it and then admitted it, while 
asserting a sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons and more powerful weapons as 
well.
330
 However, the United States misunderstood certain bellicose and belligerent 
words of the North Koreans, interpreting these words in their literal sense. The North 
Koreans later denied that they had said anything about building a programme to 
enrich uranium for nuclear weapons; rather they suggested that Kelly misunderstood 
(or even fabricated) what Kang Sok-ju, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
North Korea, had told him, which they rendered as follows. “The DPRK made itself 
very clear to the special envoy that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear 
weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereign 
right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the U.S.”
331
 The officials 
of the Korean government insisted that James A. Kelly’s misunderstanding caused the 




2.2. Attitude Toward Foreign Words and Variants 
 
It is said that words of foreign origin in a language are the inevitable products of 
world-wide economic and cultural exchange among nations. However, in North Korea 
foreign words are rejected and eliminated in accordance with Juche ideology.  
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Kim Il-sung instructed that in Juche ideology North Koreans were only allowed to 
use the pure Korean Language. His point of view is that South Korea is wrong. Even 
though globalization makes people use foreign words, I think using our own words is 




He not only testified that North Koreans obey their leader’s instructions in using 
only pure Korean language, but he also criticised South Korea’s use of foreign words. 
Visiting Pyongyang city, I observed the use of the pure Korean language which is no 
longer used in South Korea. There are two examples as follows: 1) Menus written 
using pure Korean expressions are prominent. The South Korean Omeuraiseu (>?@
AB
, that is, omelette with fried rice) is denoted as ‘Dalkal ssuiunbap’ (‘CD EFG’), 
which means ‘fried rice covering an egg of a chicken’. Dalkal ssuiunbap is not a 
foreign word, however, the CS do not understand ‘Omeuraiseu’ whereas the CW do 
not understand ‘Dalkal ssuiunbap.’ 
Most North Koreans never learnt English because it is considered to be the 
language of the enemy, whereas the Korean language spoken in the South adopted 
foreign expressions because since the liberation in 1945 the South Korean 
government in general has been pro-American. These differences between the 
Southern and the Northern versions of Korean create difficulties for the CS when they 
settle in South Korea: 
The boss said to me “Cabinet eseo key gajyeowara” (“cabinetHIkey JKLM”, 
that is, “Bring the key from the cabinet”), I could not understand ‘key’ and ‘cabinet’ 
at all. I was just standing there. He said to me that “You are deaf”, so I left the 
company after having an argument with him about it.
334
 
When I first started university, I could not understand what the lecturer said, because 
he used too many foreign words. I could not try to understand it and listen to the 
333
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
lecture at the same time. I thought to myself “what did that word mean?” I asked 




Furthermore, it was known that Kim Jong-il only understood 80% of what the 
former president of South Korea, Kim Dae-joong said during the First Inter-Korea 
Summit in 2002. According to Malicheba, Kim Jong-il said to Konstantin Pulikovsky 
plenipotentiary that “There is a difference between the North Korean dialect and 
South Korean dialect. I could only understand 80% of what he was saying. There are 
a lot of words that were coined from English.”
336
  
On the other hand, the CW do not understand words in the Northern dialect 
language which the CS use which makes them feel uneasy. For example, they do not 
know the meaning of ‘Inchagalge’ (‘NOPQ’) which means ‘I will go very soon’ 
because in South Korean the expression is ‘Gumbanggalge’ (‘RSPQ’).337 The 
meaning of both ‘Incha’ and ‘Gumbang’ is ‘soon’. However, the CW do not use 
‘Incha’ and they think it is strange when the CS use it. The differences affect every 
day expressions, even as common ones as “I'm fine.” 
I felt uncomfortable and offended when I heard South Korean people say that they 
misunderstood the meaning of my speech. For example, North Koreans say‘Il 
eopsda’ (‘TU=’) meaning ‘I am fine’ but the South Korean people interpreted it as 




Not only while visiting North Korea but also when meeting the CS in South Korea, I 
often heard ‘Incha’ and ‘Il eopsda’ and it felt alien to me. On my observation visit to 
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Pyongyang city, I could not understand some words in spite of the fact that these 
words are constituents of the Korean Language: 
I often saw the word ‘namsae’ on the signs of shops in Pyongyang city, but none of 
my South Korean companions knew its meaning. I asked a North Korean guide to 





South Koreans do not use the word ‘namsae’ but ‘chaeso’ for vegetables. In spite of 
the fact that both ‘namsae’ and ‘chaeso’ are both part of the Korean vocabulary, the 
North and the South have assigned to them different meanings. As a result they are 
not able to understand each other without interpretation. In reality, half a century of 
separation has created significant differences between the languages in the two Koreas. 
Words that are commonly used in the daily lives of Southerners are rarely found in 
North Korean.  
North Korea believed that language was another tool of the revolution so North 
Korean authorities shaped the language to fit Kim Il-sung's Juche Ideology. The 
leadership started to purge Chinese and other foreign words from Korean replacing 
them with Korean words in 1966 in order to create the “Cultural Language”. As a 
result, at least 50,000 new words have been introduced. This policy leads to a 
fundamental change of language
340
 and resulted in a deep division of the two Koreas.   
   
2.3. Intonation and Accent 
 
Intonation and accent may be very significant factors in the effectiveness of any 
communication. If one’s intonation and accent patterns are non-standard, one’s 
339
 Ha Chung-yoube, Op.Cit., p. 11. 
340
 Park Hyun-min, Op.Cit. 
		
meaning may not be conveyed correctly. The CS who were brought up as fighters and 
revolutionaries produce a restricted range of Korean strong sounds, word stress and 
basic high intonation patterns.  
  
My little daughter has made a number of new friends. Once when she was talking, 
she compared me with their mothers. She said to me “the mums of the South 
Koreans speak smoothly but why does not my mum speak like them.” I thought that 
I should change the style of my speaking, but it is not easy. I felt uncomfortable and 
offended when I hear it from a South Korean that my accent was too strong.
 341  
 





2.4. Relational Designations 
 
Relational designations are sometimes presented to form an intimacy with the other 
when a person wants to feel friendship toward the stranger. South Koreans use ‘Aga’ 
(baby) to express an intimacy when a senior male refers to a young female. However, 
it is not acceptable in North Korea, even making North Korean females feel 
embarrassed. In the same way, North Koreans use ‘Abai’ (father) to express intimacy, 
but it is unacceptable in South Korea, making South Koreans feel uncomfortable. In 
Pyongyang, I was aware of conflicts arising from designations.  
 
We (some South Koreans who were visiting North Korea with me) and two North 
Korean waitresses named Yeom Mo-lan, Kim Gyeo-hui, were having a conversation 
in a restaurant on the 47th floor in the Yanggakdo International Hotel. Mr. Geon, the 
director of the Severance Hospital in South Korea, called them ‘Aga’,(baby’). Miss 
Yeom said (with a serious face), in North Korea “Aga” is not a designation for adults 
341
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but babies aged 5-6 years or 1-4 years. Mr. Geon explained that South Koreans call a 




One Christian Saeteomin female stated: 
 
The North Koreans call an aged person ‘father’ and call those who are older than 
my husband ‘one’s father’s elder brother’, but the South Korean people refer to 
both as ‘uncle’. We mean ‘father’ when we say ‘Abai’ (‘XY5’). When I said to a 
South Korean ‘Abai sugohasyeo’ (‘XY5 Z[8\’ ‘Father, good-bye’), he 
said to me that he found the phrase strange. I did not know that “Jal gaseyo” (“] 
J^_”, good-bye) is less polite than “Annyeonghi gaseyo” '`ab J^_',) in 
South Korea. I became aware of it when somebody told me about it. However, in 
North Korea “Jal gaseyo” is a very nice expression. Even if a young man is an 
unrelated person, the North Koreans refer to him as ‘uncle’, which makes him feel 
welcome in North Korea. However, when I spoke in such a way in South Korea, I 




Relational designations are sometimes given when a person names a name of 
another nation. It is a legal requirement that for South Koreans who visit North Korea 
they should go to the Seoul Board of National Unification to be educated. South 
Korean calls North Korea ‘Bukhan’ (North Korea). However, those in North Korean 
hate it because literally ‘buk’ means ‘the North’ and ‘han’ means ‘South Korea,’ that is, 
the word ‘Bukhan’ implys that North Korea is part of South Korea. In accordance 
with the education, in North Korea, South Koreans should call North Korea 
‘Bukcheuk’ (the north side). On the other hand, North Koreans calls South Korea 
‘Namjoseon,’ however, the CS who call South Korea ‘Namjoseon’ are regarded as 
spies. I call North Korea ‘Bukhan’ in South Korea, however, I call North Korea 
343
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‘Bukcheuk’ or ‘Bukjoseon’ while staying in North Korea.  
2.5. Words Used Exclusively to Refer to the Leader 
 
As a result of the personal cult of the North Korean leader there are some phrases 
that are only used when he is addressed or referred to. 
Firstly, ‘Thank you, Father Kim II Sung” is the first phrase North Korean parents are 
instructed to teach to their children.
345
 In South Korea the word of ‘gomapseupnida’ 
has the same meaning as the word of ‘gamsa’, meaning ‘thanks’. However, in North 
Korea the two words must be used only for the leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. 
Three interviewees spoke about this: 
In North Korea the words of ‘gomapseupnida’ (‘
[cde=’, ‘thanks’) was not 
used between ordinary people but used only for their leader. However, in South 
Korea it is used very much between people. I think South Koreans have better 
manners than the North Koreans.
346
 
In North Korea I did not use ‘gamsa’ (it means ‘thanks’) at all with ordinary people, 
but Wolnammin use it too much in South Korea.
347
 
The word ‘gamsa’ does exist in North Korea. When the North Korean Saeteomin 
first heard it in South Korea, some of them misunderstood the word as ‘gami eodiseo 





The word ‘gamsa’ consists of the syllables ‘gam’ and ‘sa’. ‘Gam’ and ‘Sa’ have 
other meanings; ‘Gam’ can means ‘persimmon’, ‘material’ or ‘pattern’ and ‘Sa’ can 
mean ‘buy’.   
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Secondly, ‘to hold in esteem,’ in Korean ‘ureoreo batdeulda’ (lmm nop), 
literally means ‘to look up to and revere,’ and is used for the leaders in the North and 
a gesture accompanies its use.  
When I visited Pyongyang city, I pointed at the picture of the leader hanging on the 
wall in the hotel. A North Korean man explained that the picture of the leader must be 
pointed at not by a finger but by the palm of the hand held straight with the palm 
upwards. To anyone who identifies with the modern liberal idea, that can be 
instinctively repellent. However, in North Korea it is extremely important.  
The words in North Korean translate “to hold Kim Il-sung in high esteem” (Kim 
Il-sung eu ureoreo batdeulda) is literally the same word used religiously to “look up 
and receive” Christ.  
Thirdly, from cradle to grave, North Koreans are surrounded by the all-
encompassing presence of the “Great Leader” Kim Jong-il. The Kim dynasty is much 
more than an authoritarian government; it also presents itself as the ultimate source of 
power, virtue, spiritual wisdom, and truth for the North Korean people. For instance, 
when the experimental opening of the Kyunghui Train Lines and East Sea Lines 
between North and South Korea, which was shut for half a century, took place on the 
16
th
 of May 2007, there was a conversation between representatives of North and 
South. The Unification Minister of South Korea Mr. Lee said, “I think connecting the 
rail between North and South is a historical and great victory for both South and 
North.” A secretary of North Korea Mr. Kwon complained about the word ‘great’, 
saying “Do not attach the word ‘great’ to the present event”, which made Lee 
disheartened.
349
 Mr. Lee could not understand why Mr. Kwon had made such a 
complaint. He did not know that the word ‘great’ could be used only for the leaders 
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Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il. If Mr. Kwon had not complained to Mr. Lee, he 




Koreans derive their identity from a variety of sources. Depending on the situation, 
a person may, for instance, be identified primarily as a man or woman, an elder or a 
youth, a manager or a peasant. These and many other forms of identification are 
embedded in the Korean language as used in South Korea, which possesses verb and 
noun suffixes that structurally force a speaker to denote specific hierarchical 
relationships in all verbal interactions. The North Koreans eradicated some of these 
aspects of Korean culture. 
The North Koreans call each other ‘dongji’ (‘qr’,'comrade’) without any honorific 
title. They do not use ‘sida’ (‘s=’) which is a verb representing honour in North 
Korea. After eating a meal, the North Koreans usually say‘Abeojiege mul gassda 
jura’ (‘XtrHu v w= xM’ ‘Give father some water’) in North Korea but 
that is impolite speech in South Korea. The North Koreans say ‘Abeoji 
siksahaessseupnikka?’ (‘Xtr yz{de|?’ in Korean, it means ‘Did father 
have a meal?’) but the South Koreans say ‘Abeoji siksahasyeossseupnikka?’ (‘Xt
r yz 8}de|’, did father have a meal?). The North Koreans use the 
expression ‘gapnikka?’ (‘~e|?’in Korean, it means ‘Do you go?’) but the South 
Koreans use ‘gasipnikka?’ (‘Je|?’). At first it was very difficult for me to find 




Inserting the syllable ‘si’ or ‘syeoss’ in the middle of the word represents respect. In 
South Korea the expression of ‘gapnikka?’ and ‘haessseupnikka?’ are impolite, 
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‘gasipnikka?’ and ‘hasyeossseupnikka?’ are polite. According to the interviewee 
above, ‘si’ and ‘syeoss’ are not used even between son and father in North Korea. This 
stems from the principle of equality among the people according to which there is no 
need to express honour towards each other. ‘Dongji’ represents equality and ‘being of 
the same mind’ and it is a perfectly adequate designation. 
 
2.7. Words Expressing Tenderness and Affection  
 
Regarding relationships there is a tendency in the CS to avoid tender expressions 
because it is considered a weakness. North Korean people have been taught not to 
show forgiveness towards their enemies. This is revealed when the CS come into 
contact with the CW in the church. 
I have heard the word of ‘love’ used between man and woman in South Korea.  
However, North Koreans do not say‘Neoreul johahanda’ (‘ X<=’in 
Korean, it means ‘I like you’) or ‘Neoreul saranghanda’ (‘ z<=’, in 
Korean, it means ‘I love you’) but say ‘Neo maeume deunda’ (‘ H 
=’‘You are acceptable to me’) or ‘Neo maeume issda’ (‘ H =’‘You are 
on my mind’). It is important for North Koreans to speak and act strongly. North 
Korean women also like their men to speak and act strongly. In church, when a 
Wolnammin says ‘Love your enemy’, I think that they are making fun of me more 
and more. In addition, Wolnammin emphasise ‘sharing’ in the church. However, it is 
very difficult for us to accept ‘sharing’ because the word ‘nanum’ (‘:’‘sharing’) 




The noun ‘nanum’ does not exist in the dictionary published in North Korea named 
New Korean-English Dictionary but the noun of ‘nanumjil’ (‘’ in Korean) 
351




 does. However, in South Korea ‘nanum’ and ‘nanumjil do 
not have the same meaning. The meaning of ‘nanumjil is very negative whereas the 
meaning of ‘nanum’ is very positive in South Korea. The CS share possessions with 
their close neighbours but they do not understand why South Koreans make donations 
to people they do not know such as flood victims etc. through appeals on television. 
This suggests that they like living with their comrades like brothers and sisters within 
a restricted organisation but they see no obligation at all to peers outside that group. 
When I joined the BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church as an observer, I heard 
the word ‘Teuleojwinda’ (‘p’)353 frequently during my interviews with the CS. 
When I asked one of the CS a question about the word’s meaning, he answered me 
that the meaning was ‘Jangakhanda’
354
 (‘p’), ‘control’ or ‘strongly hold’. The 
word ‘Teuleojwinda’ is hardly used in South Korea. The word of Teuleojwinda’ is a 
compound word composed of two verbs: ‘teuleo’ means ‘twist’ and ‘jwinda’ means 
‘grasp’, which means ‘twisting and grasping’ like ‘holding something with force.’ The 
CS tend to use words which seem very direct and even harsh to the CW listeners and 
can easily give a negative impression of the CS speakers as being an aggressive, or 
even potentially violent person. 
 
2.8. Same Words Different Meanings 
 
352
 Pyongyang Oegukeodaehak Yeongeohakbusajeon Pyeonchanjipdan (Pyongyang 
University for Foreign Studies), Op.Cit., p. 382. 
353
  ‘Teuleojwinda’ (‘’) verb 1) hold, 2) seize, 3) take(get) hold of, 4) take 
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Significantly different meanings of words between the South Koreans and the CS 
can result in dangerous situations. For example, regarding ‘Daejunda’ (‘p’)355 a 
female Saeteoin had the following unpleasant experience:  
 
We (North Korea and South Korea) have a different language. I was embarrassed 
because of this, in spite of the fact that we share a common language. In North Korea 
we say ‘Daejunda’ (‘=’) meaning ‘Ilreojunda’ (‘T=’ in Korean, it means 
‘let a person know; tell a person something’). For example, when one says ‘Neone 
nampyeonhante daejwo’ (‘ V< ’in Korean) it means ‘Neone 
nampyeonhante ilreojunda’ (‘ V< T=’ ‘I will let your husband 
know’). However, I did not know that in South Korea its meaning is completely 
different; it means ‘I will have sex with your husband’. Before I recognised this, I 
nearly found myself in trouble. While working in the restaurant I said to the boss 
‘Sajangnim naega daejwo’ (‘
z 
 ¡J ’), ‘boss, I will let your wife know’. 
However, he replied to me “Ya! Hwakkeunhaguna” (‘¢! £¤8¥:‘ ‘wow! you 
are hot’). I soon came to realise that it had a different meaning in South Korea. Since 
that time, I have never used the sentence. I said “do not say such a word to me” to 




2.9. Expressing Body Weight 
 
The expression for obesity is different between the North and the South. When I 
visited North Korea, I was accompanied by three South Korean professors from 
Yonsei University of South Korea. We had dinner with four North Korean officers in a 
restaurant one day. 
355
 supply ¦provide, furnish (a person with a thing); find (a person with something); give 
(ration to) teach; show; tell; inform (a person of a thing).  
See, Pyongyang Oegukeodaehak Yeongeohakbusajeon Pyeonchanjipdan (Pyongyang 
University for Foreign Studies), Op.Cit., p. 668. 
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Mr. Park, one of the professors, said to Mr. Lee, the head of the Union of National 
Economic Committee of North Korea, that ‘after visiting North Korea last time 
‘Naneunsaljyeossda’ (‘I got fat’). Mr. Lee pointed out that in North Korea 
‘Saljyeossda’ is never used for human beings only for animals like pigs etc. North 




In short, in light of the above nine examples, both South Korea and North Korea 
have become verbally heterogeneous which leads to the unsuspecting speaker from 
one being misunderstood, humiliated and embarrassed in the other. 
 
3. Behavioural Symbols 
In spite of the fact that the CS became citizens of South Korea and Christians in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church, there has not been much change in their patterns of 
behaviour to which they were accustomed in North Korea which given the 
effectiveness of socialisation in both the CS and the CW systems, is not surprising. 
Their different behaviour aspects of which have already been alluded to, does not 
derive from something biologically inherent in human nature, but is a socialized 
variable that depends crucially on the use of symbols. 
3.1. Smiling, Praise and Greetings 
  
The CW in Youngnak complain that their North Korean counterparts hardly ever 
smile. When in Pyongyang city I noticed that people's faces were unmistakably 
scornful, or worn and blank. Nobody smiled. The following responses are indicative 
of the interviewees’ perceptions of a smile.  
357




A woman smiling in North Korea is a sign that she intends to lead a man into 
temptation and when a man laughs it means that he is a fool. The perception of a 
smile between South Korea and North Korea seems to be different.
358
 
I saw the South Koreans smiling; it seemed to me that they are covering their inmost 




Smiling in North Korean communication is not a sign of politeness but of attraction. 
On the other hand, in terms of South Korean communicative behaviour it is a sign of 
politeness.  Smiles are necessary when greeting or having a polite conversation in 
South Korea. The CS have pointed out many times that the typical South Korean 
smile seems unnatural and false to them. They think that a smiling person likes you 
and is very friendly to you. The CS smiles only to fellow workers because they feel 
that they should not favour strangers. 
Kim Gyeong-suk, one Christian Saeteomin who studied theology in Youngnak 
Women’s Theology Seminary, said that she needed three years to realise that when she 
was praised it was not a sign of ridicule.
360
 North Koreans are less ready than South 
Koreans to exchang greetings.  
Park: North Koreans do not greet each other, they do not say, 
‘Annyeonghasipnikka?’ (it means ‘How are you?’). Even though I thought I was 
well-mannered in North Korea because my job was to stand before crowds, I did not 
greet my fellow North Koreans.
361
 
Ha: Why do North Koreans not greet each other? 
Park: The society of North Korea itself does not make people respect each other. 
There is no routine for greetings in North Korea. However, I was accustomed to 
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3.2. Marital Roles 
 
There is a difference of marital roles between North and South. The CS’ family 
is based on a more patriarchal system than the South Korean family pattern. One 
of the Christian Saeteomin males stated that man’s authoritarianism is strong in 
North Korea but South Korea is the opposite of North Korea.
363
 One of the 
Christian females also testified as follows: 
 
A husband beats his wife black and blue very often in North Korea and then the wife 
still has to cook dinner. When North Korean Saeteomin enter to South Korea they first 
stay at Hanawon.
364
 They are taught there that in South Korea a husband should not 





While marital violence certainly does occur in South Korea, it has recently been 
declared illegal. This is the experience of one of the Christian Saeteomin females who 
married a South Korean male. 
In North Korea, the marital relationship is exactly the same as written in the Bible 
‘wives submit to your husbands as to the Lord…now as the church submits to Christ, 
so also wives should submit to their husbands in everything.’ North Korean wives 
363
 Interview with CS14, Seoul, 04 February 2007. 
364
 Hanawon opened on July 8, 1999, and is the government resettlement center for North 
Korean Saeteomin. It is nestled in the South Korean countryside, in Anseong, Gyeonggi 
Province, about three hours south of Seoul. Originally built to accommodate around 200 
inmates for a 3 month resettlement program, the government extended the center in 2002 to 
double its original size and cut the program from three months to two months because of the 
increase in the number of North Korean Saeteomin per year. In 2004, to mark the fifth 
anniversary of the program, a second facility opened south of Seoul. Hanawon can now feed, 
house, and train 400 people at one time. At Hanawon, the curriculum is focused on three main 
goals: easing the socioeconomic and psychological anxiety of Saeteomin; overcoming the 
barriers of cultural heterogeneity; and offering practical training for earning a livelihood in 
the South. Hanawon imposes heavy restrictions on the travel of Saeteomin because of security 
concerns. In addition, security is tight with barbed wire, security guards, and cameras. The 
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Internet; accessed 30August 2007. 
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should submit in everything to their husbands. When I lived in North Korea, I used 
to carry the shopping home on my back from the market. I cooked delicious dishes 
for my husband every day. While living together with a South Korean male, I acted 
towards my husband as I did in North Korea. I carried the heavy shopping items, 
washed the clothes, washed the dishes and did everything without any help from my 
husband. However, after marrying him, I wanted this to change. I asked my husband 
to share the burden with me. He told me that I had changed a lot. I said to him, “I do 
not wish to rely on you but I find it so hard that I need your help, please do what you 





A Christian Saeteomin couple expressed their feelings about marital roles as follows 
Han (wife): “Christian Saeteomin females wish to be raised to a higher status than 
they had when they lived in North Korea and wish to be treated with respect at home. 
However, the CS males would find difficult if the CS females insisted on such a 
thing.”  
Jong (husband): “North Korean males demand absolute submission from females. 
This expectation was formed by the system of the totalitarian state in North Korea. 
This may be problematic and it would also be difficult for South Koreans to 
understand North Korean marital roles. However, I think that the life style of South 
Korean males is also problem in terms of the perspective of North Korean males. I 
saw South Korean males carrying the heavy shopping, cooked and picked their 
babies up onto their backs. These things made me feel strange very much.” 
Han (wife): “The father of my baby does not do these things but he will adapt.” 
Jong (husband): “There is hardly any conversation between a husband and a wife in 
North Korea. A wife should submit to the orders of her husband. However, in South 






There is a difference in cooking styles between South Korea and North Korea. A 
Christian Saeteomin told me that he does not go to restaurants in South Korea because 
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South Korean food tastes salty, spicy and sweet.
 368 
Another Christian Saeteomin said 
“North Korean food tastes delicious. I grew up, eating local food only, and no western 
food at all. In South Korea I had South Korean pork porridge. The first time I went to 
South Korea, I was offered tomato juice on the plane. It made me sick.”
369
Three other 
Christian Saeteomin explained their experience:  
  
At first South Koreans seemed to be like another nation…the language of South 
Korea is mixed with English…food in South Korea is significantly different from 
that of North Korea…my South Korean friends did not eat the meal I cooked. Also, 
I was unable to enjoy South Korean food. I feel a sense of alienation, thinking that 
I will be ignored when I do not eat their food and they do not eat what I cook. 
After this, I shut my mind toward South Koreans. I dislike staying with them for 




South Korean food which is too sweet does not suit my taste. I remembered eating 
sweet things when I was a child during Japanese imperialism. The food in South 
Korea contains sweet ingredients. I do not like sweet things. Just salt, soya and 
toenjang (soybean paste): these three things are enough in North Korea. I have 





North Korean cooking is still based on local, traditional methods but South Korea 
has changed to a modern, Western style of cooking. They use too much 
monosodium glutamate. South Koreans eat less rice cake than us. South Korean 





Naengmyeon, literally iced noodles, is a Korean dish. Originally a wintertime 
delicacy in what is now North Korea, it has become an extremely popular summer 
dish throughout Korea. South Koreans use scissors to cut the noodles before eating 
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them. When I had dinner in a restaurant in North Korea with Mr. Han who is a 
secretary of the Committee of the National Economic Cooperation of North Korea, he 
told me that it took his breath away when he was suddenly given scissors with his 




3.4. Making Promises 
 
The CS need time for adaptation to perceive the notion of a promise as a social 
contract indicating a transaction between two persons. A promise may also refer to 
any kind of vow or guarantee. In the same way, the CW need to understand the notion 
of a promise from the perspective of the CS rather than criticize the CS for not 
keeping promises. A Christian Saeteomin stated:    
 
A promise made to an individual hardly exists in North Korea because North 
Korea is a totalitarian system. In North Korea we make a promise when the Party 
mobilizes the masses to carry out a specific task. The kind of promise I 
experienced in North Korea was actually an experience of obedience to the Party. 
A promise is between me and the masses, unrelated to any individual benefit…I 
mean that the individual’s well-being is not affected in any way, whether or not the 




Many CW who encounter the CS criticized the CS for not keeping promises, which 
will be dealt with further in chapter 4. 
 
3.5. Acting Simply and Expression Style 
 
Expression Style  
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North Koreans enjoy describing themselves as a society ‘dyed in one colour’. 
Magnificently choreographed mass marches and visual displays express this 
sentiment. North Koreans act simply and directly. One of the CS spoke about the 
reason why they express their feeling in a direct manner.
  
As Kim Il-sung said that apples are either red or blue, so the good thing is good, the 
bad thing is bad. There is nothing in between good and bad. North Korean 
Saeteomin speak directly when they are offended. Those who restrain themselves are 
not true North Koreans.
-(&
  
This thinking resulted in the formation of dichotomous expression which makes the 
CS difficult to communicate with for the South Koreans. The CS compared their 
expression style with the South Koreans, which I cite from the excerpts of my 
interviews:  
  
South Koreans do not express their feelings using words but the North Koreans 
Saeteomin have to express themselves directly. South Koreans seem to be 
introspective. They do not express themselves directly. It seems to me that they 





I conducted an in-depth interview with a Christian Saeteomin male.
377
 He 
mentioned one of North Korea’s slogans which illustrated the principle of 
dichotomous thinking: ‘be careful not to be shot by two bullets’ which warns of the 
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	
dangers of switching sides. This dichotomous thinking stops him from understanding 
the beneficial role of mediation between conflicting groups.
 
When I worked as a full time evangelist in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, I saw that 
Park Chun-tae, one of the pastors, worked between the pastors and the elders. He 
seemed to me that he prepared for this loophole. This kind of man is called ‘a 
turncoat’ in North Korea, a bad man. We say in North Korea ‘be careful if you do not 
want to be killed by two bullets’ which means that you must ‘certainly stand only on 
one side’. The worst people in the world are those who are shot by two bullets, one 
from our forces and one from the enemy.
-(1
He misunderstood the role of Park Chun-tae who, as an administrative pastor of the 
senior minister of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, tried to reconcile two groups with 
the different agendas in the church. The very idea of reconciliation, rather than 
elimination, seems contrary to Juche thought.  
 
Difficulty in Making Friends  
 
The principle of ideological remoulding of Juche ideology influenced the North 
Korean people to distinguish friend from foe, which impacts on forming of 
friendships. I conducted an in-depth interview with a Christian Saeteomin female who 
is a student in BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and studies theology in 
Youngnak Women Seminary. She said that she could not accept diversity or 
alternative ways of thoughts, in the South Korean society because she lived in a very 
strong either-or society in North Korea.
 
North Korean Saeteomin think that South Koreans put on a facade and hide their real 
self from North Koreans. There is no such thing as forgiveness in North Korea, 
378
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which means that I must beat you if you beat me. North Koreans can never accept 
the culture of South Korea. Since I was a child I have learnt to hate intensely and 
was taught that ‘I must take revenge.’ In my mind others became my enemies. For 
three years in South Korea… I thought that the South Koreans were lying or holding 
something back whenever they did not express their feelings directly.
-(/
 
The flames of hatred formed in North Korea against the U.S. and the South 
Koreans are still embedded in the minds of the CS as enemies, which may make it 
difficult for them to establish good relationships with Americans and South Koreans 
in South Korea. Mr. Ham, a Christian Saeteomin, spoke about the hatred against the 
U.S.: 
 
Ham: “The reunification of two Koreas should be accomplished by communism 
which will repel the imperialism of the United States!”
Ha: “Do you feel uncomfortable when you see Americans in South Korea?”
Ham: “Yes, I do.”
-1%
 
Conversely, while the CS assume that the CW do not particularly like them, they 
have a firm belief that the CW actually hate them when they blame the CS for 
something. According to Shim, the motivation for his joining the People’s Army of 
North Korea was to take revenge on the armies of both South Korea and the United 
States. Even though he became a South Korean citizen and a Christian, he is still 
prejudiced against the CW members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. He thinks that 
the South Koreans are full of hatred towards North Koreans and the CS, and that they 
look down on them. He is unable to change his perception and judgement on South 
Koreans because in the North they are regarded as enemies and enemies must be 
hated passionately. 
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The North Korean Saeteomin, when they lived in North Korea, were educated to 
hate Wolnammin who will eagerly look out for a chance of aggression against North 
Korea. I am sure that Christian Wolnammin in the church think that the North 




He refers to the fact that after 1953, the elite in North Korea were eliminated and 
the lower classes (“the beggars”) supported and advanced. This prejudice against 
members of the church influences his ability to relate to the CW in the church in 
South Korea. There are three crucial issues for him in regarding CW. First, they were 
landlords in pre-war Korea, and thus the object of Communist hatred. Second, they 
abandoned the country of their birth, and are therefore traitors. Thirdly, they may be 
interested in re-union in order to get their old lands. 
 
Although I cannot ask the CW whether they hate me, I think they hate me. I have 
heard that an elder in the church regarded me as a spy and all North Korean 
Saeteomin as spies. Furthermore, I feel a sense of distance when I see the rich CW 
coming to the church to worship in their own cars with drivers. I think that almost all 





 also noticed that North Korean Saeteomin themselves 
acknowledge that their emotional style is different from South Koreans’. In addition, 
they assume that strong emotional ties exist among themselves while South Koreans 
are “superficial.”

Her research deals with the psychological and behavioural 
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characteristics of North Korean Saeteomin living in South Korea and the implications 
for their social adjustment. Even though her article did not deal with ethnic identity in 
relation to Juche ideology the findings of the present research are supported by 
Hyang-Jin’s. Saeteomin indeed hold a polarized view about their South Korean 
neighbours, and they do find it hard to soften their stand on South Koreans even as 
South Korean citizens and Christians. Their upbringing and everyday existence was 
determined by the Juche principle which influenced their behaviour, language and 
customs to such a deep extent that unlearning and adapting becomes very difficult. 
Moreover, the behaviour that was encouraged in North Korea is not useful in South 
Korea: black and white thinking and looking at fellow citizens suspiciously, never 
quite believing their intentions, make it very hard for North Koreans to make friends 
and form meaningful, close relationships with South Koreans. 
Conclusion  
 
The hypothesis with which this chapter began was that the CS ethnic identity is 
very different from the CW ethnic identity. The aim of Chapter 3 was to demonstrate 
these differences at the level of material, verbal and behaviour symbols.  
In the following table I summarise the material and verbal symbols as well as 
behavioural patterns that emerged from my analysis of the CS ethnic identities in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Seoul. This method follows the paradigm of 
anthropological research laid down by Geertz. Data was obtained through in depth 
interviews and participant observations in both North and South Korea. 
Institute of Cross-Cultural Studies Seoul National University, 2005, pp.81-111. 
	

High-heels and blue jeans are considered enemy fashion in North Korea and the 
CS find it hard to get used to seeing them, let alone wearing them. Also six flower 
species have symbolic meanings attached to them by the state. The difference in 
meaning attached to these symbols indicates that the identity of the two communities 
is not fully shared. It is important to highlight these differences in order to avoid 
misunderstanding and lessen the possibility of conflict. 
  
Material symbols Verbal symbols Behavioural symbols  
1. Clothing
1) unfashionable 










3. Colours (red and blue) 
1. Different interpretation  of the 
phrase  
2. Words and phrases of both foreign 
origin & pure Korean language 
1)fried rice covering an egg of a
chicken & dalkal ssuiunbap
2) bring key from the cabinet&
cabinet eseo key gajyeowara 
3) Inchagalge (I will go very soon)
4) Il eopsda (I am fine)
5) namsae(vegetables)
6) abbreviations 
3. Intonation and accent 
4. Designations 
1) Abai (father) 2) Aga(baby)
5. Reserved words 
1) Gamsa(Thanks)
2) ureoreo batdeulda 
(to look up to and revere) 
3) Great 
6. Honorific address 
1) dongji (a comrade)
2)Attaching the syllable ‘si’ and 
 ‘syeoss’
7. Harsh Expressions 
1) nanumjil (sharing)
2) teuleojwinda (strongly hold)
8. Different meanings of words 
1) daejunda (let (a person) know)
9. The expression for obesity 
1. Smile, Praise, Greetings 
2. Marital relationship 
3. Cooking style 
4. Promise 
5. Prejudices stemming from 
1) Expression style
2) Acting in a direct manner 
  
Second, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that verbal communication 
between members of the two communities can often break down due to changes in the 
Korean language that occurred in both North and South in the different direction. In 
the North, some expressions were only allowed to be used in relation to the leader, 
including words that are used every day by Southerners like “thank you”, “look up to 
		
somebody” or “great”. The CS may be offended when these special words are used in 
relation to any person. Moreover, the meaning of some expression might have 
completely changed during the decades of partition. We saw the example of a 
Christian Saeteomin woman, who was ridiculed for using an innocuous expression. It 
may be concluded that shared language does not entail shared meaning at every level. 
Third, the CS believe that their Southern neighbours hate them and despise them. 
They were taught in North Korea to hate South Koreans. Even when they become 
South Korean citizens they find it very hard to feel accepted. There is a residual 
assumption of class difference and class war, the CW being equalled with landlordism, 
and the CS assuming they are regarded as outcasts.
Fourth, the CS themselves acknowledge that their abrupt speaking style and direct 
conduct stems from the expectations placed on them by Juche ideology, which 
cultivated black and white thinking and discouraged forgiveness.
The ethnic identity of the two populations is still Korean. However, that single 
Korean identity is gone, which means that practically, Koreans no longer share the 
same identity. In other words there is a South Korean identity and a North Korean 










Chapter  The Explanation of Wolnammin’s Different 




In Chapter 3 I analysed a number of material and verbal symbols as well as 
behavioural patterns that highlights the differences between the CS and the CW. The 
primary focus was on the CS experience, the symbols they grew up with and the 
effect of Juche ideology on maintaining symbolic meanings and resultant behaviour 
even when North Korean refugees become South Korean citizens and choose 
Christianity. Their experience of interacting with the CW was shown to be less than 
satisfactory for them. The CS became very aware of the differences that divide the 
two communities. Moreover, the CW (and to some extent the CS) ignorance leads to 
embarrassing situations, suspicion and argument. From the conversations I had with 
the Christian Saeteomin members of Youngnak Presbyterian Church I concluded that 
they feel isolated and misunderstood. They found the CW rude and some of their 
behaviour was unacceptable to them. For instance they did not recognise mediation as 
a positive role one can take on; they could not easily rid themselves of dichotomous 
thinking that regards every single act as either black or white. They also found it very 
hard to forgive and as a result of an argument or insult they tended to step out of the 
situation, making it very difficult to form friendships and be in fellowship with the 
CW.  
	
In this chapter, I switch the focus to the CW and examine the extent to which their 
ethnic identity is different from that of the CS with reference to material, verbal 
symbols and behavioural patterns. Regarding the lifestyles of the CW, most said that 
they tended to follow the cultural style of their former home towns in the North, 
where they were brought up. For example, their accents or manner of speaking or 
eating habits often reflect their particular place of origin. However, after living in 
South Korea for half a century, there have been many changes. In the course of 
observing the CW ways of life in the church community, especially their contacts with 
the CS, I discovered some interesting examples of cultural difference, in spite of the 
fact that originally both populations came to the church from the same provinces of 
North Korea 50 or more years apart. The ongoing ideological competition between 
the two Koreas was inevitably reflected, either directly or indirectly, in all the sixteen 
interviews. The degree of sensitivity expressed by the participants in their approach 
seemed to play an important role in determining how much differences would be 
allowed to exert a negative influence on the course and atmosphere of the developing 
relationship between the CW and the CS. This factor can be affected considerably by 
both the interviewees’ personal feelings and views of North Korea, which were 
formed by the experience of their or their family’s possible communist persecution 
and the definite anti-communist education to which every South Koreans were 
subjected. Due to three factors, memory of hell, scapegoat for anger and focus of 
paranoia towards the CS as well as North Korea, the CW have not formed strong 
relationships with the CS in the BSCFP section in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and 
any communication between them is characterised by difficulties. 
In this area, the conflict and closeness of relationships among the two populations 
plays a considerable role in determining how the people of North and South Korea get 
	
on in more limited context of a Seoul Church-and may give an indication of how they 
might react during the reunification of the two Koreas. The aim of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that it is not easy for the two populations to understand each other as 
their differing material symbols, verbal symbols and behavioural symbols, shown in 
chapter 3, points to distinct identities. I will present evidence for these distinct 
identities as revealed by the CW interview data. First, material symbols will be 
discussed; second, some examples of verbal symbols will be presented; finally, 
behavioural patterns will be described. The same methodology will be used as in 
Chapter 3. The identity of the CW will be investigated in two ways: 1) it will be found 
in the Christian Wolnammin’s material and verbal symbols, and also their behavioural 
patterns, 2) by reflecting upon the deserved and reported interaction between the CW 
and the CS. In particular, I will focus on the responses of the CW towards the CS.        
It is not the purpose of this chapter to deal with all the CW, but rather to deal 
with those only who are involved with the BSCFP. The BSCFP participants, among 
whom I conducted most of my research, are part of a small community of North 
Korean Saeteomin within Youngnak Presbyterian Church, all of which are taught by 
CW. The work of the BSCFP with the North Korean Saeteomin is organised into four 
areas of responsibility as follows: 1) the senior minister, a guidance pastor, a full time 
unordained guidance pastor, and a part-time guidance lay pastor, 2) the head of the 
Centre, 3) a team leader and a financial aid team leader, 4) regular teachers and 
volunteers. The chain of command is as follows: 1) the senior minister is in charge of 
the guidance pastor, who issues advice and guidelines to the teachers, 2) the guidance 
pastor discusses the work with the head of the Centre, 3) the head of the Centre 
supervises the team leader who oversees the regular teachers and volunteers with 
regard of the administration of the classes, 4) the teachers meet with the North Korean 
	
Saeteomin, providing both teaching and pastoral care. The two unordained guidance 
pastors assist the guidance pastor. Among the 50,000 members of the church, these are 
the only people who render services to the CS in the BSCFP. My data collection 
methods consisted of participant observation and sixteen in-depth interviews with 
Christian Wolnammin members of the church who are involved with the BSCFP. 
 
	
1. Material Symbols 
 
1.1. Preferred clothing 

Until 1945 clothing styles were quite traditional except for some modern styles 
preferred in the larger cities. There was very little difference between styles worn in 
the north and south. 
Historically, the colours of the clothes reflected social class in Korea. Common people 
wore mostly white and royal persons wore yellow. Koreans usually wore traditional 
clothing in the first half of the 20th century. The traditional costume is called as 
hanbok which is a two-piece outfit for men and women. Women wore a chogori 
(jacket) with long rectangular sleeves, which was accompanied by a chima (wrap 
skirt) made from a large rectangular piece of fabric with long sashes attached to the 
skirt to form a waistband. The traditional costume for Korean men was a chogori 
jacket similar to the one worn by women, accompanied by paji (trousers).
 385
  
However, after Korea was liberated from Japan, distinct clothing styles began to 
appear. The differences became increasingly apparent after the 1960s when South 
Korea began to develop economically. Today the CW wear Western clothes and 
follow the latest European and American fashion. However, they wear traditional 
Korean outfits on holidays such as on Seol (New Year’s Day) and Chuseok (the 
Harvest Moon Day) etc.  
Nevertheless, the CW generally enjoy wearing modern Western-style clothing most 
of the time. On the contrary, North Koreans wear socialist style clothing, Western 
385
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style garments were not generally available because they symbolised capitalist ways 
of thinking, which would corrupt the minds of the people (see Chapter 3 for more 
details).  
Therefore, the CS could be spotted easily in church even if they try to dress and use 
makeup like their South Korean counterparts.
386
 Only a few CW interviewees said 
that it was difficult for them to distinguish the CS from the CW regarding appearance, 
even if a Christian Saeteomin had lived in South Korea for four or five years.
 387
 
1.2. Wine and Tobacco 

W.W. Rockwell, the formal American consul in Seoul, remarked that Koreans were 
the nation with the most smokers.
388
They also enjoyed drinking alcoholic beverages.   
However, ten years after the Methodist Episcopal missionary proclaimed 
teetotalism in Korea in August 1893,
389
 the Methodist Episcopal Church prohibited 
its members to smoke and drink.
390
 The conservative evangelical denominations 
including Korean Presbyterians had the same position at that time which has prevailed 
to this day.   
There are no such prohibitions in North Korea and the CS have continued to enjoy 
drinking alcohol and smoking very much. In the eyes of the CW tobacco and alcohol 
are symbols of secularism. “The CS smoke in front of the teachers in the church. 
Moreover, one of them gifted kaoliang wine to me for Christmas. I refused the gift 
and told him that Christians shouldn’t drink wine at all, or smoke tobacco. His face 
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turned red at this.”
391
 However, for the North Korean Saeteomin, wine is an 
appropriate gift showing their warm feelings towards their teachers; therefore, they 
feel hurt when such a gift is refused and may even leave the church.  
In short, although the ethnic identities of the two populations used to be 
indistinguishable, differing attitudes towards clothes after partition, and towards wine 
and tobacco for religious reasons, opened up a gulf between them over time. 
2. Verbal Symbols 
 
It has been pointed out that South Koreans produce symbols with reference to 
anti-Communist ideology. The following are three examples of verbal symbols. 
 
2.1. Jaju (Independence) 
 
The CW object to the words ‘uri minjok’ (‘our ethnic Koreans’) and ‘jaju’ 
(‘independence’ achieving reunification without the assistance of a foreign power). 
The North Korean government used the words uri minjok and jaju in relation to the 
policy of reunification. The CW do not want to use these words in connection with the 
reunification policy because they consider it as part of Communist discourse.
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One 
of the elders of Youngnak Presbyterian Church regarded those who use the word ‘uri 
minjok’ as Communists.  He criticized both his brother, who lives in the United 
States, and even Noh Mu-hyeon, the ex-president of South Korea, as Communists on 
the grounds that they prefer to use these words in the same way as North Koreans.  
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2.2. Dongmu (Friend)      
           
The CW no longer use the word ‘dongmu’ (‘comrade,’ or ‘friend’). The most 
popular monthly student magazine was named ‘Eokkae Dongmu’ (it means ‘friends 
putting their hands around each other’s shoulders’) when I was in primary school. 
However, since then the word ‘dongmu’ has disappeared because it is how North 
Koreans call each other. Those who use the word in South Korea nowadays might be 
regarded as North Korean spies. The word has a powerful communist connotation. 
However, the unsuspecting Saeteomin cannot help but use this word and they do not 
like the fact that it is somehow unacceptable in South Korea. 
   
2.3. Migun Cheolsu (Withdraw of the United States Army) 
             
Those who persist in using the phrase ‘migun cheolsu’ (it means ‘withdrawal of 
the United States Army’) might be regarded as Communists. A mentality of 
dependence on the United States for security remains deep-rooted in the South Korean 
psyche, and CW are firmly convinced that the maintenance of peace, freedom and 
prosperity is due to the government’s firm defence stance based on a South Korea–
United States military alliance that has successfully deterred aggression from the 
communist North. When a person insists on the withdrawal of the Army of the United 
States, he will be regarded as someone who wishes that South Korea becomes part of 
the Communist North. In other words the CW perceives him as Communists or spies 
of North Korea.  
 
When I was serving in the Vietnam War, a Vietnamese said to me “Why don’t you 
get out of here? Our country would be reunified if you left”. They were Commies. 
The situation is the exactly same in South Korea where some people insist on the 
	

withdrawal of the United States Army. They are Commies. If, in accordance with 
their wishes, the United States withdraws their troops from South Korea, South 
Korea will become a Communist country.
393
  
In spite of the fact that phrases like ‘uri minjok’, ‘jaju’,‘dongmu’ and ‘migun 
cheolsu’ are integral to the Korean language, they are not used in South Korea and 
those who use them may be regarded as spies or Communists. The reason is that the 
words have taken on a symbolic meaning. One could indeed see echoes of the North 
Korean “black and white” thinking in these verbal usages of the CW. 
         
 2.4. Hancha (Chinese Characters)         
  
Finally, as part of the Cultural Language Movement in North Korea, Chinese and 
other foreign words were purged and replaced by Korean words. At the same time the 
language in the South embraced many American expressions. In addition, one of the 
verbal differences between the two Koreas is the status of Sino-Korean vocabulary 
and characters (hancha). In the north the use of hancha was abolished altogether 
because it was perceived as the privilege of the elite. In the South, there had been a 
gradual decline in the use of hancha. Purists and pragmatists used to hold heated 
debates on the fate of hancha; nowadays, however, it is actually experiencing a 
revival due to the emergence of China as a powerhouse.  
North Korea purged foreign words and replaced the Chinese-Korean vocabulary with 
a pure Korean one in accordance with the requirements of the Juche ideology. 
Conversely, South Koreans have a tendency to regard those who use English and 
Chinese-Korean vocabulary as more intellectual because of their pro-America outlook. 
While North Koreans perceive the use of foreign words and Hancha as a 
393
 Interview with CW01, 22 October 2006. 
		
characteristic of reactionary elements and therefore negative, South Koreans see this 
as the mark of an intellectual.  
The CS cannot understand foreign words and Hancha phrases which are widely 
used in the CW circles but when they use words like ‘uri minjok’, ‘jaju’,‘dongmu’ and 
‘migun cheolsu’ etc. they are regarded as suspicious. It seems that more evidence for 
different identities has been uncovered by looking at verbal expressions.  
  
3. Behavioural Patterns  
 
3.1. The Nuclear Family and Individualism  
 
The family used to be regarded as rock-solid in Korea, with strong social ties based 
on shared norms and values, in which mutual support and assistance was a matter of 
course. The family had traditionally been the main guardian of stability. It was by its 
nature one of the most important mainstays of a harmonious and close-knit society.
394
   
 However, since the partition of Korea, the social development of the two Koreas 
has been different: North Koreans have lived in a society of collective organisation
395
 
and South Koreans have lived in a society in which the nuclear family has become the 
norm, bringing about individualisation within the family. These different social 
circumstances mean that the CW were affected by the sight of family unity displayed 
by the CS.  
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The solidarity within their family is much stronger than in ours … it seems to me that 
they are not individualists like South Koreans. Family solidarity still remains with 





These days the family relationships of CS are stronger than ours. The families of 
South Koreans are breaking down more and more as a result of individualism. 
Through observing their daily life, I changed my thinking about the value and 




 One of the CS apologised in public to his elder brother for fighting with him. He is a 
younger brother who supports his elder brother financially, respecting his elder 
brother in place of his father who was left behind in North Korea. It would be hard for 




However, a minister at Youngnak Presbyterian Church whom I met during the time 
of my field work and who was a second generation Wolnammin told me that he 
hardly regarded the CS as human beings because they left their family behind in 
North Korea and chose to live alone in South Korea. Nevertheless, most of the 
Christian Wolnammin interviewees were not only sympathetic to the predicament of 
the CS when they escaped on their own from North Korea, but also were impressed 
by their great efforts to bring the rest of their families to South Korea. Those Christian 
Wolnammin realised that they themselves had become individualists in their 
capitalistic system.  
 
Human fellowship is still a part of the CS personality, whereas it is something that 
we are gradually losing. Even though they are poor, not only do they sometimes 
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bring rice cake to the BSCFP to share but also they make buns and cook North 
Korean food and eat together, even inviting members of Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church. However, even though I am comfortably off, I have not done such a thing. I 
am always impressed whenever I see such behaviour. This always challenges me to 




Since the partition of Korea the CW have lived in a capitalist system and the CS in 
the collectivist system before they came to the South. This has resulted in the 
formation of a different identity of the two populations. The more the CW became 
individualistic the more they feel that they have lost human fellowship. On the 
contrary, the CS kept the family relationships important in line with the expectations 
of a collectivist society. The Juche idea of revenge and antagonism does not extend to 
relations within the family. The CW felt there to be more humanity in the behaviour 
of the CS than in that of the CW.  
 
In sum, it would have been difficult for the CS to consider themselves as 
individualists because they used to live in the collectivist social system of North 
Korea. Also they did not leave North Korea in order to live alone because they try 
very hard to bring their family to join them where they are.  
 
3.2. The Conflict between the CW and the CS  
 
First, it is difficult for the CW to understand that the CS feel a sense of inferiority 
when the CW are thoughtful and considerate towards them. In fact, the CS think they 
are being treated unfairly in a situation like that.   
One of the CS started to attend one of support groups in the church. The monthly 
membership was five pounds. Out of consideration for him, he was not asked to pay it 
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because we thought that the fee might be a burden. In fact, the group does not require 
new members to pay the subscription unless they choose to pay it voluntarily. 
However, he phoned two teachers of the BSCFP late at night while under the 
influence of alcohol, complaining that the group did not ask him to pay the fee and 
that he was being treated in a discriminatory way. I tried to explain everything but he 




It may not have been a sense of inferiority arising from conflict between the desire 
to be noticed and the fear of being humiliated, but might have been more a problem of 
equal treatment because the CS were accustomed to cooperating with each other in 
their communities on an equal basis. Bruce Cumings noted that “there is an egalitarian 
sameness about most people in the DPRK, at least to an external observer.”
401
 
However, the CW interpreted the man’s discontent as a sense of inferiority. The 
reason for such an interpretation might stem from an anti-communist point of view 
which is accustomed to seeing anything from North Korea in a negative light. This 
misunderstanding resulted in the CS member leaving the church. 
Second, in order for Kim Il-sung to take absolute authority, he had to first teach that 
Niccolo Machiavelli's premise that the end justifies the means,
402
 which has 
influenced the perception of North Koreans while they are socialized by the teachings 
of their leader. However, believing that the end justifies the means is a feature of the 
modern history of South Korea, for example, as described in chapter one, over 115 
students were killed by South Korean police on 19 April 1960 so that president Rhee 
could consolidate the regime of the South Korean government.  
Kim Seoung-min, the director of the Free North Korea Radio and one of the CS, 
and Kim Nae-young, the head of Mission Centre who is one of the CW, are members 
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of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. A conflict arose between them over the progress 
of the establishment of Missionary Radio broadcast to North Korea. Kim Seoung-min 
applied for 10,000 grant available from Youngnak Mission Centre in order to 
establish the Missionary Radio outside the church in an effort to spread the Gospel to 
North Koreans. Kim Nae-young supported the application; however, in the end, this 
missionary project was not implemented. They explained their reasons to me during 
the interviews. Kim Nae-young told me the following:  
First of all, I asked Kim Seoung-min for details of the plan for the establishment of 
the Missionary Radio so that I could show them to people who were authorised to sign 
the bills of expenditure. When he did this I realised that his proposals were not 
sufficiently prepared for presentation. I told him that he had to work on the weak 
points of the plan and that I would help him if he found it difficult to do it by himself. 
He then brought the upgraded plan to me but it was still unsatisfactory. I asked him 
who should be receiving the money, according to the procedures of the Missionary 
Radio. My reason for that question is that the church could not pay the 10,000 pounds 
into Kim Seong-min’s own account, but only to the director of the organisation. It was 
important for the church to follow appropriate procedures and processes. If the correct 
procedure were not followed we would both be criticised if something went wrong. 




Kim Seoung-min told me the following: 
I thought that Kim Nae-young did not trust me. Even though it was true that funds 
from the church had to be paid into the organisation’s account, I thought that it was 
more important to get the Radio project established first than setting up an 
organisation. I wanted to show people the result first. One of Kim Il-sung’s principle 
was that the final results were the most important and not the steps we need to take to 
get there. The way Kim Nae-young spoke to me, he seemed to look down on me. I 
was hurt when he told me that if I could not do what was necessary he would do the 
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In sum, a Christian Wolnammin who focuses on the rightness or wrongness of 
actions as opposed to the rightness or wrongness of the consequences of those actions 
conflicted with a Christian Saeteomin who believes that a morally right action is an 
action that produces good consequences. The Christian Wolnammin insisted on 
working through an official organisation when providing public funds for the 
establishment of the Missionary Radio because they could not pay these to a private 
individual. He also had to bear in mind who would take responsibility if something 
went wrong. For the Christian Saeteoin this was a matter of trust. In fact, he thought 
and acted in accordance with the teaching of Kim Il-sung that ‘the final result was 
more important than any other element.’ Clearly accounting rules had to be kept-but 
with understanding and forethought, the problem could have been avoided. 
The CW live in a society in which it is normal to consider various aspects of any 
issue before deciding on a course of action whereas the CS come from a society 
conditioned by consequentialism, providing further evidence for the existence of non-
shared identities. 
 
3.3. The Firm Faith System 
 
The CW believe that the CS can settle successfully in South Korea if they become 
committed Christians which corresponds with their or their parents experience of 
settling in South Korea after the partition. As depicted in chapter 1, the CW who 
escaped from North Korea had a firm conservative faith of Christianity in the 
Northern territory and have maintained their faith after their migration to South Korea.  
	
Article 68 of the DPRK Constitution states that “citizens have freedom of religious 
beliefs.”
405
 However, Article 68 also has provisions on drawing in foreign forces and 
harming the state or social order, provisions that could lead to potentially severe 
limitations resulting in the arbitrary application of the constitutional provision on 
“freedom of religious beliefs.” According to Suh Dae-sook, Kim II-sung’s most 
comprehensive biographer, “One of Kim Il-sung’s most difficult tasks after the 
establishment of the state was the handling of Christians,”
406
 who confronted the 
Communist regime. Eventually his regime prevailed: Christianity was totally 
suppressed by the 1960s. The North Korean regime constructed and substituted Juche 
ideology which also replaced Christianity and the other existing belief systems. 
According to the experience and perspectives of forty North Korean Saeteomin in a 
written report named “Thank You Father Kim Il Sung”: Eyewitness Accounts of 
Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North 
Korea’
407
, North Koreans were taught that religion was nothing more than “opium.” 
Virtually all interviewees used that very term. Although the phrase “religion is opiate 
of the masses” is typically attributed to Karl Marx, numerous respondents attributed 
its sentiment directly to Kim II-sung.
408
 One of interviewees said that Communism 
and the belief in Juche ideology are all that exist, and religion is considered the 
biggest crime and is to be dealt with in the harshest manner, and if one believed in 
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religion he or she would be politically ostracized.
409
 Furthermore, public executions 
of Christian believers in North Korea were carried out. Two interviewees mentioned 
that they personally witnessed the execution of people because of their religious 
beliefs, affiliation, or practices. Another mentioned that her brother, a pastor, had 
been executed.
410
This means that in spite of the fact that the CS may go into a church 
in South Korea, it is not easy for them to become Christians with a firm faith. 
Nevertheless, the CW expect the CS to switch from Juche to a firm Christian faith. 
 
Furthermore, the CW emphasized that Christians should be self-sufficient by the 
grace of God, expecting the North Korean Saeteomin to be Christians just like them.  
  
The CS are poor. Avarice knows no bounds. I hope that the North Korean 
Saeteomin will accept a firm faith so that they can realise that the things of the 
world are not the most important in their lives but it is enough just to be happy 
living with their families. That is self-sufficiency. If they keep on comparing 
themselves with South Koreans, they would be discontented with their lives, 
their health, their relationships. However, if they encounter God and change the 




In addition, in the name of the love of Christ, the CW have made available a 
grant-in-aid which was regarded as a means of evangelism, in spite of the fact 
that the South Korean government also provided subsidies to the CS. The 
church supplied basic essentials of life to the CS when they came to South 
Korea.  However, the CS who had been accustomed to the Public Distribution 
System (PDS)
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of North Korea did not regard the grant-in-aid and the basic 
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essentials provided by the church as tokens of the church’s love and as a means 
of evangelism: to them it was normal provisioning by the central organisation. 
Nonetheless, the CW did expect the North Korean Saeteomin to understand the 
church’s purpose in doing this and to feel appropriately thankful. In short, the 
CW’s expectations in the church based on a conservative-evangelical faith 
resulted in their disappointment with the CS. 
 
3.4. Forming Personal Relationships 
 
The CW have grown disillusioned over time as the CS do not meet their 
expectations. One of the CW argued that the CS do not trust South Koreans because 
they had been taught that South Koreans were bad people and enemies. They do not 
open themselves up to the CW,
413
though of course the CW do not often recognize that 
they do not trust the CS. 
  
It seems that the main difference about the CS is that they are too competitive. I 
myself do not have a competitive personality. Of course, competitiveness is 
necessary for sportsmen, but the CS seem to always desire to beat others at all 
costs. Such behaviour seems forced and unusual. In particular, they have a 
tendency to divide people into two types: the good and the bad. If I tried to treat 
them kindly, they regard this as the behaviour of an untrustworthy man with a 
duplicitous personality. They also expressed their feelings directly, which hurt me. 
They have no consideration for others.
414
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information about the identity of the CS. In fact, Kim Il-sung’s perspective on the 
world was defined by his experience as a guerrilla fighter with the Chinese 
Communists against the Japanese in Manchuria.
415
He emphasized that “that the 
guerrilla ethos was not only supreme, but also the only legitimate basis on which to 
reconstitute a reunified Korea.”
416
 In his view, economic activity produced the means 
to wage war, education produced soldiers to wage war, and ideology convinced the 
people of the sociological and historical inevitability of war.
417
That impacts on the 
character, personality, and the way of life. The perception of North Koreans cannot be 
understood apart from Kim Il-sung’s teachings and his influence remains dominant in 
it. In other words, North Koreans firmly think and act in the knowledge that they must 
defeat their enemies and win all wars with a guerrilla spirit. Their mentality was 
cultivated by the teachings of their leader to whom they had to be loyal at all cost and 
they cannot instantly switch their thoughts and behaviour patterns to suit the CW 
expectations. 
 
3.5. Reproduction of Distrust   
 
Distrust between the CW and the CS is deeply rooted. The anti-communist 
education taught South Koreans that communist North Koreans are liars and security 
threats. In this section I will explore the basis for understanding how distrust is 
reproduced in interaction.  
First of all, we have already seen in Chapter 3 and here that the CW tend to 
attribute the behaviour and attitudes of the CS to an inferiority complex. They do not 
415
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understand that North Koreans were not allowed to admit that they were unable to do 
something or they lacked some knowledge in a particular area. As far as the CW 
interviewees were concerned the CS were simply lying when they said “I can do this” 
when they obviously could not. The CW had no idea that these responses were 
automatic and have their origin in the ethos of North Korea. 
  
The CS told worthless lies to us. They really don’t need to lie, we understand that 
they face difficult circumstances. They are obviously very defiant and respect 
themselves a lot. They did not say at first whether or not they knew some of the 
things I asked, but it turned out later that they did not know them at all. However, 
they lied and pretended to know. I wanted them to be honest. They disliked being 
treated by others as people who come from a poor country. They seemed to have 
a sense of inferiority, so they tried to show us that there were good things in 
North Korea. I think that these were the motives behind their lies.
418
  
        
We know that the Christian faith of the CS lacks doctrine but we cannot tell them 
that they do not have a firm faith because they might be hurt. We would 
understand them if they spoke honestly to us. However, they themselves think 
that they have to have a faith and that they have to know everything, so they do 
not ask any honest questions and so we can not help them. It is only natural that 





Besides the inferiority complex, the CW suspected that the CS were ready to 
deceive them
420
because they had a hidden agenda or motive, such as avoiding 
punishment or obtaining some benefit.
421
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In the North Korean system it seems normal for a man to be a liar. One of the CS 
told me that he could paint very well and was a painter who had even made a 
portrait of Kim Il-sung. I found a job for him but he was a liar. Not only does he 
not paint very well but also his job involved painting billboards for films and he 




The CS hid behind masks they made for themselves. It seemed to me that they 
experienced too much dishonesty within the structure of their society before they 
came to South Korea, even within inside their own families... I cannot trust the 
CS at all. They wear a variety of masks to suit their various circumstances. I do 
not know who they really are.
424
  
   
To add insult to injury, suspicious Christian Wolnammin were likely to regard 
those who lie as Communists, in order to maintain their perception formed by anti-
communist indoctrination that North Korean Communists are liars. This easily leads 
to becoming that all the CS are liars unless proved honest each time. This is an 
another example of stigmatization. The CW judge the CS by appearances, and they 
interpret these in a way which magnifies any negative impressions. This indicates that 
CW need to learn about and understand the behaviour patterns of the CS if they aim to 
coexist with them harmoniously. 
 
3.6. Choices and Promises 
 
“Choice is the power, right, or faculty of choosing,”and choice consists of the mental 
process of thinking involved with the process of judging the merits of multiple 
options and selecting one of them for action.
425
For the CW, “choosing behaviour” is 
central to their existence and is driven by fundamental psychological needs such as 
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love, significance, freedom, responsibility, fun, learning etc. In contrast, the CS 
behaviour is driven by the fulfilment of basic survival such as access to food, clothing, 
shelter, and ensuring personal and others’ safety. 
The CW assume that the CS choose to tell lies, and choose do not keep their 
promises, leading a Christian Wolnammin to assume that promises are not as 
significant for the CS. “The CS break their promises thoughtlessly and this reflects 
badly on them in South Korean society. As a result the CW do not trust them at 




In North Korea the CS did not seem to be accustomed to keeping their promises. 
In South Korea there would be no problem to phone if it was difficult to keep an 
appointment. However, they did not do this, in spite of the fact that they have 
their own cell phones. For example, a group invited ten Christian North Korean 
Saeteomin and they accepted it. However, there were only two who came as 




The CW believe that a Christian who makes an oath to God is responsible for it, 
and if he breaks it he commits a sin and those who do not keep a promise are 
irresponsible. As a result, they find it extremely difficult to form a relationship with 
the CS.  
However, it may be necessary that the CW should consider the CS situation when 
they utter a promise to the CW. Whatever the background, it would in fact be difficult 
for the CS to refuse the CW’s suggestions to make promises because of their own 
feelings of powerlessness. If the CS are unwilling to make such promises, or in the 
manner and with the outcome the CW might expect, it would still be very difficult for 
the CS to find a polite way of declining. We saw in chapter 3 that according to the CS 
they had no experience of making promises to their fellows before they came to South 
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Korea, because these hardly existed in North Korea. One was to make a promise to 





3.7. Self-Sufficiency  
 
The CW expect the CS to successfully settle in South Korea and become self-
sufficient depending only on God’s grace. It is very hard for them to accept the 
dependent life style of the CS and they often feel disappointed. Upon entering South 
Korea, the CW faced many difficulties. Most of them were much poorer than the 
residents of Seoul. They had to settle down when virtually no support facilities existed.  
However, they managed to fit in the mainstream of South Korean life successfully and 
the second and subsequent generations eventually became successful in the wider 
world. They take a great pride in having risen from one class to another through their 
own resources. Therefore, they expect the same level of self-sufficiency when it 
comes to the CS and when faced with the special benefits received by the CS and with 
their dependent life style CW may become disappointed and critical. 
  
I thought that the North Korean Saeteomin were poor and that they found it hard 
to live. Even entry into South Korea was very hard. However, I found out that 
some of the resettlement funds provided by the South Korean government have 
been used to bring family members to South Korea. Besides, the North Korean 
Saeteomin students have been given places at high-ranking universities without 
any entry exams. This is unfair. From the perspective of a self-made man these 




Some Saeteomin do not work even though they are perfectly capable. They think 
that it is easier for them to receive government benefits than to work for a 
428
 Interview with CS15, Seoul, 05 February 2007. 
429
 Interview with CWG02, Seoul, 12 November 2006. 
	
company. Or they only work part time because the government stops the benefit 
if the North Korean Saeteomin has a full time job. I want to beat them when I see 
this happening.
430
       
  
However, the CW argument is not totally valid, because he did not take into 
account that social circumstances after the Korean war were very different from those 
of the 21
st
 century. The king, the bureaucracy, the royal clan, landed aristocrats, local 
potentates and the country magistrates: all this civilized order had been broken up by 
the Western and Japanese impact, and then the Korean War. Japanese policies left 
Korea with a tiny middle class. After the liberation in South Korea, the effective 
opposition to the developing southern system was almost wholly on the left, a mass 
popular resistance from 1945 to 1950 included raw peasant protest and organized 
labour union activity and, finally, armed guerrilla resistance. In contrast, a 
numerically small class on the right which virtually monopolized the native wealth 
and education of the country and which could not acquire and maintain its favoured 
position under Japanese rule without a certain minimum of collaboration was forced 
to support imported expatriate politicians.
431
 The rightists controlled the overt 
political structure in the US zone, completely suppressing leftist activity with the help 
of the National Police. The class system of South Korea descended into extreme chaos 
after the Korean War. Amid such chaos, the process of settling down for the CW in 
South Korea went along with the settling down of the entire country. However, it is 
very difficult for the CS to settle because the present class system of South Korea is 
rock solid. Furthermore, during the half-century before they came to South Korea, 
they lived in a system where resources were organised and distributed centrally by the 
Korean Workers’ Party.  
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To sum up, the CW arrived in South Korea empty-handed and settled down 
independently. The nature of their own experience make them automatically expect 
the CS to settle in South Korea in the same way and the CW are critical of benefits 
given to the CS by the government and the church. The CW do not seem to realise 
that the CS were used to a life style dependent on the distribution system of the Party. 
  
3.8. Different Tradition  
  
The CW emphasize that the CS come from exactly the same geographical area as 
themselves called Kokuryeo.
432
 There was a general agreement that the people of 
Kokuryeo had an enterprising outlook on life which made them successful. 
  
The national characteristics and the spirits of Northern people of Kokuryeo are so 
strong they survive even if they are put in Siberia. In this sense, after the CW 
came from the Northern territory to the South, the majority of those who 
succeeded in Seoul’s Namdaemun market were the CW. The CS also came from 
the same Northern territory, so they should have been able to settle down 




My parents are first generation of the CW and they told me that the Northern 
people used to be very diligent, men of strong faith and a strong will to succeed, 
as you would expect from descendents of Kokuryeo. I believe that, since the CS 





In reality, both the CS and the CW have been educated by the stories of an 
invented tradition. In North Korea there is myth, fairy tale, implausible story, or 
432
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 whose core is based on Kim Il-sung’s struggle during Korea’s 
colonization and his restoration of the people after the liberation. Eric Hobsbawm 
defined ‘invented traditions’ as follows: “‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of 
practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or 
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”
436
The CW 
‘knowledge’ of Kokuryeo is likewise post hoc and idealized to the point of invention 
of the tradition. 
After the partition and liberation, the political situation of both South Korea and 
North Korea was chaotic. Since then the two Koreas have changed from traditional to 
modern societies but the driving force behind the change was not shared, South 
Koreans growing up under the influence of an anti-Communist ideology and North 
Koreans being taught the tradition of Kim Il-sung’s revolutionary Juche ideology. Eric 
Hobsbawm also argued that invented traditions occurred more frequently at times of 
rapid social transformation when ‘old’ traditions were disappearing. He therefore 
expected an especially large number of ‘new’ traditions to be invented.
437
  
The CW and the CS operate within the framework of differing imagined traditions 
which lead to the establishment of two separate, non-shared identities. The crucial 
issue, however, is that in Seoul, South Korean ways are the only ones accepted by that 
ethnic group and the same goes for interaction between the CS and the CW in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church: the Christian faith has not actually enabled them to 
be equal.  
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In this chapter, I investigated the hypothesis that the CW ethnic identity is very 
different from the CS one as evidenced in material symbols, verbal symbols and 
behaviour symbols.  
  First, clothing, and the use of tobacco and alcohol are material symbols for both 
groups. Southerners wear Western clothes and Northerners wore uniform like 
garments. The CW regard alcohol and tobacco consumption sinful, while the CS 
regard these as part of socialising.  
Second, concerning verbal symbols, or more accurately language, the connotations 
attached to some words changed in the South as the population suffered the 
aggression of the North, while a positive meaning of these words was retained in the 
North. For Southerners previously neutral words like Minjok, Jaju, Dogmu and Migun 
Cheolsu evoked the persecution of communism they suffered before migrating to the 
South. The CS have been accustomed to using these words and still like using them. 
This incongruence highlights the different ethnic identity of the two groups which is 
further enhanced by the use of foreign expressions and the Hancha.  
Third, there is a variety of evidence in section 3 to suggest that the hypothesis has 
been strengthened in terms of behavioural symbols as follows: 1) the CW embraced 
individualism which led to looser family ties and weaker solidarity, whereas the CS’ 
families are strong because they are used to live in the circumstances of collective 
organisation; 2) the CW who tried to make allowances for the CS were disappointed 
because the latter were accustomed to equal treatment and regarded these gestures of 
goodwill as discrimination; 3) the CW helped the CS to become Christians so that 
they could adapt to South Korea successfully. They expected the CS to be self-
	
sufficient and they supported grant-in-aid as a means of evangelism, in accordance 
with their conservative-evangelical faith. However the CS, being accustomed to the 
distribution system of North Korea, did not perceive this in the same way as the CW; 
4) the CW and CS differ in their level of competitiveness, the latter being perceived 
by the former to be extremely competitive; In spite of the fact that the whole basis of 
South Korean socio-political life is, of course, one of extreme competition; 5) the CW 
held strongly to anti-Communism and automatically tended to regard the CS as liars 
and were convinced that they wore masks in order to deceive; 6) the CW criticised the 
CS for not keeping promises whereas the latter had no experience of individual 
promises in North Korea; 7) the CW expected the CS to emulate their successful 
settlement in South Korea, supported only by their faith. However, they were 
disappointed with the dependent life style of the CS who were accustomed to 
dependence on the distribution system of the Party. Since the partition of Korea, the 
CW lived under a capitalist system while the CS had lived under a collective system 
before coming to the South; 8) the CW expect the CS to have inherited what they 
imagined as the common characteristics of Kokuryeo’s spirit but the latter do not 
understand this expectation because the two groups were educated by different 
invented traditions. These eight points make a compelling case to accept that the CW 
and the CS, despite their shared geographical origins, do not share the same ethnic 
identity. 
 
Conclusion to Part Two: Rejection and Exclusion 
 
I have investigated the hypothesis that the ethnic identity of the CW and the CS is 
heterogeneous. The evidence came from the analysis of material, verbal and 




each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church as they were not aware of how 
significant the difference of identities is. Their premise according to which they share 
the same ethnic identity set them up for disappointment. 
First I examined the perspectives of Frederick Barth and Anthony Cohen on ethnic 
identity and found that ethnic identity is not the product of primordial values but 
changeable. North and South Korea has gone down a very different political path 
since the partition, which I expected to significantly impact on the identity of the two 
communities who initially shared the same geographical origin. I proposed, therefore, 
that their ethnic identity has been modulated and moderated while the two groups 
lived in separate societies of contrasting ideologies for half a century. The political 
circumstances and the driving ideologies were described in detail in Part One in order 
to demonstrate the extent of the political and resulting social intra-community level 
differences that have emerged during the decades of partition. 
Looking to literature, I cited the two contrasting views of Koreans historians on the 
ethnic identity of Koreans inhabiting the Korean peninsula. One argues that the ethnic 
identity of Koreans has been homogeneous while the other recognises and emphasises 
the role other cultures and races play in the formation of identity. This latter view 
breaks with the ‘myth of homogeneity of identity’ whose emergence they attribute to 
education during a period of weakness, such as the Japanese rule during which the 
self-determination of people was lost.  
Nevertheless, many still expect that the CW and the CS are one ethnicity despite of 
all the differences that have come about over the past sixty years. I maintain that the 
expectation of homogeneity hinders progress on the construction of single community 
consisting of the two groups, and even creates exclusion. In order to demonstrate the 
depth of the differences between the two groups I analysed material and verbal 

	
symbols and behavioural patterns whose interpretation cause great difficulty for both 
groups when they interact in Yougnak Presbyterian Church. 
I shall now briefly highlight some of the areas of contention, within Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church, keeping in mind not only the nature of the differences but also 
how when faced with these the CW and the CS react.  
First, material symbols were reviewed. I found that the CS continued wearing 
simple clothing after their arrival to Youngnak Presbyterian Church. Even when they 
attempted to emulate South Korean styles they could be distinguished of which they 
were aware. They also continued smoking and consuming alcohol. These two habits 
are not only frowned upon among the CW but also prohibited. That being the case, at 
least one Christian Wolnammin refused a gift from a Christian Saeteomin. Another 
case was the colours red and blue. They symbolise the exact opposite: for the CS red 
is the colour of goodness and blue the colour of failure and bad deeds while the CW 
preferred blue at all times over red. This difference led to at least one conflict. The 
above cases may only be resolved when the two communities understand and reflect 
on the source of the problems, some of which derive from religious ideas specific to 
Protestantism in Korea, and others from issues outside religion.  
Recognising the differences in verbal symbols are more difficult if one assumes a 
homogeneous identity based on a shared language. It was demonstrated that basic 
phrases such as ‘I can do this’ expressed different intent: for North Koreans this is a 
standard reply any time the party makes a request. It expresses their intention to 
please the Party and further the revolution wit the totality of their being regardless of 
ability. The CW would only say that they can do something when they know they are 
able to carry out a task. The inability to recognise this difference led to suspicion and 
offence on numerous occasions. I learnt from an interview that a Christian Saeteomin 


left his job as a result of this. On a broader linguistic level it is worth noting that the 
CW embraced many foreign words while in North Korea every word had to have a 
North Korean equivalent and foreign words were banned. Decades of separate 
language evolution lead to comprehension difficulties and differences in intonation 
and expressing subtleties Further, there are certain phrases the CW do not tolerate 
such as ‘comrade,’ ‘withdrawal of the U.S. Army’, ‘our ethnic Koreans’ because these 
evoke anxieties regarding the security of South Korea. This sentiment is so strong that 
the CW interviewees could not help but be suspicious of the intentions of those 
Christian Saeteomin who use these phrases. Some of them would actually accuse the 
CS in question of being a spy, a communist with an agenda. At the same time, the CS 
have expressions they only use in relation to their leaders and when they hear it in 
another context they find it offensive and profane. North Koreans grew up to be tough 
fighters and it is evident from their abrupt and direct speech. South Koreans on the 
other hand are polite and more subtle which makes the CS wonder whether there is a 
hidden agenda behind the kind words. In this atmosphere it is almost impossible to 
establish trust until these differences are acknowledged. 
 Another area that jeopardizes the building up of mutual respect and trust is 
behaviour. As opposed to South Koreans, North Koreans are not used to make and 
keep promises to individuals as the only kind of promise they encountered was made 
to the masses at the request of the party and were more like pledges of allegiance with 
no consequences if they failed to deliver. The CW interpreted these failed promises as 
deceit or at least as signs of an inferiority complex. The abrupt and direct 
communication style of the CS was wrongly interpreted as lack of politeness because 
the CW failed to recognise the extent of black and white thinking (dividing people 
into friends and enemies) and constant readiness to face the enemy which was a result 


of Juche indoctrination. They did not, of course, recognise the extent of their own 
black and white thinking. Last, but not least the CW expected the CS to settle in South 
Korea successfully just like their parents and grandparents did following their arrival 
after the partition or the Korean War. The CS perceived failure to become self-
sufficient is a cause for great concern and much criticism among the CW who do not 
understand that in the North wealth was redistributed centrally.  
It is also obvious that the contrasting socializations created rejection and exclusion 
within the community of BSCFP. The CW expected the CS to completely rid 
themselves of their former North Korean identity and become just like them.
438
 The 
reason is that the North Korean identity was formed by the principles of Juche 
ideology which was regarded as evil by the CW conservative evangelical faith. 
 On the other hand, the CS had to face the fact that their identity was completely 
different from that of South Koreans.
439
 One Christian Wolnammin interviewee 
realized that North Koreans and South Koreans do not share the same ethnicity.
440
 




 “a sense of disappointment,”
443
 
and “a sense of distance”
444
 when encountering with the Christian Saeteomin 
members in the church. One female Wolnammin admitted that her community was not 
ready to welcome the CS.
445
One male Wolnammin told the CS to “go back to North 
Korea immediately.”
446
 Some Christian Saeteomin thought that they would actually 
be happier in North Korea.  
However, the CS tried to become like South Korean Christians, fearing being 
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 Interview with CW061, Seoul, 15 February 2007. 


pushed out of South Korea and the community of the church if they remained true to 
their identity. They carried out a programme in order to change which pervaded their 
inner and social lives. One of the interviewees put it this way:  
  
It was extremely difficult for me to be a slave to the idea that we must learn the history 
of South Korea, to be regarded as people who experienced everything completely 
wrong in North Korea and to hear that the South Korea is right. The South Koreans 
look down on us because we behave differently even as we try to mimic their speech, 
dress sense and behaviour to avoid their gaze. However, I realized that it is a disgusting 
way to live as I am unable to change my identity that was formed in North Korea. I am 
aware of the fact that I am who I am. It is true that I was born in North Korea and am 
obviously different from the South Koreans. I asked myself why I tried to be South 
Korean. It was because I live in South Korea as a North Korean Saetomin and a 
Christian North Korean Saetomin and I want to feel comfortable. I will keep my 
identity until I die. I am sure, in spite of the fact that I am a South Korean citizen my 
identity will never become the same as those who were born in South Korea. Rather, it 




A Christian Saeteomin told me that university students spoke badly of North Korea, 
and they even said that North Korea had to be destroyed as soon as possible. Since 
then he has hidden his origin.
448
 Another Christian Saeteomin told me that 
reunification must not happen soon because South Koreans are completely different 
from North Koreans socio-politically, culturally, even linguistically.
449
  
In this aspect, a construction of community in Youngnak Presbyterian Church and 
even reunification in the Korean Peninsula seems to be an ambivalent and dangerous 
venture insofar as it assumes the creation of a homogenous community and nation. 
The CW cannot take even one step toward solving the exclusion in the community 
because they believe that the ethnic identity of the CS was formed by Juche ideology 
that is rooted in materialism, nihilism, atheism and personal cult of Kim Il-sung and 
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Kim Jong-il. In terms of their conservative evangelical faith, the CW must fight 
against the evil forces of Juche ideology and must destroy the North Korean identity. 
The CW do not recognise that the political nature of their Christian faith may be as 
“contaminated” as the CW see the faith of the CS. 
My argument is that the identity of the CS should not be destroyed to fit the 
requirements of a community which dominates them, the CW. Instead the differences 
need to be recognised and one way of achieving a peaceful and equal satisfactory 
coexistence is to construct a catholic community in which everyone maintains their 
own identity and are still full members of the community.  
There are two significant elements with which the two groups can construct a 
catholic community in which they live together in harmony. One is a courteous 
attitude toward Juche ideology rather than regarding it as evil. Part of this would 
necessitate the CW reflecting on their own non-religious ideological trappings. 
However, just as North Koreans in North Korea could not readily reflect critically on 
Juche ideology given the political demands of the regime, so too it demands strength 
for the CW to reflect critically on their views given the political ideology of the South 
Korean regime. The second would then be that individuals of the two groups ought to 
repent from their animosity toward each other, forgive each other as Christians, and 
embrace each other. In order to make this exploration clear there are two research 
questions: How can the CW come to respect Juche ideology theologically? How can 
the CW embrace the CS? These significant issues will open up a new direction. I will 
offer a theological reflection on exclusion and embrace and the understanding of the 
attitude toward Juche ideology in Part Three.  
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Part Three  
 





In part three, in order to solve the problem of exclusion in Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church, a theological way will be proposed which I believe could allow the two 
groups to construct a harmonious catholic community. I will describe the courteous 
attitude of the ‘New Starting: Toward the Changing Life’ (hereafter NSTCL)
450
 
towards Juche ideology through fulfilment theology as discussed in the Fourth 
Commission of the 1910 World Missionary Conference to clarify the missiological 
position of the NSTCL in chapter 5. I will then examine the principle of embracing 
the other and its application in the context of the Korean Peninsula and, in particular, 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church through Miroslav Volf’s metaphorical lens of 
exclusion and embrace in chapter 6.  
I will not attempt here to deal equally with attitudes of the two groups, but to focus 
rather more on the attitude of the CW towards the CS because the CW are relatively 
stronger than the CS in terms of the dominant-subordinate relationship. Moreover, it 
is rather easy for the CW to require the CS to follow their way and to become people 
in the image of the CW. However, that does not mean that the building of a 
community can be a one way process. The construction of a community in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church essentially requires relevant input from the CS. Study of the role 
450
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and contribution of the CS in this process, while certainly not ignored, requires further 
examination beyond the scope of this thesis, allowing more scope for the CS voices to 
speak for themselves.   
The CW and the CS in Youngnak Presbyterian Church believed that their ethnic 
identity was homogeneous and assumed that even if differences were found they 
would overcome them easily. However, given that they had lived in two countries 
with contrasting ideologies for over half a century, their ethnic identity had been 
modulated and moderated before they began to meet each other face to face in the 
church. On encountering each other, and misinterpreting or rejecting material, verbal 
and behavioural symbols, the two groups realized that their heterogeneity is so acute 
that they cannot live together in harmony. Members of the two groups became 
disillusioned and disappointed, which led to isolationism on both sides. The CW, 
indoctrinated by anti-communist ideology, demanded the CS give up their identity and 
become like them because the CW regarded Juche ideology as an evil ideology which 
must be destroyed (see chapter 4). The CW were unable to accept that the CS identity 
stems from Juche, rather than the presumed intentional evil of the other. It is necessary, 
therefore, that the CW find a new theological orientation toward Juche ideology in 
order to create a catholic community. In other words, in Part three the focus of the 
thesis will be concerned with a possible new theological orientation of the CW 
towards the CS.  
My argument is that, at the moment, the CW refuse to see anything positive in the 
life of the CS. It would of course be better if the CW’s appreciation of and respect for 
the CS as people would come from the CW spontaneously as part of their Christian 
life. This, however, will not happen given the overriding strength of anti-communist 
ideology of the CW. Given this situation, there needs to be some top-down teaching of 


the CW in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. First, the CW need to be shown how they 
can see some positive Confucian aspects in Juche ideology which helped the CS to 
become Christians. Second, the CW should recognize the unChristian nature of their 
animosity toward the North Korean people, which was formed by the socialization of 
anti-communist ideology, and embrace them. Thirdly, the relationship between 
Christian faith and praxis in this endeavour needs to be clarified as a basis for 
movement among the CW.  
 
1. Toward a Catholic Community in Diversity 
 
The term catholic is an adjective derived from the Greek adjective 	 
(katholikos), meaning “whole” or “complete.”
451
 As catholic points to wholeness, it 
includes “all that which Christ, in and by the Spirit, wants to share with, and pour into, 
his body, in terms of the fruit and gifts of the sanctifying and liberating Spirit.”
452
 




 According to Miroslav Volf, every church is catholic as long as it has the whole 
Christ along with all means of salvation. The meaning of catholicity to him is “the 
wholeness of a congregation or church based on the presence of the whole Christ.”
454
 
An ecclesiological whole which is “the eschatological indwelling of the triune God in 
God’s whole people” transcends a local church. He lays emphasis upon an 
anticipation of the still outstanding gathering of the whole people of God rather than 
451
 Catholic, available from; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic/; accessed on 23
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November, 2008.                   
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the realization or concretization of the already existing universal church, in spite of an 
anticipation in which communal eschatological salvation is experienced concretely.
455
 
That is, according to him, the catholicity of the local church lies in a historical 
anticipation of the eschatological catholicity of the people of God in the totality of 
God’s new creation.
456
 Most importantly, he insists that one of the external marks of 
catholicity of a local church is “the openness of each church to all other churches.”
457
 
In this sense, in case of the community consisting of both the CW and the CS 
members in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, the community seems to be uncatholic 
because the two groups remained separate. There are, in a real sense, two churches 
within the Youngnak Presbyterian Church community, but only one, that of the CW, is 
regarded as the “proper” church. This may not be expressed openly, but I suggest it 
influences the CW’s attitudes. In Volf’s sense, however, the CW act of rejecting and 
excluding the CS almost disqualifies them from being part of the catholic, that is 
whole, church which shares the fruits of the Spirit. Youngnak Presbyterian Church has 
been an anti-communist ideological bastion since the church was established as 
described in chapter 1. Its members feel that they have no need to repent because they 
have been coloured by their ideology, which lead them automatically to think that 
Juche ideology is evil. This is a real three dimensional power in the view of Steven 
Lukes, which has operated on the CW. The very existence of the church is based on an 
anti-communist ideology, which means that these two things have become inseparable. 
This is a fundamental problem. In a sense this is syncretism on a large scale.  
This indicates that in order that the community of the two groups be catholic, the two 
groups must become open toward each other. My argument is that in order to open 
455
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toward each other, the two groups would need to change both their theological and 
sociological approach which they show toward others. In particular, the CW would 
need to show openness toward Juche ideology.  
 
2. The Principle of Analogy and Otherness and Their Implication   
 
In this section I will briefly describe Juergen Moltmann’s perspective on how we 
understand the other, before dealing with Volf’s theological approach on a solution of 
exclusion. I follow this order in discussing the two scholars because Moltmann was 
Volf’s supervisor.   
Juergen Moltmann deals with the problem of like and unlike in relation to creating 
a community in diversity. First, he established the relationship between knowledge 
and community, saying that there is no community without knowledge and no 
knowledge without community. Thus, in order to enter a community one has to make 
contact with ‘the others’, perceive them and acknowledge them. Initially, one sees 
only the reflection of one’s own self in ‘the others’, and one embraces them as in 
one’s image so that one may subject them to one’s own idea.  
Groups do settle on the basis of similarities: this avoids challenge and comes easily 
to a Christian community. In general, any self-selecting Christian community risks 
excluding others either intentionally or because the outsiders do not feel accepted in 
the same way. This is a fundamental problem with self-selecting. Of course, if you 
have church which is attended by everybody who lives within the same boundary or 
in the neighbourhood, it is not self-selecting. When people have a wide choice of 
places to go, we find churches which are self-selecting. Therefore it is generally found 
that Christians assemble in groupings where they will meet others like themselves and 
where they will not be faced with uncomfortable challenges. For example, people 
		
easily become Christians based on a common anti-communist ideology or a shared 
Korean nationalism. But it is risky. 
One’s perception of ‘the others’ is also shaped by one’s social relationship to them. 
This means that one should know the differences of ‘the others,’ which is knowledge 
related to community. Here Moltmann criticizes the principle of Aristotle according to 
which ‘Like is only known by like’ and ‘Like draws to like,’ which is called by 
Moltmann “the principle of analogy and homogeneity.” 
458
 He insists that we must 
establish the principle of “Other is only known by other” or “the acceptance of others 
creates community in diversity”, which he calls “the principle of difference and 
diversity of kind,”
459
 which is the antithesis of the principle of likeness. Taking this 
perspective, it is right that the CW and the CS should not assume that they share a 
homogeneous identity but they should be able to understand each other by the 
principle of difference and diversity of kind; that is, they have to know the others 
through this way that the CS know themselves and the CW know themselves, but in 
order to create a catholic community in diversity to live together they have to know 
the others. However, the problem is that, in contact with others, like will 
automatically choose to go with like. In particular, those who are socialized by anti-
communist ideology will associate with those who are socialized in the same way. We 
should not overlook the operation of three dimensional power here. 
Second, Moltmann observes that Western Christianity is dominated by the 
‘likeness’ principle or “Eros principle”. The principle of likeness that “Like is only 
known by like” proposes that one cannot perceive “the others” who are not the same 
as them. Moltmann says that early Greek philosophy expanded this principle to the 
458
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principle that ‘Similar is known only by the similar.’ Moltmann describes the 
principle as the principle of Eros: that like seeks like in order to be united with it, 
which leads to the knowing of like by like, creating the universe by the power of 
Eros.
460
 Moltmann points out that the ‘likeness’ principle or Eros principle has 
dominated the Western world, Christianity and the activities of its mission since the 
so-called discovery of America by Columbus of 1492.  
 
The Europeans never really ‘discovered’ America at all in its unique character and 
difference. The Conquistadores saw nothing, and ‘discovered’ only what they were 
looking for – gold and silver. The Indian kingdoms were never known. They have 
never been understood, right down to the present day. They were subjugated, destroyed 
and exploited, and were missionized and colonized according to European blueprints. 
The ‘other’ people were accommodated to the rulers, as their subjects. The Christian 
missionaries too, as their diaries show, understood only what they could make the same 
as themselves through conversion. Spaniards, Portuguese and the Protestant Pilgrim 
Fathers failed to perceive the difference in kind and unique character of the Indians. 
Because they could only recognize what was like themselves, and because it was only 
that which they had the will to understand, they were bound to destroy the alien culture, 
and level down ‘the others’ to be like themselves. The sorry result was the uniform 





The analysis conducted in Part Two reveals a very similar picture: the CW only 
accept the components of the CS identity that they share and are impatient, to say the 
least, when they discover the ‘otherness’ of the CS. Being convinced that the CW 
thinking is the correct one and the CS is somehow distorted they strive to assimilate 
the CS. Their view of successful resettlement stems from their own experience, not 
taking into account the vast differences in the outside circumstances of resettlement. 





automatically that their thinking is right and the CS’s is wrong, demanding that the CS 
follow the CW’s life style; the CW automatically act to lead the CS to be like them. In 
this sense, on the view of Steven Lukes, we can say that the three dimensional power 
operates on the CW’s perception, cognition and activity.
462
 They encourage the CS to 
take on the uniform South Korean culture, the uniform South Korean Christianity, and 
uniform aspects of language, e.g. accent etc. almost forcing them to give up their own 
identities. It is extremely dangerous. I criticize the CW perspective because they 
ignore the CS own identity and want to conquer it and destroy it as the Western 
missionaries did in America.  
Third, Moltmann insists that the antithesis of the principle of likeness can form a 
community in diversity and the diversity in the community to the extent that we can 
love our enemies.  
 
It forms community in the diversity and the diversity in the community. The basic law 
of a society like this is ‘recognition of the other’ in his or her difference. Societies 
which develop according to this principle are not closed societies. Nor are they 
uniform societies, where people are brought into line. They are ‘open societies’. They 
can live not only with different and dissimilar people, but also, …, with ‘their enemies’ 
too; for they can even make the enmity of their enemies fruitful for the things that are 
of concern to them…While the foundation of a society consisting of people who are 
like each other is normally the love of friends, the foundation of the society made up of 




Most importantly, Moltmann lays emphasis upon creating community based on 
the love of enemies. Following his argument, the CW should also be open to the 
CS and they should love even their enemies while they meet in the church as 
sisters and brothers in Christ so that they can create a catholic community in 
diversity. It is true that Jews and Samaritans had their differences and conflicts. 

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The relationship of Jews and Samaritans to each other seems to be quite similar to 
that holding between South Koreans and North Koreans and between the CW and 
the CS. Since Jesus demolished all boundary expectations by depicting a 
Samaritan as the hero of the story, social position, race, religion, or region all 
count for nothing,
464
 the CW must go along the path of Jesus because they are 
Christians. 
Moltmann is in pursuit of ‘a unity in diversity’ as Jesus was. As Jesus was 
‘unlikeness’ to human being, he identified himself with the children, sinners, tax 
collectors, the poor, women, the disabled, the ill etc. becoming likeness to them. 
Eventually, he constructed the community in which all the people of God dwell. The 
CW and CS, by following Christ’s love of the other may be able to create a shared 
community in which they can accept the differences between them without destroying 
their own identities. Surely, a community in which everyone is the same means no 
challenge, no space for the prophetic voice, and a high chance of self-satisfied pride, 
rather as the New Testament (not always fairly) describes the self-elected Pharisees 
who excluded the “unlike.” It is not just a Christ issue but it is an issue for Christians 
who are expressly told “in Christ there is no Jew, Gentile, slave or free” etc. Pharisees 
were a self-elected group; they failed to live according to the Law and excluded 
anybody who was not of their point of view. In the context of Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church, however, the CW might appear to be Pharisees if they excluded the CS. 
However, they are not Pharisees but Christians. In this sense, they must be open to the 
CS as their brothers and sisters in Christ as they should be living by the fruits of the 
Spirit. 

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3. A Concept of Tong-i  
  
Having set out theological issues which relate to Youngnak Presbyterian Church, 
I shall now move into a more positive mode by looking at unity. 
In terms of Korean phrases it is necessary to first establish tong-i before one can 
contemplate a successful tong-il of Koreans. Let me explain. Tong-il (¨©ª means 
unification and is a powerful concept in Korean thinking. There is a song that the 
whole nation of South Korea knows by heart which expresses their yearning for the 
unification of the Korean Peninsula in a language both the youngest and the oldest can 
understand.  
 
Our desire is unification 
In our dreams, our desire is unification 
With all our efforts, unification 
Oh, come, unification! 
 
Unification which saves our people 
Unification which saves this nation 
Come, unification! 
Oh, come, unification! 
 
This sentiment involves a strong vision and assumption of homogeneity permeating 
both North Korea and South Korea which portrays the division of the peninsula as a 
temporary disruption of Korean identity and assumes that unification will eventually 
recover the lost national unity.
465
 There has been a general consensus by South 
Koreans that unification of the two Koreas will bring forth one nation, one culture and 
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one language as it used to be before the division of the Korea Peninsula. This is the 
meaning of Tong-il (reunification). The issue of reunification between North and 
South Korea in diversity is relevant to the Christian community in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church.  
However, in Part Two it was shown that the identities of the two populations are 
not homogeneous but heterogeneous. The two populations did not begin to perceive 
their heterogeneous identities until they encountered each other in the church. Their 
disappointment resulted in exclusion and refusal to create a community in which 
people live together in harmony.  
The Missionary Policy of Youngnak Presbyterian Church concerning the North 
Korean Saeteomin has not only focused on making them become Christians but also 
on training them for mission toward North Korea.
466
 This policy has failed to 
integrate the two communities because of identity conflicts—to the point of 
ideological confrontation between Juche ideology and anti-Communist ideology. The 
CW have hated Juche ideology, regarding it as the evil ideology. They firmly believed 
that they must destroy it. They claimed that it was necessary to eliminate the CS 
identity because it was formed by Juche ideology. We can see the same process at 
work when we look at the image of the native missionary sent by western missions to 
do “their civilizing work.” If the CW see the Juche element of the CS as evil and anti-
Christian, this follows the same pattern with the same problems as western mission: a) 
the native missionary experiences internal alienation and their identity is rejected by 
their employer or supervisor: b) the native missionary, when working, is seen as a 
traitor. If the CW made the CS become like them and become missionaries towards 
North Korea, the CS will no longer share an identity with the North Koreans. When 
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the CS are able to go to North Korea as missionaries in a reunited Korea, they may be 
rejected by the North Korean people and regarded as traitors due to the CS’s different 
identity from the North Korean identity. In the long run, Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church will have failed. 
As long as the CW thinking remains the same, the two communities cannot take 
even one step toward the construction of a catholic community to live together in 
harmony. I contend that the two groups should construct Tong-i before they move on 
to Tong-il. 
Tong-i is a combination of the two Chinese characters tong («, )̈ and i (¬, ­). 
Tong may be translated as ‘unity’, i as ‘differences.’ Thus Tong-i literally means ‘unity 
in differences.’ The message of tong-i is very simple. The two communities can only 
create a harmonious catholic community if they embrace and respect their differences 
and give up on trying to assimilate one group into the other.  
In comparing Tong-i with Tong-il, the meaning of ‘Tong-i’ is different from that of 
‘Tong-il’ («® in Korean,  in Chinese, unification) because literally ‘Tong’ («, 
) may be translated as ‘unity’, ‘il’ (®, ) as ‘one’ and ‘i’ (¬, ­) as ‘differences.’    
As described above, Tong-il means that people of the two Koreas become one nation, 
one culture and one language as it used to be before division of the Korea Peninsula, 
but Tong-i means that people of the two Koreas is united with their differences and 
based on respect. In Part Three, I will offer a theologically based account of 
establishing tong-i, unity in diversity.  
In Chapter 5 I will investigate why exclusion happens in the church and what 
theological responses there are to the exclusion in order to create Tong-i in the church.  
Chapter 6 will suggest how Tong-i of the two populations will be constructed in the 
everyday church context in the future. 
	
4. Approach  
 
Having used two sociological concepts as the basis for a description and analysis 
of the cases in Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Part One and Two, in Part Three I 
will use a theological concept in order to give an account for the construction of a 
catholic community; Miroslav Volf’s metaphorical lens of exclusion and embrace. 
Volf draws heavily on Moltmann’s theology, as illustrated in The Crucified God, 
in developing his own idea of God’s solidarity with the victims of violence.
467
 
However, Volf further expands on it by elaborating on the idea that Christ’s death on 
the cross was a divine self-donation and a reception of the other (i.e. humanity or, in 
fact, the enemy). He asserts that we, as Christians, must try to emulate this self-
donation through solidarity with those who are suffering while embodying the divine 
act of receiving (not ingesting) each other in our humanity. The identity must become 
that of Christ, one of self donation, solidarity, and forgiveness. Volf further explains 
what this self donation that leads to embrace means: “The will to give ourselves to 
others and "welcome" them, to readjust our identities to make space for them, is prior 
to any judgment about other, except that of identifying them in their humanity.”
468
 
The three elements are interrelated: 1) repentance and forgiveness will create a 
space for the adjustment of one’s identity to embrace the other, 2) reconciliation will 
enable the construction of a new community, 3) new identity can be created based on 
embrace and mutual respect. The process stems from Miroslav Volf’s description of 
the interrelatedness of the cross and the Trinitarian God: a) the mutuality of self-
giving love in the Trinity (the doctrine of God), b) the outstretched arms of Christ on 
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the cross for the ‘godless’ (the doctrine of Christ), c) the open arms of the ‘father’ 
receiving the ‘prodigal’ (the doctrine of salvation).
469
  
God’s reception of a hostile humanity into divine communion is a model for how 
human beings should relate to each other. As God acts, human beings must welcome 
each other, each adjust their identity and thus construct a catholic community in the 
church. For this human beings must make space by repentance and forgiveness 
moving from exclusion to embrace. As a result human beings can be reconciled with 
each other. 
 
Diagram 4 The Methodology in Relation to Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation  
 
 
Christian   Christian 
                                                                                          
Wolnammin    Saeteomin 
                    Repentance                                                                                     
Exclusion 
                    Forgiveness                                                                          
In Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
The Perspective of 
The Metaphorical Lens of Volf                        
CW              CS 
                                                                                                             
                                                        Embrace                                                          
 Catholic Community  
                                                                                               
 
                                                                                                  
In Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
                             
 
With regard to Christian Wolnammin and Christian Saeteomin they have no 
capacity to embrace each other due to the fact that for over half a century they have 
been indoctrinated by sharply contrasting ideologies that make them enemies of each 
other: they do not recognize their own bias, their own politicized attitudes, as needing 
repentance and reconciliation. 
This chapter will place a particular emphasis on the necessity of creating space by 
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repentance and forgiveness in order to embrace each other. In the view of the relation 
between power and sin of Mary Grey, the responsibility for sin “changes according to 
whether one is landless, a property-owner or an invader crossing into neighbouring 
territory.”
470
 One man may have power (which is not in itself a sin) and another may 
have less power, (which is also not a sin), but the powerful one is more responsible 
than him who has less power. For example, if a person has no money and takes money 
from somebody else to buy bread, that person cannot feel guilty of sin in the same 
way as somebody who has a lot of money and takes more money from somebody else. 
In this sense, we can think that, in relation to sin, the powerless person carries less 
responsibility for sin than the one in power in respect of certain acts. Nevertheless this 
is not a signal for the powerless to abuse others. 
The CW do not recognise that they need to repent and forgive, so in a real sense they 
live in continual sin. If sinfulness is related to the power not to sin, then surely the 
powerful CW carry a far more sinful burden than the CS. The CS grew up in a context 
where they risked going without food if they disobeyed the instructions of the North 
Korean government ideology. This means their power to reflect upon their own 
context was limited. The CW have also lived in a context where their power to reflect 
critically was limited, in their case by the anti-communist socialization. However, if 
we think critically or reflectively, we can see that the CW were not going to be 
without food and that they were not in most cases going to be put in prison. We would 
say that the CW are actually, morally and theologically more sinful than the CS who 
did not have the same capacity or opportunity of making choices.  
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Chapter Attitude and Missiological Position Towards 




One way in which the CW can be encouraged to regard the CS and Juche ideology 
more positively (essential if they are to recognise their sin in rejecting the CS as full 
brothers and sisters in Christ) is to consider Juche as a religious tradition. Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church have traditionally had a negative exclusivist attitude to other 
religions, whether other forms of Christianity or Confucianism, Shamanism or 
Buddhism, dating from the time of the early missions. Such a sweepingly dismissive 
attitude is not necessarily part of Christian witness, as the development of fulfilment 
theology in the 19
th
 century and its presentation at Edinburgh 1910 showed. Indeed, 
the teaching text for the CS used at Youngnak Presbyterian Church, NSTNL, is based 
very clearly on fulfilment theology, seeing the positive in Juche as the basis for 
Christian growth. However, this aspect of NSTNL has never been shared with the CW 
members of the wider Youngnak Presbyterian Church congregation, who remain 
largely negative towards fulfilment theology or any move to inclusivism. Moreover, 
even if they did accept Confucianism and Buddhism, for example, as foundational for 
Christian faith in Korea, and not religions to be totally eliminated, they would still 
find it hard to see anything positive in Juche. The need, therefore, is to deal with the 
overriding strength of anti-communism in the CW’s thought and faith and then enable 
them to look more calmly at Juche. Given their socialization, this will be difficult. 
In this chapter, I will, therefore, set out the missiological position of the book titled 

New Starting: Toward the Changing Life
471
which the teachers of the BSCFP use for 
the CS is based on fulfilment theology. I shall use Alan Race’s definition of fulfilment 
theology, which he suggests is a form of inclusivism. He defined inclusivism as 
follows: as opposed to exclusivism, or pluralism, inclusivism entails, ‘both an 
acceptance and a rejection of the other faiths [....] On the one hand it accepts the 
spiritual power and depth manifest in them [....] On the other hand, it rejects them as 
not being sufficient for salvation apart from Christ [....]
472
 In other words, although 
there are various fulfilment theologies, one commonality can be found in the typical 
fulfilment theology: God does operate in the non-Christian world to prepare for 
people’s eventual salvation to be fulfilled in Christ. 
In order to make clear that the NSTCL is not a new idea coined for the purpose, I 
will relate the missiological position of the NSTCL to the fulfilment theology of the 
Fourth Commission of the 1910 World Missionary Conference. 
The contemporary missionary approach of Youngnak Presbyterian Church towards 
religious Juche ideology is exclusivist as has been evidenced multiple times in Part 
One and Two. The CW maintain their hostile attitude toward religious Juche ideology: 
only by the destruction of Juche ideology can people be set free. On the other hand, 
analysing the content of the NSTCL, I found that a part of the CW’s leadership takes a 
more inclusivist stance regarding the integration of the CS into Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church. The NSTNL made attempts at finding good elements in Juche 
ideology such as the notions of ‘immortality’
473
 and ‘grace’ etc., and use them for 
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leading the CS toward Christianity.  
When Youngnak Presbyterian Church began the Bible Study Class for Free 
People
474
in 1999, the church needed a text book. The church entrusted the 
Educational Institute of Christianity
475
with writing the text book,
476
 which was 
published before I began interviews. The text reflected the intention of strategic 
purpose of the writers without clarifying the concept of inclusivism. My interviewees 
also recognized only the strategic purpose without the knowledge of the concept of 
inclusivism, but the text influenced their attitude toward Juche ideology to move 
toward a more courteous attitude. Before describing the NSTCL, I shall briefly 
discuss the missiological development of fulfilment theology. 
 
The Fulfilment Theology of the 1910 World Missionary Conference  
 
1. Background of Edinburgh 1910  
 
There are three reasons why fulfilment theology eventually emerged from the 
World Missionary Conference of 1910 Edinburgh: the rise of the science of religion, 
growing concern over nationalism in the non-Western world and critical reflection on 
the effects of colonialism.   
 
Firstly, the rise of the science of religion, initiated by Friedrich Max Muller (1823-
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1900), was closely linked with the birth of Fulfilment Theology. The bases of science 
of religion were historical criticism and religious evolutionism.
477
 Muller held that 
since divine revelation is at work in all religion, all must contain some truth. 
Ultimately, the science of religion brought about a more tolerant attitude towards non-
Christian religions and provided an evolutionary concept for fulfilment theology. 
Secondly, John R. Mott
478
 indicated that the rise of nationalism leads to political 
perils. The Japanese victory over the Russians at Mukden in 1905 encouraged 
nationalism in all parts of the non-Christian world. In Asia, especially, this national 
spirit had been growing in association with a spirit of racial pride and antagonism. 
Mott went on to give examples of rising nationalism in India and Africa.
479
 This 
meant that the awakening of a national spirit in the non-Western world tended to close 
the minds and hearts of people to everything connected with Western missionaries. In 
Korea, at that time, even though the Korean church grew rapidly, nationalism emerged 
under Japanese Colonialism, although given the different colonial context, this was 
less anti-Western than in other parts of Asia. 
Thirdly, Hiebert stated that fulfilment theology was born during the heyday of 
British Imperialism in the 19
th
 century, thus its exponents were influenced by 
colonialism, which sought to demonstrate cultural superiority over subordinate 
nations. It was the task of the West to bring the benefits of this civilization to the 
world. Old systems had to be replaced by modern systems. For Christians, the parallel 
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was the superiority of the gospel.
480
 However, practical as well as missiological deeds 
demanded a new missionary attitude in the mission field and a new theological 
understanding towards other religions, one seeing a convert’s previous religious 
tradition as a preparation for evangelism. 
 
2. Missionary Attitudes towards Other Religions and to Christ 
 
In this section, I will explore how Edinburgh respondents and missiologists 
understood the relationship of the Gospel to other religions. 
With the rise of nationalism in the non-Christian world, a change in the 
missionary attitude towards other religions was considered essential. This can be 
clearly seen from the answers of some Edinburgh respondents.
481
 One respondent 
indicated that he largely gave up “sledge hammer condemnation style” preaching, and 
thought the missionary attitude had to be persuasive rather than needlessly 
aggressive.
482
 The Chinese YMCA leader C.T. Wang demonstrated that two or three 
decades earlier the attitude of most missionaries was that Christianity alone was the 
true religion while all others were false. Wang concluded that this was wrong,
483
 and 
unhelpful to mission. This was the pragmatic approach. 
On the other hand, this new missionary attitude towards other religions was 
480
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connected with the theological understanding of many missionaries at that time. Such 
Edinburgh respondents spoke of God’s activity within other religious traditions as the 
working out of salvific purposes, seeing that great leaders of all other religions must 
have been sent by God for certain purposes.
484
 Kenneth Cracknell demonstrates, in 
his book Justice, Courtesy and Love, that the Edinburgh respondents, in search of a 
theological understanding of the place and purposes of other religious traditions, used 
ancient ideas like the universal working of the Logos, or Divine Wisdom, or Holy 
Spirit.
485
 Missionaries and theologians recognising God’s activity within other 
religious traditions as the working out of salvific purposes laid the foundations for the 
interfaith dialogues of our times. 
They felt the missionary should adopt a conciliatory attitude, as Dr. Dodd, one of the 
respondents, commented:  
The Christian preacher is the intruder into his hearers’ country, an innovator as to social 
and religious matters, and, humanly speaking, has all the odds against him. He will lose 
nothing, and he has everything to gain, by recognizing the good in the religion of the 
region, in order to take advantage of any points of contact with Christianity, and 
preparations for it.486  
 
The Fourth Commission established that Christianity was the fulfilment of other 
religions, though these were not seen as a preparation for Christianity in the same way 
that the Old Testament was: they were on a par with Hellenism and thus less 
important. Their view was that justice, courtesy, and love were essential to the proper 
attitude of the missionary towards other religions. In more detail, the Conference set 
484
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out three points. 
Firstly, the view of the majority of the respondents allows at least some parallels 
with other religions. Donald Fraser, one Edinburgh respondent, wrote that animists 
believed in one Supreme God. “He is fierce. He is the Creator… He brings death into 
the home. And when a dear one is taken away, they say, God is fierce.”
487
 While 
Animism is imperfect, missionaries emphasised its importance in suggesting a line of 
approach to the animistic mind, which could be more easily filled with a rich 
Christian content.
488
 They felt that the missionary should look for the element of 
good, foster it, and build upon it, gently leading on to the full truth. Christianity 
should not be antagonistic to the other religions, but a fuller revelation of what the 
people instinctively yearn after. 
Secondly, Edinburgh respondents thought that the missionary should condemn 
evil and false elements courteously but definitely, though he should prefer to labour 
points which illuminate Christian truths.
489
 This means that the missionary does not 
accept all elements within other religions. If some of the elements are not sufficient 
for leading on to the Christian truth, the missionary should reject them. According to 
this view, the missionary must never attempt to combine other religions and 
Christianity because syncretism is unacceptable.
490
 
Thirdly, the missionaries were to adamantly adhere to the finality of the Christian 
Gospel. The theology of religion implied or fully spelt out in the Edinburgh 
correspondence should be Christocentric. In relation to Christ, they believed all other 
religions were teleological, and moved toward their fulfilment in the Christian 
487
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 Most of the missionaries responded to the Commissioners in terms of 
fulfilment, and indeed Edinburgh 1910 fully reflected this idea. The idea of fulfilment 
was developed most extensively by J.N. Farquhar
492
, in his book The Crown of 
Hinduism, where he refers to the words of Jesus Christ which summarizes His whole 
relationship to Israel: “I have not come to destroy but to fulfil.”
493
 As in the case of 
Farquhar, the key text for many other respondents was Matthew 5:17.
494
 In his book, 
he contends that Christ fufils the hightest and deepest spiritual aspirations of the 
Hindu, suggesting that Christianity should be presented ‘as the fulfilment of all that is 
aimed at in Hinduism, as the satisfaction of the spiritual yearnings of her people, as 
the crown and climax of the crudest forms of her worship as well as of those lofty 
spirititual movements which have so often appeared in Hinduism but have always 
ended in weakness.’
495
Yet if other religions did not even have the status of the OT, 
this was actually a more limited view that it appears 
On the whole, the mission atmosphere of the World Missionary Conference of 
1910 was less optimistic than the Ecumenical Missionary Conference in 1900 due to 
the emergence of nationalism in the non-Western world. Acknowledging the changing 
situation, Edinburgh respondents reached out towards other religions by recognising 
God’s activity within other religious traditions as the working out of salvific purposes 
while they firmly emphasised the finality of Christ as the ultimate fulfilment. It may 
491
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be concluded that they tried to underline both the particular importance of Christ and 
the importance of universal truth in other religions. While this was a difficult 
balancing act in itself, it ignores the implicit denegration of other religions, despite the 
appearance of acceptance, implied in fulfilment theology   
 
Responses to the Commision IV of Edinburgh 1910 and and its 
Critics 
  
1. Radical Discontinuity 
 
In the period following the end of the first World War, which eventually witnessed 
the increasing menace of fascism in Europe, the optimistic assessment of human 
nature evidenced in fulfilment theory was again replaced by a more negative 
evaluation of other religion. This occurred under the influences of the German 
theologian, Karl Barth, and the most influential exponent of his views within 
missionary thinking, the Dutch missiologist, Hendrik Kraemer.
496
 He regarded 
fulfilment theology as erroneous, rejecting the term on the basis of what he termed 
Biblical realism. This view regards non-Christian religions as human attempts to find 
God that are flawed as a consequence of the fallen nature of the human condition. He 
496
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held that other religions lack genuine revelation from God, and are merely rebellious 
efforts to reach God. True faith is the human response only to God’s saving self-
revelation in Jesus Christ, the truth that Christianity alone proclaims, even as it 
remains under the judgment of Christ as a religion. It is meaningless, he argued, for 
Christians to look for points of contact between Christianity and other religions 
because the Gospel stands in judgment, not fulfilment, of all religions, and it is the 
task of the Christian missionary to bring the saving news of Jesus Christ to people of 
all religions. His theology dominated the Tambaram Missionary Conference in 1938. 
If Kraemer’s statement is accepted, no contact points can be found to relate the 
Gospel to the people of non-Christian religions: people have either to accept or reject 
the whole Christian package. He did not accept that the non-Christian religions would 
eventually, in their own time, attain Christ through the operation of diffused reason 
(logos spermatikos) in the non-Christian world. For Kraemer, that was a denial of the 
dynamic character of Biblical revelation.
497 
 
While Kraemer’s idea that Biblical revelation is the full revelation from God may 
be acceptable, his total denial of divine presence in the world’s religions must be 
challenged. The weakest point of Kraemer’s theology is that Biblical realism limited 
God’s revelation within too narrow a range.  
  
2. Anonymous Christianity  
 
Although it is often overlooked in discussions of missionary theology, partly 
because of the importance attributed to Kraemer in missiology, a new view, with some 
of the same faults and benefits of fulfilment theology, was espoused after Vatican 
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by leading Roman Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner. Kraemer is on the 
pessimistic side because he experienced the horror of World War I. Conversely, 
Rahner insists that Christians should think optimistically about the possibilities of 
salvation outside Christianity. He wants to focus on God’s love and grace.
498
 He said 
that Christian must learn to look upon adherents of other faiths as ‘anonymous’ 
Christians in their unconscious mind, beneath their own religion. Rahner insists that 
Grace is offered to all men and all creation: it is not given as an extrinsic addition to 
human nature. Rather, grace infuses and becomes part of human nature. He says, “a 
non-Christian religion… does not merely contain element of natural knowledge of 
God...It contains also supernatural elements arising out of grace which is given to men 
as a gratuitous gift on account of Christ.”
499
 This means that every time non-
Christians reach out beyond themselves to what is true and good, they are 
experiencing and responding to grace; they are experiencing and truly knowing God. 
Such an encounter with revealing grace can be experienced in a variety of real-life 
situations.  
Secondly, those non-Christians who respond to the divine revelation this way are 
“anonymous Christians.” Rahner insists that “Christianity does not merely confront 
the member of an extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as someone 
who can and must already be regarded as an anonymous Christian.”
500
 In showing 
that other believers can be called anonymous Christians, Rahner tries to break through 
Christian exclusivism. Further, to call believers in other religions anonymous 
Christians disposes Christians to approach them with the realization that the Gospel 
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does not necessarily bring them anything essentially new. Anonymous Christians 
already know the one God of love who is active in their midst. Rahner’s view seems 
entirely consistent with the Logos Christology of the early church. This seems to 
allow Christians to enter the authentic dialogue with other religions with the 
expectation that other believers have experienced the one God.  
Rahner emphasises the importance of the universal truth in other religions, 
building his theory of the anonymous Christian. Rahner’s view can be briefly 
epitomized thus: Christians can begin dialogue with other religions by recognising the 
presence of the anonymous Christian.  
Thirdly, Rahner underlines the particular importance of Jesus Christ, emphasising 
Christ as the finality of salvation. Rahner says, “God desires the salvation of everyone. 
And this salvation willed by God is the salvation won by Christ.”
501
 This means that 
there is no such thing as pure grace; it is always grace won by Christ. Even though 
other religions may contain all the supernatural elements, they are incomplete until 
they come to know and embrace Christ. Only in Him can they find true identity and 
the fullness of salvation. Rahner affirms that Christ must be proclaimed as the fullest 
revelation and the definite saviour. He states not only that there is saving grace within 
other religions but also that this grace comes from Christ.  
When the theological understanding of Rahner is compared with that of Edinburgh 
1910, we can say that, despite respect for the anonymous Christian, Rahner’s 
understanding of Christ as the finality of salvation is similar to Edinburgh 
respondents’ understanding of Christ as the fulfillment. Therefore, we can assert that 
Rahner stresses the particular importance of Christ, by describing Him as the finality 
of salvation. Both he and fulfillment theologians have a similar theological position. 
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3. Faith and Beliefs 
 
Nowadays Christians see indeed a resurgence of missionary zeal among other 
religions. As for Christianity, other religions send their own missioners to compete in 
the mission field. Thus, Christianity can be confronted with other religions in the 
mission field. They, however, must meet each other and relate to each other, not in 
order to obliterate each other but to learn from and help each other.
502
 
Some contemporary Christian theologians began to develop a new method for a 
global or world theology. John Hick proposes and describes a ‘global theology’
503
 in 
his book Death and Eternal, having emphasized the importance of a universal ‘faith’ 
with various religions. Paul F. Knitter suggests, in his book, “No Other Name?”, the 
need for a ‘global theology’. He insists that global theology requires the theologian to 
know something about what the major world religions have experienced and said 
about the nature of the Ultimate and the value of this world.
 504
 On this basis, we can 
suggest that the ultimate purpose of religious pluralism would be a world religion in 
which all religions can coexist in peace. Hendrick Kraemer insists on an exclusive 
uniqueness, affirming that only Jesus is true revelation. Karl Rahner, dissatisfied with 
such blatant exclusivity, proposes that God’s revealing action in Jesus includes all 
other religions even though individuals will not finally be fulfilled until they realize 
Christ. Knitter criticizes both theologians for claims which are insufficiently sensitive 
in that they contradict or impede authentic dialogue with believers of other faiths.
505
 
He proposes a theocentric model which offers a relational uniqueness of Jesus. It 
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affirms that Jesus is unique, but with a uniqueness defined by its ability to relate to 
other unique religious figures.
506
 He regards the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as a trait 
of confessional language. According to him, all the “one and only” adjectives used to 
describe Jesus Christ in the New Testament belong to the language of confession.
507
 
Knitter’s purpose appears to allow for interreligious dialogue. He says, “even if some 
of the details in this selective summary of New Testament Christology are debatable, 
the general picture is clear enough to provide some insights into the task of 
interpreting Jesus Christ’s uniqueness with a view to interreligious dialogue.”
508
 He 
seems to believe strongly that the uniqueness of Jesus Christ impedes authentic 
dialogue with believers of other faiths.  
Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that ‘faith can be distinguished from ‘beliefs’, which 
define the doctrinal positions within the various religions and thus operate at the 
intellectual level. This same distinction was discussed at length earlier in the twentieth 
century by a Scottish missionary to India, A.G. Hogg.
509
 He argues that a vital 
relationship exists between faith, understood as trust in the highest and best that we 
know, and beliefs as the intellectual articulations whereby faith is achieved, 
interpreted and maintained.  
Hogg has also been known as a chief and serious critic of Farquhar’s fulfilment 
theology. However, he did not express wholesale condemnation against fulfilment 
theology, but acknowledged some good points in it, although they were extremely 
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similarities on which fulfilment is grounded are ‘superficial’ and ‘unhelpful.’
510
 
Furthermore, morally speaking, the attitude of fulfilment is arrogant, since it assumes 





In sum, Kraemer accused the 1910 Edinburgh Fourth Commission of denying the 
power of the Bible as God’s full revelation. However, Kraemer’s Biblical realism is 
weakened on account of his hostility towards non-Christian religions. Although the 
Bible does not explicitly say that there are seeds of truth in other religions, it cannot 
be proved that fulfilment theology is wrong especially in light of the concept of logos 
spermaticos. Whatever the theological argument, the practical outcome of Kraemer’s 
view can easily be a wide gap between Gospel and people, rules and praxis.  
It may well be that the CW and to an extent some NSTCL teachers of the CS at 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church share Kraemer’s view (as well as their own fierce 
anti-communism). However, it is also the case that the NSTCL text and some, if not 
most, teachers of the CS share a more fulfilment view.  
Pragmatism has papered over this deep difference, but the issue may need to be 
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Fulfilment Theology and the Text Book of BSCFP
In this section I will analyze the text book of the BSCFP titled NSTCL to tease out 
its missiological position. The NSTCL has a student and a teacher edition. I will focus 
on the latter in order to demonstrate that the text moves toward a more inclusivist 
outlook in relation to the teaching of the CS, while recognising that this may not 
impinge on the CW understanding of inclusivism at all. All in all, the CW in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church are not likely to move towards an inclusivist position 
merely because the CS are using a text written by the PCTS which uses that approach. 
However, at least the CW teachers who serve in BSCFP may be influenced by the text 
book because they use it for teaching to the CS. 
 
1. The Missionary Attitude of the NSTCL toward Juche Ideology 
        
The NSTCL lays emphasis upon three aspects: 1) the system of North Korea (Juche 
ideology) has ethical similarities to Christianity; 2) it is cautious about condemning 
Juche ideology, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il; 3) emphasises the necessity of 
Juchejeokin Sinang
512
(a self-reliant Christian faith).
513
 It is evident that the attitudes 
expressed in the teacher edition are markedly different from those emerging from the 
interviews cited in Part 2 with the CW.  
In chapter 4, titled We Are Glorious And Invaluable Human Beings, we can read the 
following: “The concept of self-respect as expressed in Juche ideology must be 
maintained in the CS;”
514
 in chapter 6 titled Human Beings Were Seduced into Tasting 
the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, we can read: “Teachers must 
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deal with the personal cult of Kim Il-sung respectfully if they have to do it, saying 
that the cause of its existence is because human beings are intrinsically religious.”
515
 
In fact, this level of possibly pseudo-acceptance goes against the anti-communist 
sentiments evidenced in chapter 3.  
 
2. Stepping Stones Emerging from Juche Ideology Towards Christ 
 
In this section, I will investigate how the NSTCL regards certain elements within 
Juche ideology as stepping stones towards Christ.  
    
The Image of God  
  
As Kim Byeong-ro says that the understanding of the essence of human being is 
similar in Juche ideology and Christianity,
516
 the NSTCL places emphasis on the 
essence of the human being. In accordance with the philosophical principle of Juche 
ideology, according to the NSTCL, humans are masters of everything and decide 
everything. Thus, human beings are valuable and glorious.
517
 The NSTCL explains 
that the reason why human beings are so valuable and glorious is that human beings 
are created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-28) being made to reflect the divine 
nature, but in a bodily way. Col. 1: 15-20 declares that Christ is the image of the 
invisible God; As God’s image, Christ manifests God, reflecting his nature.
518
 The 
text book used the Juche concept of ‘valuable human beings’ to help the CS 
understand the image of God and through that learn about Christ.  
515
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While clearly the NSTCL ignores issues such as the Fall and humility, it does 
politely condemn the system of North Korea in which the entire population is graded 
into 47, some say 67, ranks according to their class background. This determines 
everything right down to the monthly food rations. The NSTCL places emphasis upon 
equality because everybody is equal before God,
519
an aspect of theology which the 
NSTCL stresses. However, the NSTCL ignores some very fundamental issues or 
fundamental issues of Youngnak Presbyterian Church. It can be accused of a 




 The NSTCL regards also Kim Il-sung’s figure as a stepping stone. According to 
the NSTCL, Kim Il-sung is a prominent figure who liberated the North Korean people 
from Japan’s and the United States’ imperialism: he is the Suryeong, the saviour who 
defeats the devil. The NSTCL recognized the analogy between Christ and the 
Suryeong and actively used it to teach about Salvation. The book points out, however, 
that only Christ can liberate humans from sin.
520
  
While there is Christology in Christianity, there is the theory of Suryeong (Leader) 
in Juche ideology. Jasper Becker points out that Kim Il-sung is a Christ-like saviour of 
Korea.
521
 According to the “Theory of the Immortal Socio-Political Body,” as 
described in chapter 2, the Suryeong (Leader) is the supreme brain of a living body, 
the Party are the nerves and the masses are endowed with life when they offer their 
absolute loyalty. The theory states that the masses will remain dead without the 
Suryeong which means that only the Suryeong can give the masses life. The Suryeong 
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can understand and coordinate the desires of the masses and unite them into one 
socio-political organism. Only the masses guided by the Party and the Suryeong are 
the “masters of history.” According to this theory, if an individual submerges himself 
entirely in the being of the Suryeong, then he will achieve immortality,
522
 immortality 
being achieved through Suryeong. Furthermore, Lee He-sang states that the Party 
openly describes Kim Il-sung as a god: Sun of Love (Kim Il-sung) is superior to 
Christ in love, superior to Buddha in benevolence, superior to Confucius in virtue and 
superior to Mohammed in justice.
523
 The Juche ideology teaching about the Leader, 
however different in approach and practice, offers a stepping-stone, which can be 




The notion of the socio-political organism can be viewed as similar to the concept 
of church. The NSTCL took similar elements from the concept to explain the role of 
the individual in the church (chapter 13, Church Life). 1) The centre of life for the 
individual is the church: 2) Individuals should make efforts to become a member of 
the congregation just like they were expected to become Party members: 3) 
Individuals should sacrifice themselves for the church after obtaining membership as 
they sacrificed themselves for the Party.
524
 It also points out the difference between 
the nature of the sacrifice: in church efforts and sacrifice are done not by demand on 
force but by Juche-based (subjective) personal decision.
525
  
The NSTCL also explains the differences between a church meeting and a Party 
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 Taking part in Party meetings was compulsory even at the height of the 
famine. During the meeting the members were quizzed about the Juche ideology
527
 
and were expected to praise the leaders.
528
Article 63 of DPRK’s Socialist Constitution, 
North Korea depicts its society almost like a church community, the rights and duties 
of citizens being based on the collectivist principle, “One for all and all for 
one,”
529
against the background of the body. In moving to the doctrine of the church, 
Paul describes the church as the body of Christ.
530
 When I visited North Korea first in 
1999, I met a North Korean Juche scholar, Kim Cheol-su. In Kim Il Sung University, 
he wrote his dissertation titled The Comparative Study: Juche Idea and Christianity. 
He told me that Juche ideology and Christianity was very similar because in the 
theory of Juche, the ‘individual’ does not exist but only the community of North 
Korea; in the same way, in the church, the ‘individual’ does not exist but only the 
body of Christ. Not all theologians may agree with his concept but he, as a North 
Korea Juche scholar, placed emphasis on the similarity between the two sides in his 
perspective. And it certainly gives a metaphorical basis for discussion in teaching the 




The NSTCL explains worship using the activities of the political meeting with 
which the CS are familiar (chapter 16: The Worshiping Human Being). 
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The activities of the political meeting of Juche ideology are similar to the worship in 
the church. Through the activities the North Korean people are enthusiastic about and 
praise the Suryeong. One Christian Saeteomin said that when he saw the CW 
worshiping, praising and praying he found that he felt similarly during Party meeting 
activities. The CS misunderstood what worshiping God was about. Nevertheless, we 
can find the similarity between Juche ideology and Christianity in the various aspects 
of the activities of the North Korean people, which would be either a useful element or 
a stumbling block to teach the gospel to the CS.
531
    
  
Furthermore, the NSTCL places emphasis on replacing the Suryeong, Kim Il-sung 
and Kim Jong Il, with God in relation to the object of the worship.
532
 When I led the 
BSCFP in Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 1998, I experienced a significant point 
through Shim Shin-bok, a Christian Saeteomin who joined the BSCFP. While reading 
Genesis chapter 1-2, he realized that the theory of the Suryeong in Juche ideology was 
borrowed from the Genesis chapter 1-2, replacing the position of God with the 
Suryeong. Shim became a passionate reader of the Bible. Then he became the first 
Christian Saeteomin student in the PCTS and then the first Christian Saeteomin 
minister of Youngnak.     
Kim Byeong-ro points out that the North Korean worship of the Suryeong is like a 
religion in appearance. There are specific places of worship or shrines e.g. Kimilsung 
Hyukmyeong Hakseupgwan (Kim Il-sung Revolutionary History Institute).
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Christian Saeteomin interviewees told me what these look like. There is a portrait of 
Kim Il-sung hanging on the wall in front, and also a plaster sculpture of him on a 
platform. There are pictures from Kim Il-sung’s childhood on the walls. There is a 
special storage area for dust cloths and soap to clean the portrait of Kim Il-sung. 
&-$
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There are lectures and discussions.
534
 While staying in Shinuiju city in North Korea 
in 2000, I visited one Kimilsung Hyukmyeong Hakseupgwan (Kim Il-sung 
Revolutionary History Institute). I listened attentively to what the female guide said 
about Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il for five hours while looking around rooms 
displaying various materials related to the life of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. The 
guide was excellently well-trained and impressed me: after viewing and listening I 
could easily see myself becoming a new believer in Juche ideology. There I 
understood for the first time the North Korean people’s faith in the personal cult of the 
Leaders. The function of the Kim Il-sung Revolutionary History Institute is similar to 
that of a church of Christianity. The teacher’s book explains these to the Christian 
Wolnammin teachers, who in turn can utilize the material to help the CS understand 
the structure of Christian practice. 
The NSTCL uses the similarities between the Christian Church and a personality 
cult when teaching about the person of God, immortality, salvation and worship but it 
is careful to highlight the differences. The success of this method can be seen in the 
example of Shim Shin-bok, who not only became the first Saeteomin minister in 
Youngnak Church but was also planning to become a missionary in the China-North 
Korea border region, a highly dangerous place. Yet if the CW are not aware of the 
underlying fulfilment approach-if this pragmatic comparison can truly be called that-
then the tensions between the CW and the CS may not be ameliorated by the 
programme. 
&-.
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Conclusion   
 
 In this chapter, I demonstrated that the missiological position of the NSTCL is 
based on fulfilment theology or inclusivism. First, I described inclusivist theology 
based on the 1910 World Missionary Conference respondents’ contribution. The 
respondents emphasized the importance of moving from an aggressive to a more 
courteous manner when presenting Christianity to non-Christians, highlighting the 
similarities between the indigenous religion and Christianity when contact is made 
between the missionaries and the people. Some respondents endorsed fulfilment 
theology which holds that there are seeds of the Logos (i.e. Christ) in many religions, 
with the Gospel filling the gaps, so to speak. Missionaries were encouraged to foster 
the good elements of the indigenous religion, build on these and lead people toward 
the Gospel. Second, they were to politely but firmly and definitely condemn evil and 
false elements in order to avoid syncretism. Finally, they are to tie in appropriate good 
elements with Christ. 
The textbook used by Christian Wolnammin teachers in the BSCFP utilized this 
concept and adapted the teaching to highlight similarities between Juche and 
Christianity. It employed the idea of a “Jucheistic faith” which emphasizes self-
reliance but puts it in the Christian context. Incorporating the word Juche was a big 
step toward the recognition of the Christian Saetomin life experience and identity and 
demonstrates that the CW teachers are able to move beyond their own anti-
communism. It is, however, possible that this “moving beyond” is a mere device, and 
in that sense a dishonest representation of self. 
Despite the fact that the contemporary missiological position of the NSTCL as 
fulfilment theology is in its early stages, the more it is will be developed beyond the 

CS the more the Youngnak Presbyterian Church community could find good elements 
within Juche ideology. As a result, the hostile attitude of the CW toward Juche 
ideology could be reduced and a minimally courteous attitude could develop.      
In the next chapter I will argue that besides adopting elements of fulfillment theology, 
recognition of the problem, repentance and forgiveness are also necessary elements in 
creating a community in diversity.  
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Chapter  Embracing the Other and Its Application in the 





In this chapter I will describe the fundamental necessity for making space through 
repentance and forgiveness by the CW to embrace the CS in order that Tong-i may be 
constructed in the church.  
As described in the previous chapters, the CW were steeped in anti-communist 
ideology through the political circumstances and education and as a result they came 
to perceive North Koreans as evil. At the same time, North Koreans are indoctrinated 
by Juche ideology to regard South Koreans as their enemies. These produced the 
heterogeneous identities of the two populations, which led to mutual exclusion in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church. In order to approach the problem, I proposed the 
adoption of fulfilment theology as a theological basis for approach. I analysed the 
teacher’s edition of the textbook used in Youngnak Presbyterian Church for 
introducing Christianity to the Saeteomin. I found that the authors indeed apply the 
concepts of fulfilment theology: the content of the textbook deal with Juche ideology, 
but instead of condemning it outright they highlight points of similarity with 
Christianity and build on those. Despite the fact that this was a significant change, it is 
not enough unless the CW enmity is eliminated by repentance and forgiveness in 
order to create space to embrace the CS to construct a harmonious catholic 
community.  





Volf’s book entitled Exclusion and Embrace indicates that God’s reception of 
hostile humanity into divine communion is a model for how human beings should 
relate to the other. Volf explicates his analysis in four central sections: “repentance,” 
“forgiveness,” “making space in oneself for the other,” and “healing of memory,” so 
as to move from exclusion to embrace. Then he describes the drama of embrace as the 
key structural element of a successful embrace. In this chapter I will not attempt to 
deal with the four central sections equally. Rather I will place primary emphasis on 
the section of “making space in oneself for the other,” relating this to the other 
sections in order that the aim of this chapter be fulfilled.  
The concept of embrace in the context of North and South Korea was first 
advocated by Lim Dong-won who is one of the architects of South Korea’s Sunshine 
Policy. He is also a Protestant Christian Wolnammin. Lim Dong-won had significantly 
contributed to reconciliation and cooperation between South Korea and North Korea 
since 1993 before he left the government in 2003.  

Here is a summary of chronology of Lim Dong-won’s life 
-1934: Born in northwestern territory, in Korea 
-1957: Graduated from Korea Military Academy, Appointed as a second lieutenant. 
-1980: Left the Army as a Vice-Marshal. 
-1981-1985: Ambassador of Nigeria. 
-1985-1988: Ambassador of Australia. 
-1988-1992: Chancellor of Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. 
-1993-1994: Vice-Minister of Unification. 
-1995-1998: Secretary-General of Asia-Pacific Peace Foundation. 
-1998: Advisor of Kim Dae-jung’s administration. 
-1998-1999: Minister of Unification. 
-1999-2001: Director of National Intelligence Service. 
-2001-2002: Minster of Unification 
-2002-2003: Chief Negotiator with North Korea. 
-2004-the present: Chairman of Sejong Foundation. 
He was the architect of South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy,” which calls for engaging with North 
Korea rather than isolating it, in hopes of reunifying the Korean Peninsula. Before joining 
Kim Dae-jung’s administration he had served as head of Kim’s Asia-Pacific Peace 
Foundation: deputy chief of the unification board under President Roh Tae-woo; and as 
ambassador to Nigeria and Australia in the 1980s.   Available from; 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/won.html; accessed on 7 June 
2008. 
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This chapter consists of three sections: first, Miroslav Volf’s concept of embrace 
and the importance of creating space; second, the embrace policy of Lim Dong-won 
in the Korean peninsula; third, the response of Youngnak Presbyterian Church to the 
embrace policy and cases of embrace experienced in the Bible Study for Free People 
in the church.  
 
Embrace in Miroslav Volf’s Work  
                            
1. Definition of Embrace 
 
The definition of embrace is terminologically “To clasp or hold close with the arms, 
usually as an expression of affection.”
536
 In Volf’s book, the notion of embrace stands 
in opposition to exclusion. In order to explain what embrace is, he begins his 
discussion of exclusion through the development of the themes of distance and 
belonging.  
Exclusion is created when persons distance themselves from one another and 
close themselves to the possibility of belonging to and with other persons. Instead of 
distancing ourselves from the other, Volf argues that we must distance ourselves from 
our particular culture and membership in it, in order to make room for the other and 
accept otherness. This is a crucial issue, especially for the CW who see Christianity as 




Significantly, Volf claims that the embrace model is found on the cross which is the 
ultimate symbol of self-giving: the outstretched arms of Christ are open to embrace all 

Available from; http://www.thefreedictionary.com/embrace; accessed on 20 June 2008. 
Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, 
and Reconciliation Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, pp. 99-166.
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of humanity and welcome all. An embrace has doctrinal implications for Volf. It calls 
to mind the mutuality of self-giving love that exists in the Trinity and therefore, 
implies a doctrine of God. The embrace reminds us of Christ’s embrace of the 
“godless” on the cross and therefore, the doctrine of Christ. And finally, the 
outstretched arms of Christ herald the doctrine of salvation in the outstretched arms of 
the father receiving his prodigal son.  
In short, the notion of embrace for Volf is that one can embrace the other, which 
stems from the self-giving of Jesus on the cross: to refuse to embrace the other as they 
are is surely a judgement which an imperfect human is not entitled to make.                   
  
2. A Summary of Embrace According to Volf 
 
In this section, I will describe Volf’s emphasis upon the task of responsible 
theology and the importance of repentance and forgiveness to make space to embrace 
the other. 
First of all, we must recognize not only that God is the final grantor of 
reconciliation, but also we, as God’s agents, can not escape our responsibility to 
embrace the other and to love the other as Jesus did. The central thesis of Volf’s 
chapter on embrace is that “God’s reception of hostile humanity into divine 
communion is a model for how human beings should relate to the other.”
538
 
Returning to the divine self-giving of Christ on the cross, Volf argues for the primacy 
of love. Furthermore, Volf is not content that the kingdom of love is purely an 
eschatological hope. He believes that “authentic human freedom consists in being a 
friend of God and partaking in the glory of the triune God who is nothing but pure 

Ibid., p. 100. 
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love” in the struggle for liberation.
539
 According to him, enabling us to live in peace 




A theology of embrace has four basic elements: repentance, forgiveness, space, and 
forgetting: a) “repentance implies not merely a recognition that one has made a bad 
mistake, but that one has sinned,”
541
; b) forgiveness is the only way out of the 
irreversibility of acts of exclusion;
542
c) space is created when forgiveness “heals the 
wounds that the power-acts of exclusion have inflicted and breaks down the dividing 
wall of hostility”
543
; d) a redemption of the memories involves a “certain kind of 
forgetting” in order to heal.
544
Victims and oppressors need to repent
545
 and need to 
forgive each other with the power of the Holy Spirit. 
Jesus grounds his radical message in the message of God’s unconditional love and 
the people’s need to repent. This repentance is a call to all. According to Volf, victims 
cannot claim purity because they can readily bear hatred against oppressors, and in 
other context are oppressors themselves. All must repent and claim citizenship in the 
kingdom of love. Victims and oppressors may need to repent from different sins, but 
all must repent if they wish to become true social agents in the kingdom of love. Volf 
recognizes that “Genuine repentance may be one of the most difficult acts for a person, 
let alone a community, to perform.”
546
 However, Volf overlooks the need to repent of 
the sin that violence stems from “the socially structured and culturally patterned 

Ibid.¯ p. 105. 
Ibid., p. 109. 
Ibid., p. 113. Italics are Volf’s. 
Ibid., p. 121.
Ibid., p. 125. 
Ibid., p. 133, 135. 
Ibid., pp. 111-119.  





by which people act without “the probability of individuals 
realizing their wills”
548
 which is called the three dimensional power by Steven Lukes. 
Indeed, it would not be easy for Christians to perceive such sin of violence and they 
would need time to realize that it is not compatible with Christ. The CW socialized by 
strong anti-communist ideology may too easily stigmatize the CS when the CW 
encountered the CS’s different verbal or behaviour aspects from their own, by which 
they may violate the CS. To take another example, the National Council of Churches 
in Korea (NCCK) issued the ‘Declaration of the Korea National Council of the 
Churches toward the unification and peace of Korean people’ in 1988, which 
“acknowledges and confesses past and present sins: the sin of mutual hatred, the sin 
of justifying the division of Korea, and the sin of accepting each ideology as absolute, 
which is contrary to God’s absolute authority.”
549
 This provoked severe criticism 
from the conservative sections of the Korean church.
550
 In spite of the fact that this 
positive Declaration, as Sebastian Kim evaluates, “has challenged many conservative 
sections of the church to rethink their traditional approaches toward the North, 
moving from evangelism or relief to partnership for the common goal of peace and 
reconciliation,”
551
 it was refused acceptance by the General Assembly of the 
denomination to which Youngnak Presbyterian Church belonged.
552
 Indeed, it would 
be difficult for those who have been socialized by anti-communist ideology to realize 

Steven Lukes, Op.Cit., p. 26. 
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Sebastian Kim, Reconciliation Possible? The Churches’ efforts toward the peace and 
reunification of North and South Korea, Clare Amos, Kirsteen Kim, and Sarah Middleton, ed., 
Rethinking Mission, vol. 3, Number 3, London: The Methodist Church, UCA, USPG, 2005, p. 
10. 
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 Daehanyesukyojangrohoechonghoeyeoksawiwonhoe (A Committee of History of the 
General Assemble of Korean Presbyterian Church), Daehanyesukyojangrokyohoesa (The 
History of the Korean Presbyterian Church), Vol.2, Seoul: The Press of the Korean 
Presbyterian Church, 2003, p. 332. 
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this to be sin and confess “the sin of accepting each ideology as absolute, which is 
contrary to God’s absolute authority.” 
Christians, according to Volf, affirm the ability to repent as a gift from God, but 
repentance is only half the formula. Forgiveness is the other half and it may be even 
more difficult. Persons caught in the polarity of conflict draw a line between evil and 
good. They struggle over who is most wrong or most right and the fact of the 
irreversibility of actions. However, according to Volf, forgiveness is the only route to 
get human persons out of these struggles and perceptions, and forgiveness creates 
space in their minds.
553
 This does not necessarly mean forgetting. Again, if God 
could forgive humanity and embrace the godless on the cross in the suffering of Christ, 
we are called to do likewise for each other, especially those who we perceive to be our 
greatest enemies. It is important that reciprocal forgiveness can potentially negate the 
power imbalance between the weak and the strong and between the poor and the rich. 
As Steven Lukes points out in his three dimensional power by which people accept 
their role in the existing order of things because they can imagine no alternative to 
it,
554
 the weak or the poor can pretend to participate in forgiveness when the strong or 
the rich demand forgiveness in the context of the dominant-structure. For example, in 
the context of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, the CW support the CS financially and 
spiritually, Christian Wolnammin ordained pastors demand that the CW teachers and 
the CS in the BSCFP should repent and forgive each other for the Korean War during 
which South and North Koreans killed each other. The CS can pretend to pray for 
repentance and forgiveness because they can not imagine any alternative to their past, 
and may feel ‘repentance’ is the price of support. On the other hand, the CW do not 
like admitting complicity in or sin over for the War and its aftermath because they 

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believe that the War broke out because of the action of North Korea. They tend to 
think that only the CS must repent and then the CW would be able to forgive them. In 
this sense, false repentance and forgiveness take place. Paradoxically real reciprocal 
forgiveness can happen in the dominant-free structure.    
In addition, Volf points out the function of prayer in the process of forgiveness; 
when one forgives the other, it is not through the human will but through pure reliance 
on the power of God’s grace. The essential connection between God’s forgiveness and 
human forgiveness of each other is the prayer, “Father, forgive them; for they do not 
know what they are doing” (Luke 23:34).
555
 Walter Wink also says “we must pray for 
the power to forgive so that we can reach across the divide that separates us from our 
enemies. Nonetheless, we are not bridge builders so much as bridge crossers.”
556
 It is 
obvious that it is a matter of faith for us that the Holy Spirit can empower us to 
forgive anyone. Forgiveness is the boundary between exclusion and embrace.
557
 
Volf notes that there are four “acts” in the “Drama of Embrace”. Act one is 
opening the arms, Act two waiting, Act three closing the arms and Act four opening 
the arms again
558
. He draws these acts from the parable of the Prodigal Son which 
demonstrates both embrace and exclusion. The physical act of embrace makes space 
for the other and welcomes them.
559
 It mirrors God’s action on the cross where God 
stretched open the divine arms to embrace humanity. “Embrace is grace,” says Volf.
560
 
Volf takes the metaphor of embrace one step further, saying that God’s embrace of 
humanity on the cross was an act of covenant with humanity.
561
 According to him, it 
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was a covenant not only which bound God to humanity, making space for a sinful 
humanity in the embrace of God, but which also demonstrated God’s self-giving and 
unconditional love towards humankind. It was a covenant because it is about the 
relationship between God and human persons, as well as the relationships between 
human persons. Covenants bind humanity to God and other humans in a steadfast 
bond no matter what happens. One breaks a contract, but one does not easily walk 
away from a covenant. Paradigmatic of this relationship is the story of the prodigal 
son in Luke 15:11-32. Just as the father welcomes the son, despite all the evil things 




In brief, Volf puts an emphasis on taking part in the Kingdom of love, requiring 
repentance and forgiveness to make space to embrace the other, as God received a 
hostile humanity into divine communion.  
 
3. Evaluation of Volf’s Stance 
 
First, the demand for each to make room to embrace the other, Volf argues, can be 
criticized by the weak as an unfair requirement in terms of the circumstances of 
dominant structure. Let us consider the power relations within the communities of 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church. There is still a dominant-subordinate relationship 
between the communities of the church: the Christian Saeteomin position is clearly 
weaker than that of the CW not only because the former is an often despised minority 
in the church but also because they are recipients of financial and spiritual support 
provided by the CW. The CW may require that in return for their support, the CS 
become like them, leaving their past convictions and cultural practices behind, 

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remaking themselves in the CW image. This is a risk of idolatry. In fact, anti-
communism and Christianity become merged, that is, proper Christians are anti-
communists. This is a statement of belief not a fact. If the CW say that their way is the 
only correct way so that the CS must follow their way, then the CW set themselves up 
as a godlike image. The CW are asking the CS to create a space in themselves to 
accept the Christian Wolnammin identity, but they themselves will accept nothing of 
CS identity. Clearly, this expectation cannot lead to embrace and final reconciliation.  
In practical terms embrace is the fulfilment of the biblical principle according to 
which in Christ all are equal before God and should be equal to one another. Making 
room in oneself for the other must be required of both parties. Walter Wink states that 
the followers of Jesus are to maintain domination-free relationships in a discipleship 
of equals that includes women,
563
 insisting that “the churches of the world have never 
yet decided that domination is wrong.”
564
 The implications are such, that if the CW 
do not regard the CS as their equals, i.e. equal objects of God’s love, they are 
theologically on dangerous ground, in which they risk setting themselves up as the 
image of God, so that the CS model themselves on the CW instead of on Jesus. 
Secondly, to make reconciliation which must come from the considered intention of 
all without consideration of the domination system can lead to false reconciliation. 
Volf places emphasis on the fact that the repentance of the victim is crucial to the 
success of reconciliation. However, Volf’s stand applies to situations in which there 
has been physical violence. Most reconciliation happens where violence is done to the 
moral or spiritual integrity of the other. For this, we need to recognize what is 
invisible, i.e., inner pain, which is done by reflection, after perceiving the damage and 
one’s possible contribution to it. Therefore, reconciliation should take place in a 
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domination-free structure: not all parties to a conflict recognise their postion or indeed 
their contribution to the problem.  
Walter Wink points out that true reconciliation can be subverted by government 
propaganda apparatus that equates reconciliation with compromise.
565
This is pertinent 
to the Korean context. In the contemporary context of the Korean Peninsula, North 
Korea is poor whereas South Korea is not; the former is isolated from the outside 
world whereas the latter is not. In fact, neither side have acknowledged publicly that 
the significant number of casualties suffered by the Korean War was committed by 
both sides. When parts of South Korea were under North Korean control, political 
killings took place in the cities and villages. South Korean forces executed in turn tens 
of thousands of leftist and alleged communist sympathizers.
566
 It is important that 
both sides recognize their fault, repent and reconcile together. Perhaps more important 
is that both sides should not blame each other for the war; in particular, the strong 
should not blame the weak for the war, in order to make genuine reconciliation.  
In considering that the CW are South Koreans and tend to perceive the CS as 
irredeemably North Koreans in spite of the fact that the CS became citizens of South 
Korea and Christians, the CW should not blame the CS for the war. In terms of the 
structure of power in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, with the CW holding power as 
provider of financial and spiritual support to the CS, this is especially relevant.  
Thirdly, it is very difficult for an entire population collectively to make space for 
embracing otherness in a multi-religions context. Volf cites John Howard Yoder at the 
outset for his insistence on the centrality of Jesus as example for Christian today. His 
key claim is that “All sufferers can find comfort in the solidarity of the crucified; but 
only those who struggle against evil by following the example of the crucified will 

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discover him at their side.”
567
 Self-giving love, in radical obedience to God, is the 
way of Christ.  
However, there is a limitation in bringing this principle to the current context of 
the Korean Peninsula which houses various religions and where there is a clamour of 
contemporary dispute over incompatible ideologies. It is estimated that Christians 
comprise 29.3% of the whole population in South Korea, of which 18.3 % profess to 
be Protestants and 10.9%, Catholics.
568
 This means 70.7% of the people are non-
Christians in South Korea. In terms of the socio-political ideological perspective, as 
we have seen, there is a tension between anti-communist ideology and Juche ideology 
in the Korean Peninsula and between anti-North Korea and pro-North Korea in South 
Korea. In particular, it is extremely difficult for a government official of South Korea, 
as a Christian, to apply Volf’s principle to the context where Christians are mixed with 
non-Christians, especially given that non-Christians are the majority working towards 
reconciliation. If anti-North Korea propaganda is still taught in schools, reconciliation 
has surely some political and patriotism aspects. Issues of security are an added 
problem. It is obvious that non-Christians cannot be required to be obedient to God in 
order to make space for accepting the North Korea’s regime and its people. This 
indicates that the embrace of Volf cannot be applied to a population collectively in a 
non-Christian society, only individually among Christians. This will be dealt with in 
detail in the next section. 
Paradoxically, the principle of Volf can be applied to Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church because 100% of members in the church are Christians. The church can be 
required to be obedient to God in order to embrace North Korea’s people. However, 
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given the CW’s ideological opposition to the communist outlook which they see 
represented in all the CS, difficulties in this process may suggest that the CW’s 
acceptance of an anti-communist and anti-Juche position is stronger than their 
acceptance of the equality of all before God and the divine embrace. This is not 
uncommon in church life. Churches form social groups based on interest, class etc., 
which tend easily to override the relationship of equality within the Trinity.  
In the ministry of reconciliation a distinction is being made between individual and 
social reconciliation. The prominent Catholic theologian Robert Schreiter describes 
best the distinction between individual reconciliation, which refers to the victim’s 
damaged humanity restored by God and by a supportive community offering safety, 
companionship and hospitality, and social reconciliation, defined as the process of 
reconstructing the moral order of a society.
569
 The transition between these two types 
of reconciliation is inherent in God’s work of restoration in the hearts of the victims of 
exclusion. This restoration should be continued by these reconciled individuals who 
could be in a better position to bring about social reconciliation.  
Social reconciliation should neither be regarded as an abstract mode of viewing and 
addressing exclusion in a society, nor as another form of public apologizing. Schreiter 
is again illuminating when he warns that social reconciliation “…is not only a matter 
of healing memories and receiving forgiveness, it is also about changing the structures 
in society that provoked, promoted and sustained violence.”
570
 In studying 
reconciliation, it is important to pay attention to the power because reconciliation can 
be enforced as well as contested by the use of violence, either by the strong or the rich. 
Andre Droogers points out that reconciliation can be “the result of the wielding of 

Robert J. Schreiter, Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order, 
Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1997, pp. 111-112. 
Ibid., p. 1. 

power, either through the structures themselves or through the efforts to erode and 
replace them,”
571
 stating that reconciliation could be either a structural given or 
provisional result in an otherwise dynamic, vulnerable and ongoing process.
572
This 
indicates that reconciliation not only includes at least two parties coming together in 
mutual respect-one may forgive and yet not be reconciled-but also changes “the 
structures in society” by which cause violence: the dominant-free structure should be 
created to enable each other to be reconciled equally. Consider two opponents, one the 
CW, a powerful group in Youngnak Presbyterian Church takeing the initiative in 
supporting the CS finiancially and spiritually, the other the CS a weak group, unable 
to live according to their own identity. In order to bring about true reconciliation and 
embrace of each other on equal terms. The CW must be obedient to God who 
reconciles human beings, creates the dominant-free structure in this world to make 
friends with tax-collectors and sinners etc., and requires us to love our enemies.   
 
In sum, Volf’s concept of embrace is limited to Christians which makes it very hard 
to apply this concept in a non-Christian or non-religious setting such as the conflict 
between North and South Korea. Also, Volf does not specifically address the 
difficulties that arise when two groups within a Christian community are not equal, i.e. 
when there is a dominant structure. Volf places emphasis on creating space for 
embracing the other, following the divine self-giving of Christ on the cross and God’s 
reception of hostile humanity into divine communion. In particular, forgiveness and 
repentance create space to embrace the other, even one’s enemy. However, Volf’s 
concept may be criticized by the weak in a dominant-weak structure. In addition, the 
act of embracing is limited insofar as it cannot be applied to an entire population, only 
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to an individual or self-defined community such as Youngnak Presbyterian Church. In 
the next section it will be demonstrated how Lim Dong-won attempts to extend the 
scope of embrace to the population of the Korean peninsula.
                                         
The Embrace Policy of Lim Dong-won 
                     
It is worth understanding and evaluating the embrace policy in order to analyze 
how the principle of embrace applies to the context of the Korean Peninsula. It is 
simple to say that the policy which South Korea attempted was to embrace North 
Korea. In considering the significant negative response of Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church to the policy, it is firstly important to understand the policy. 
The embrace policy (1998-2007) was the South Korean doctrine towards North 
Korea until Lee Myung-bak’s election to presidency (2008). It is clear that this study 
needs to deal with the embrace policy because this was the first time that it has been 
applied to the context of the Korean Peninsula since the division. Above all, the policy 
has led the society of South Korea to be divided into two groups: its supporters and its 
objectors. The supporters believe that the policy has resulted in greater political 
contact between North and South Korea, Korean summits in Pyongyang (the first in 
2000, the second in 2007), and meetings of separated family members. On the other 
hand, the objectors believe that the policy helped the fundamentally repressive and 
belligerent North Korea by sending aid which has predominantly been used to 
strengthen the North Korean military.
573
   
These two perspectives on the embrace policy exist within Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church. It is necessary, therefore, to analyze the embrace policy in order to 
understand how embrace can be applied in the context of over 70% non-Christians in 
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South Korea as a policy of a nation. And then next section will analyze the responses 
to the embrace policy in the 100% Christians of Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
                          
1. Brief Background 
 
The international political milieu has undergone profound changes since the late 
1980s. We have witnessed the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, i.e. the dissolution of the Cold War structure. However, the Korean 
peninsula is still divided, and there is still military tension. Nevertheless, the two 
Koreas have made efforts to reconcile with each other since the 1990s, producing two 
significant agreements: (1) the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, 
and Cooperation and Exchange
574
 (the Basic Agreement hereafter) and (2) the June 
15 South-North Joint Declaration.
575
 Lim Dong-won was significantly engaged in the 
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The Declaration was signed on 15 June 2000 by President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic 
of Korea and National Defence Commission Chairman Kim Jung-il, which consists of five 
articles as follows: 
“1. The South and North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification on their own 
initiative and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the 
country; 2. Acknowledging that there are common elements in the South’s proposal for a 
confederation and the North’s proposal for a federation of lower stage as the formulae for 
achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that 
direction;  
3. The South and North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as 
exchange visits by separated family members and relations on the occasion of the August 15 
National Liberation Day, and the question of former long-term prisoners who had refused to 
renounce Communism;  
4. The South and North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced 
development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulation 
cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and all other 
fields;  
5. The South and North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the 
near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously.”  





creation of the Basic Agreement as a Delegate of Inter-Korea Talks and the June 15 
South-North Joint Declaration as the Director of the National Intelligence Service. He 
is one of the major architects of reconciliation and cooperation applying the embrace 
policy. He is the only person, among the South Korean delegates, who took part in 
producing both historic agreements in South Korea. 
In the Korean Peninsula, the Basic Agreement led to the thawing of tension within 
the inter-Korean relations in 1991. In the aftermath of the Basic Agreement, however, 
the North Korea nuclear issue arose and political leadership was transferred to Kim 
Jong-il following the death of Kim Il-sung. Although the Geneva Agreed 
Framework
576
 contributed to averting a major military crisis in the Korean Peninsula, 
North and South Korea have not been able to overcome the vicious cycle of mutual 
distrust and hostile interactions. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il’s pledge to build a ‘strong 
and big nation (kangsongdaekuk)’ and his hard line adventures such as the launch of 
the Tapodong missile in August 1998 have further complicated the process of inter-
Korean confidence building and reconciliation.  
Surprisingly enough, this was the first time that political power was transferred 
peacefully in South Korea in 50 years as Kim Dae-jung
577
became the president in 
1998. The unification policy of the previous governments for half a century was based 
on the absorption of North Korea. However, the government of Kim Dae-jung made it 
clear from the outset that the old policy of unification by absorption was to be 
abandoned in favour of co-operation and friendly exchanges with the North. The 
embrace policy was introduced and became prevalent in Korea and the world. Most 
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importantly, Kim Dae-jung appointed Lim as Chief Secretary of Foreign Security of 
the Presidential Residence, in order to push the embrace policy forward.  
 
2. The Definition of Embrace Policy 
 
The South Korean government labelled its new North Korean policy “Poongyo 
Jeongchaek” which means ‘engagement policy’ or ‘embrace policy’ and was defined 
by them as opposite to ‘containment,’ which effectively meant rejection. The policy 
was also called “Haetbyeot Jeongchaek”: sunshine policy. The word ‘Poongyo’ means 
accepting and embracing others with an open mind
 578
and ‘Jeongchaek’ means “a 
plan of action agreed or chosen by a political party, a business, etc.”
579
 The widely 
used English translation of ‘sunshine’ or ‘engagement’ fails to reflect the 
comprehensiveness of Lim’s North Korean policy because engagement represented 
only a segment of his policy: the fact that its dimensions extended to mutual meetings, 
especially summits, has often been overlooked. During the Summit Meeting in North 
Korea in 2000, the leaders embraced each other. This event impressed the Koreans 
and the world. Moreover, the members of a significant number of separated families 
could embrace each other as a result of the policy. Therefore it is appropriate to refer 
to this policy as the ‘embrace policy,’ whatever the terms used by the international 
community. In this chapter, ‘sunshine policy’, ‘engagement policy’ and ‘embrace 
policy’ will be used interchangeably according to appropriate contexts. 
The word sunshine refers to a well-known Aesop's fable about the competition 
between the wind and the sunshine to get a man take off his coat. The gentle sunshine 
made the man take off his coat whereas the harder the wind blew the harder the man 
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wrapped the coat around himself. The main aim of the policy was to soften North 
Korea’s attitude towards the South by encouraging interaction and by providing 
economic assistance. Lim argued that sunshine and embrace is more effective than the 
strong wind of hostility in making North Korea come out of isolation and ease 
confrontation.
580
 Lim delivered a speech for senior officials of the Ministry of 
Unification on 9 February 1999 in which he stated that  
The sunshine policy can be seen as a proactive policy to induce incremental and 
voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, opening, and reforms through a patient 
pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and co-operation. But as shall be discussed below, 
the sunshine policy goes beyond simple engagement. It comprises several components 
such as military deterrence, international collaboration, and domestic consensus. 
Nevertheless, its objective is crystal clear: to lay the foundation for peaceful Korean 
unification by severing the vicious cycle of negative and hostile actions and reactions 




To sum up, the embrace policy was a new policy in which South Korea pledged to 
accept North Korea with a broad mind in the hope that North Korea will soften its 
attitude towards South Korea in order to promote reconciliation, exchanges and 
cooperation between the two Koreas. However, if it was an embrace with the intention 
of softening the other and not also softening oneself, that is, seeing faults in both, it 
falls short of Volf’s understanding.
 
3. A Summary of Lim’s Embrace Policy 
 
The sunshine policy was based on three fundamental principles as outlined by Lim. 
The first is the principle of non-tolerance of military threat or armed provocation by 
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North Korea. The second is the official abandonment of the idea of unification by 
absorption and the negation of any other measures which would undermine or 
threaten North Korea. The final component was the promotion of exchanges and co-
operation through the resumption of the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
aggression, Exchanges, and Co-operation.
582
 
The operating principle was flexible dualism, which was predicated on major 
changes in the sequential order of inter-Korean interactions. It was the separation of 
politics and economics. In practice, this means that the South has loosened restrictions 
on its private sector to invest in North Korea, limiting its own involvement essentially 
to humanitarian aid. This was initially meant both to improve the North’s economy 
and to induce change in the North’s repressive government, though the latter goal was 
officially de-emphasized. Lim summarized the new rules of engagement with North 
Korea as follows: 1) Easy tasks first, and difficult tasks later (	
); 2) 
Economics first, politics later (	); 3) Non-governmental organizations first, 
government later (	); 4) Give first, and take later (	).
583
 It represents 
a profound paradigm shift in managing inter-Korean relations. Past governments 
failed to overcome the inter-Korean stalemate precisely because of their rigid 
adherence to the principles of ‘government first, civil society later, politics first, 
economy later or political-economic linkage, and the primacy of mechanical 
reciprocity.’
584
   
Nevertheless, some argue that the sunshine policy was not different from the old 
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 under Park Chung-hee (president 1961-1979), Roh Tae-woo’s 
(president 1988-1993) “Northern Policy”
586
 and Young Sam Kim’s (president 1993-
1998) engagement policy during the first part of his administration. They too 
advocated the importance of peaceful co-existence with the North through the 
promotion of exchanges and co-operation. However, the sunshine policy is 
profoundly different because it created far more space in the Korean Peninsula for 
inter-Korean encounters and embrace than the previous policies. Moreover, its scope 
was far more comprehensive than the previous ones by favouring all-out interactions 
with the North. On top of that, its time framework was substantively different. While 
the previous governments were opting for immediate gains, the sunshine policy aimed 
at achieving medium and long-term gains encouraging patience and endurance.                 
The first implementations of the Sunshine Policy included North-South 
cooperative business developments. Part of the business initiative was a stretch of 
railway and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region, where several thousand South 
Korean citizens still travel every year. Though negotiations concerning them were 
difficult, three reunions among members of divided families were held. In 2000, Kim 
Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il held the first summit meeting. The two leaders embraced 
each other at Pyonyang Airport. In the same year, Kim Dae-jung was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize as a result of the Sunshine Policy. 
Roh Moo-hyun (president 2003-2008) continued the policy of his predecessor. 
However, in 2003, the issue of the North’s possession of nuclear weapons surfaced 
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again and both North Korea and the United States accused the other of breaching the 
Agreed Framework. Nevertheless, Roh stayed committed to the policy and his 
government continued to supply the North with humanitarian aid. The two 
governments continued co-operation on projects already under way and also 
established the Kaesong Industrial Park. In Pyonyang the second summit meeting was 
held in 2007 between Roh and Kim Jong-il. Roh travelled from Seoul to Pyongyang 
by car and crossed over the Military Demarcation Line by foot to express hope in the 




Since the beginning of the embrace policy, hundreds of separated families have 
been able to get in touch with each other and exchange news. Later the number of 
reunited families reached 4000, meaning that 20000 people had a chance to meet each 
other more than a dozen times. Previous to the Sunshine Policy the number stood at a 
mere 200 over 50 years. The number of mutual visits reached 430,000 people 
compared to 3000 before the first summit meeting.
588
 The number of South Korean 
tourists who visited Mount Kumgang in North Korea reached 1.3million and the 
number is continuously growing. Many companies from the South have advanced into 
the North.  Especially in the Kaesong Industrial Complex near the DMZ, 6,000 North 
Korean workers are already employed by South Korean companies and this figure 
will increase to 700,000 in the future as planned.  Exchanges in academia, culture and 
sports between the two Koreas have increased.
589
                
In short, the embrace policy of Lim made far more space in the Korean Peninsula 
for inter-Korean encounters than the policies of past governments.  
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  4. A Biblical Perspective of Lim’s Sunshine Policy 
 
In this chapter I examine why Lim adopted the embrace policy. Several factors 
explain the shift. The most salient factor, I suggest, was his biblical background. He 
was born in 1934 and grew up in a Christian family in the northern territory. He left 
the North for the South during the Korean War. He attends Kwanglim Methodist 
Church
590
 in South Korea. In terms of political tendency Lim was in the conservative 
position and Kim Dae-jung was in the liberal position. Kim Dae-jung, who was 
labelled as ‘communist’
591
 by the conservative side, sent a message to Lim twice in 
1994 asking that they should work together but Lim rejected the offer. After the 
second rejection Kim Sun-do, the senior minister of Kwanglim Methodist Church, 
preached a sermon which influenced Lim to meet Kim Dae-jung, saying in a Sunday 
Service, “do not adhere to the past, hold on to a vision pointing to the future, which is 
not negative and passive but positive and progressive, and live as an adventurist.”
592
 
In spite of the fact that the church has the same anti-communist background as 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church
593
 and the senior minister of the church also is a 
Christian Wolnammin,
594
 the church spoke prophetically to Lim. 
Lim has developed his own unique biblical perspective for the national unification 
of the Korean Peninsula and applied it to establish the embrace policy toward North 
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Korea during the dissolution of the structure of the Cold War world.                  
First of all, he used to be a ‘peacekeeper’ and a strong anti-communist while he 
served in the Army of South Korea for 27 years. However, he became ‘peacemaker’ at 
the end of the Cold War era. In particular, while he anticipated the full process of 
high-level talks between the two Koreas in the early 1990s, he received a new calling 
when reading Matthew 5:9, “Blessed are those who are peacemakers, for they will be 
called sons of God.”
595
             
As he became a ‘peacemaker’ under biblical influence, his biblical perspective 
influenced the creation of the embrace policy toward North Korea. He said that the 
four key elements of the embrace policy, known as the ‘reconciliation, cooperation 
policy’ came from Romans 12:17-21: a) “Do not take revenge, but leave room for 
God’s wrath”; b) “If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him 
something to drink”; c) “Do not repay anyone evil for evil, but overcome evil with 
good”; d) “Live at peace with everyone.”
596
 
The phrase ‘do not directly take revenge but leave room for God’s wrath’ for him 
meant that the two Koreas must make peace with each other rather than judge each 
other. Since the Korean War the two Koreas have become enemies, hated each other 
and engaged in a zero sum game. They had treated each other with distrust and 
hostility for over 50 years. However, Lim realised from the biblical verses that 
‘leaving revenge to me, I will repay,’ and that ‘forgive your enemy and love him,’ 
mean that victory comes when you make your enemy a friend and change him: 
changing yourself in the process would be the only basis for honest embrace. 
However, the word ‘victory’ he used is an ambiguous expression. It can be spiritual, 
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national, individual or collective. If the strong requires the weak to change, it can be a 
power game, leading the two Korean people to a false reconciliation at best. The two 
Korean people, according to him, must 1) stop their hatred toward one another, 2) 
forgive each other, 3) accept and respect each other, 4) become partners in the 
unification process.
597
 Most importantly, they have to admit that they had sinned and 
repent. Acceptance and respect will take up the space created by forgiveness and 
turning away from hatred. To be partners in the reunification process means that they 
have to turn round to encounter each other. This is what Lim refers to as 
‘reconciliation,’ which is also the starting point of his embrace policy toward North 
Korea. Nevertheless, he did not take account of inequality of power which exists 
between North and South Korea, and it is not clear the extent to which he himself is 
therefore aware of the implications of this omission.   
Comparing these four factors of Lim’s with Volf’s, surprisingly, three factors 
coincide in the thought of Volf and Lim: repentance, forgiveness and making space for 
the other. As with Volf, no attention is paid to unequal power. 
                     
5. Evaluation of Lim’s Policy         
   
There are some major critiques regarding the limitations of the embrace policy of 
Lim. First of all, Lim failed to prepare space in the South Korean people for accepting 
the North Korean people and Kim Jung-il’s regime as he placed emphasis on making 
space to accept the other from his biblical perspective. One unsatisfactory aspect of 
his embrace policy is ‘give first, and take later’ because it is not unconditional love 
but clearly conditional love. His embrace policy would have made more space in the 





love of Jesus Christ on the cross, since the concept of ‘take later’ eventually made the 
South Korean people demand the return of the aid in other ways. 
  However, it would have been extremely difficult for the embrace policy to have 
excluded ‘take later’ because the South Korean people do not like giving 
unconditionally anything to the North Korean people and Kim Jung-il’s regime.
598
 As 
it was, the embrace policy produced three negative responses from the South Korean 
people: a) they immediately expected reciprocity from North Korea,
599
 b) the policy 
ensured Kim Jong-il regime’s survival through the aid given by South Korea’s 
government,
600
 c) it created a trade-off between the embrace policy and national 
security.
601
 These negative responses stemmed from the legacy of anti-Communist 
ideology, which indicated that Lim did not prepare room in the minds of the people 
for the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il’s regime, nor did he pay enough 
attention to the deep-seated ethnic differentiation which has taken place. 
  Most importantly, it should be noted that there is a profound incompatibility 
between the embrace policy and its opponents. Lim mastered the virtue of patience 
and prudence which originates from his biblical perspective, and has a firm belief in 
the possibility of North Korea’s voluntary openness to change and reform as well as 
peaceful co-existence with the South, while his critics have not. Nevertheless, he 
overlooked the fact that the South Korean people had no room yet to embrace the 
North Koreans and the regime. They were educated by an anti-Communist ideology 
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and still believed that the North Koreans, and in particular Kim Jong-il’s regime, were 
evil. Youngnak Presbyterian Church is Christian, yet exemplifies opposition to Lim. 
When I invited Lim, who was a minister of unification in the government, to 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 1999 as a lecturer, some prominent elders of the 
church demanded that I cancel his lecture in the church. 
In terms of the change of political power, South Korean politics has long been 
dominated by vested interests framed around and depending on conservative Cold 
War ideology. Transfer of political leadership and a shifting North Korean policy 
threatens the very foundation of these interests’ ideology, concerns, and power. Thus, 
opposition from the conservative camp seems natural, but it is irreconcilable with the 
embrace policy and, arguably, also with Christian witness. 
Nevertheless, the government should have found a way in which those who 
belong to the conservative camp were able to prepare for the acceptance of North 
Koreans. They might need another half a century to feel comfortable about accepting 
the North Korean people because they had been educated by anti-communist ideology 
for so long, through the policy and practice of successive governments. On the other 
hand, the South Korean people need to repent of their sins that they have not loved 
North Korea, its people and its regime, they need to forgive them, they need to make 
space to embrace them equally, and they need to support any kind of aid to North 
Korea unconditionally. However, the South Korean people consist of over 70% non-
Christians who cannot be required by the South Korean government to repent and 
forgive. The next section will deal with embrace in the context of Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church consisting of 100% Christians.  
 
In conclusion, the embrace policy of Lim is that South Korea should embrace North 

Korea to promote reconciliation, exchanges and co-operation. These principles result 
from Lim’s particular biblical perspective. It is true that the embrace policy made far 
more space in the Korean Peninsula for inter-Korean encounter than the policies of 
past governments. However, the embrace policy faced criticisms from its objectors 
who have no space for embracing the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il’s regime.   
                    
Embrace in Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
 
This section will investigate the negative response to the embrace policy in the 
church, the necessity of a new direction of mission toward North Korea, and embrace 
cases experienced in the Bible Study Class for Free People to show evidence that the 
two populations can construct a harmonious catholic community. 
 
1. The Response of Youngnak Presbyterian Church to the Embrace 
Policy 
                 
The founder of the church, together with his congregation, firmly believed that the 
communist ideology which is rooted in materialism, nihilism and atheism, 
fundamentally threatened Christianity as well as national security. For the sake of true 
peace, Christians must fight against these evil forces.
602
 Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church firmly believed that North Korea must be totally absorbed into the South, its 
state destroyed, and its people assimilated. In fact, the Korean War in 1950 embittered 
both South and North Korean governments and their people. Since then, the South 
Korean unification policy has grown, rooted in the eagerness to see the downfall of 
Communism.  
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However, the policy seemed to be unrealistic until recently. In 1998, the Kim Dae-
jung government announced the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea in order to 
realize the concept of reconciliation, and cooperation between the two Koreas.
603
 To 
achieve this, the Korean government pursued a basic but continuous South-North 
dialogue, provided economic development and advice, and assisted North Korea in its 
hunger crisis, which resulted in unprecedented favourable exchanges among South 
and North Korean people and political leaders. Especially, the historic summit 
meeting between two leaders of Korea was more than a surprise to the Korean people 
as well as to the world.  
Furthermore, the Roh Moo-hyun government in 2004 tried to abolish the Anti-
Communist Law, which had been enacted on the first day of December 1948 in order 
to remove leftist organizations and other political opponents in South Korea. 
According to the Law, contacts with North Koreans and exposure to communist 
ideologies became strictly forbidden. Roh Moo-hyun’s government believed that the 
Law was an obstacle to reconciliation and co-operation between the two Koreas. All 
these certainly made a great impact on Youngnak Presbyterian Church. 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church protested against the government. The 
Conservative Christian circle including Youngnak Presbyterian Church held a huge 
demonstration at the heart of Seoul attended by approximately 120,000 people on 4 
October, 2004, to publicly protest against the abolition of the anti-Communist Law 
and complain about the Sunshine Policy. Through this demonstration, the 
conservative Christian circle divulged the contradiction inherent in it.  
Society in general severely criticized the demonstration, pointing out that some 
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pastors who co-operated with the past dictator regimes were again exercising their 
influential power
604
and yet again contributing to problems in South Korea. Korean 
Christianity was warned that it may be confronted with a crisis.
605
 Moreover, the 
demonstration did not receive full support even within the conservative Christian 
circles, not only because it failed to present a new direction for Evangelism, but also 




This indicates that the conservative circle of Korean Christianity, definitely 
including Youngnak Presbyterian Church, could not take even one step toward 
reconciliation in mission toward North Korea because for them the campaign against 
Communism, so easily translated into opposition to North Korean people as they are, 
was just and should prevail. Despite the fact that the government was making steady 
progress toward reconciliation with North Korea, the Cold War had ended, and the 
leaders of the two Korea shaken hands with each other, Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church still adhered to the idea that North Korea should collapse and that the Church 
and the government must not help North Korea at all.  
Christians with a humanitarian view claim that the Churches in South Korea, 
especially Youngnak Presbyterian Church, should help North Korea and overcome 
their anti-Communist ideology. North Korean people are our brothers, sisters, and 
close relatives: they need food, medical treatment and clothes and so on as we do. As 
a nongovernmental organization, the churches support North Korea in terms of 
mission, hoping to realize the love of Christ in North Korea. 
On the other hand, those Christians who emphasize the justness of anti-
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communism criticize the humanitarian view, insisting that the humanitarians fail to 
realise how menacing Communism is. I had first hand experience of the popularity of 
anti-communist attitudes. A speaker gave a lecture asking the audience to help North 
Korea in Youngnak Presbyterian Church. After the lecture one person raised his hand 
and asserted that North Korea should receive no help because it is a dangerous 
communist state that we cannot trust. The audience applauded loudly.  
There are tensions and collisions between anti-Communists and humanitarians in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church on account of the anti-Communist ideology which has 
painted the North Korean people as evil. Both anti-Communists and humanitarians 
need a new direction in their understanding of Evangelism relating to reconciliation 
and co-operation and resolving the legacy of anti-communist ideology. 
In a new context of reconciliation and co-operation, Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church should embrace the North Korean people and aim for reconciliation in the 
dimension of mission toward North Korea, making space in people by repentance and 
forgiveness to embrace the North Korean people as their brothers and sisters in Jesus 
Christ.  
To sum up, Youngnak Presbyterian Church, devout Christians though they feel they 
are, believed in defeating Communism and making North Korea collapse.
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However, the anti-Communist ideology of Youngnak Presbyterian Church is faced 
with the government policy of reconciliation with North Korea. The church 
recognizes that they need to find a new dimension for mission toward North Korea, 




Such an intention does not perhaps sit well with fundamental Christian principle.

2. Repentance and Forgiveness of Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
  
Following Volf’s argument, it is necessary that the CW should repent their sins 
and forgive the CS in order to make space to embrace the CS. In my opinion, there are 
three sins in Youngnak Presbyterian Church from which the CW need to repent.  
 
First, the church leadership needs to repent of their hatred toward North Korea, its 
people and its regime, and the congregation of the church also needs to forgive them. 
Volf mentions that space is made by mutual repentance and forgiveness to embrace 
the other as Jesus’ self-giving love on the cross made space and calls us for 
reconciliation.
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 In fact, Volf begins his study with a description of a conversation 
with Juergen Moltmann following a lecture in which Volf had stressed the importance 





 Volf replied to the question of Moltmann, “No, I 
cannot, but as a follower of Christ I think I should be able to.”
611
 Exclusion and 
Embrace is an investigation of the tensions and difficulties thrown up by Moltmann’s 
question and the implications for the identity of a victim who embraces an enemy.  
The CW firmly believe that the North Korean Army launched an all-out attack 
on the South on 25 June 1950 as they have been taught that the Korean War was 
initiated by North Korea. Conversely, the CS were taught that Republic of Korea 
Army troops under the “bandit traitor Rhee Syng-man” crossed the border first.
612
 
The CW regard themselves as victims of the war because they lost their family and 
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property at the hands of the communists. The CS claim the same victim status based 
on the same evidence. This indicates that the CW and CS communities are needed in 
repenting from regarding each other as evil perpetrators of the Korean War.  
Second, the church, especially the leaders, following Volf’s theology, is in need of 
repentance for having been silent on the criminal guilt of the state. Walter Wink points 
out that:  
Granted that criminal guilt applies only to those individuals who actually commit 
human right violations, torture, and murder; nevertheless, all the members of a state are 
responsible for what their nation does in their name. Thus the individual members of a 
nation are judged collectively by God on the basis of how they treated “the least of 
these”(Matt. 25:31-32)…All of the citizens of a nation share political guilt for its 
wrongful acts, but most do not bear criminal guilt and should not be brought to trial.
613
   
 
During the period of military dictatorship of South Korea, thousands of students 
and police clashed at university campuses throughout Seoul. In the midst of the 
demonstration the students demanded the democratization of Korea and the removal 
of the United States’ troops from South Korea. During the clashes Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church remained silent. Moreover, they labelled the students as “north 
Korean sympathizers,” “communists,” and “supporters of the enemy.” The point is 
that political dissenters at that time were almost invariably branded as communists, 
which led to the intensification of the existing anti-communist propaganda. 
Understandably, the biggest and the most crucial discourse penetrating the church was 
on the subject of anti-communism.  
The ‘Kwangju Minjuwha Woondong’ (Kwangju Democratization Movement) 
took place between 18 May and 27 May 1980 in Kwangju, South Korea. During this 
period, citizens rose up against Chun Du-hwan’s military dictatorship and took control 
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of the city. Kwangju citizens who cried for democratization were killed, although 
there is still no exact death toll. According to the May 18 Bereaved Family 
Association, at least 165 people were killed and another 65 are still missing, whilst 23 
soldiers and 4 policemen were also killed. During the period of Chun Doo-hwan’s 




In the following years of the Movement, at least during Chun’s regime, the church 
remained silent or put the blame on the people who took part in the movement. For 
this stance the church has been criticized by the Korean people. Generally speaking, 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church, which had played a role of the leadership of the 
Korean Church, was no exception: it must accept blame.    
Third, the CW are in need of repentance regarding the inequal relationship they 
continue to exert over the CS. According to Walter Wink, Jesus does not reject power 
as such, but its use to dominate others. Jesus does not reject greatness, but finds it in 
identification and solidarity with the needy at the bottom of society (Matt. 5:3-12, 
Luke 6:20-23). He also says, “I do not call you servants any longer, because the 
servant does not know what the master is doing; but I have called you friends” (John 
15:5). According to Jesus, the hierarchical relationship of master and slave, teacher 
and student, is not to persist. Jesus’ own actions embody his words, according to the 
Fourth Gospel, Jesus washes the disciple’s feet, a task considered so degrading that a 
master could not order a Jewish slave to perform it (John 13:1-20).
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In terms of the dominant-weak relationship between the communities of the 
church, the position of CW is relatively stronger than that of the CS because the 
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former provides the financial and spiritual support and the latter is the recipient. In 
this situation it is nearly inevitable that the dominant party will require that the weaker 
party give up their identity in favour of the dominant one unless they are prepared for 
their attitudes to undergo a revolution. Missiologically speaking, it is obvious that this 
kind of mission is to be avoided for it is both potentially arrogant, given to pride and 
may do violence to the identity of the subordinated other. The CW should treat the CS 
equally as their brothers and sisters in Jesus Christ.    
In short, both groups can make individual space by repentance and forgiveness in 
order to embrace each other.       
 
3. Embrace Cases in Youngnak Presbyterian Church  
 
I have come across cases of forgiveness and resulting embrace among the 
Christian Wolnammin and Saeteomin members in Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
during my research. In the following I will describe such cases in order to provide 
these as examples for Tong-I, i.e. unity in diversity 
 
Case 1: Lee and Shim 
 
Lee is the senior minister of the church and Shim is a Christian Saeteomin. Shim 
was a high-ranking officer of the People’s Army in Pyongyang in North Korea. He 
escaped from North Korea in 1998 and entered South Korea in the same year via 
China. In spite of the fact that the church and the senior minster of the church have the 
strongest anti-Communist ideology,
616
 Youngnak Presbyterian Church welcomed him 
as a member of the church. The church began to call him and other Christian 
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Saeteomin as Free People and the church organized Bible Study Class for the Free 
People. For a few years Shim had studied the Bible in the BSCFP before he became 
the first Christian North Korean Saeteomin student in the Presbyterian College and 
Theological Seminary in Seoul. Through the recommendation of the senior minister 
of the church he was allowed to enter the Seminary without entry exams. During his 
seminary time the church and its senior minister accepted him as a part time lay pastor 
and then after the graduation he became a full time lay pastor.  
However, he suddenly disappeared from the church. A few months later the 
church heard that he was in China to rescue his family, left in North Korea, to bring 
them to South Korea. It turned out, however, that he had been conned and lost a great 
deal of money by bad brokers who led him to believe that they were able to bring his 
family to China. He returned to Youngnak Presbyterian Church with no money and no 
family.  
However, he hid this fact before the church and claimed that his family members 
were in South Korea staying in Hanawon and were going to come to Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church soon. When he was unable to lie any longer, he suddenly 
disappeared again leaving behind only a memorandum of resignation. Nobody in the 
church was aware of the reasons for his disappearance.
617
 Lee, the senior minster of 
the church, said:  
I employed him not because he had the ability to work according to the appropriate 
way befitting South Korean Christians but because the church has a duty to cultivate 
his abilities. I expected him to become a minister, to be able to learn the traditional way 
of South Korean ministers and work accordingly. However, I cannot believe that he 
told a fantastic lie to the church. In addition, he suddenly disappeared without an 
apology. Things cannot be done in this manner. It is true that his wrong behaviour 
significantly negatively affected the work of the North Korean Saeteomin in the church. 

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Decision makers of the church started to doubt Christian North Korean Saeteomin 
again wondering whether the Saeteomin were communists, spies and their defection 
was only a disguise. However, I said to the decision makers that we must not treat them 
as such but keep an open mind when evaluating what happened and see them in our 
pure minds. Even though we are victims of the affair we must continue to support him 
and other North Korean Saeteomin until they stand well by themselves.
618
    
   
However, the phrase of ‘I expected him to become a minister to be able to work in 
accordance with the traditional way of South Korean ministers’ can be criticized. It 
implies that he expected Shim to change to become like a South Korean Christian and
put on a South Korean’s identity which means that Mr. Shim must give up his own 
identity that had been formed in North Korea. 
Nevertheless, when he says that “we must not treat them as such but keep an open 
mind when evaluating what happened” he reveals his ability to readjust his identity to 
make space to embrace Shim, emphasizing his support for him. Yet he still sees Shim 
as part of a collective “them.” 
This embrace did not result in separation between Shim and Lee and between 
Shim and the church. Recently, with the help of Shim, Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
was able to hold the first united conference for North Korean Saeteomin ministers in 
Youngnak Prayer Retreat Centre on 15 January 2007. Furthermore, the church has 
supported financially Changjo Church which was planted by Shim in 2007. The two 
churches still have a good relationship based on the good relationship between Shim 
and Lee. 
           
This case shows us the possibility that Christian anti-communists are able to 
embrace a Christian North Korean Saeteomin and to form good relationships between 
them.              
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Case 2: Yang and Kim  
 
Kim is a Christian Wolnammin teacher and Yang is a Christian North Korean 
Saeteomin student in the BSCFP. Yang Shin-ok is a North Korean Saeteomin female 
who was born in North Korea in 1970 and escaped from North Korea in 2001 and 
then entered South Korea in 2002 via China. She has attended Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church since 2004. She says:  
I joined the BSFP at this church in February 2004. Young Suk Kim was my teacher in 
the class. My child became very sick and lost a lot of blood. At that time I was very 
fearful. I phoned Kim to ask for help. Kim came to my house to help as soon as she 
received my call. Since then I called her whenever my child was sick or whenever I 
found it hard to live in South Korea. Kim always accepted my demands. I needed to be 
loved. Kim visited and embraced me no matter when I asked at dawn or at night. To be 
honest I phoned and cried to my brother to help me, however, he said it to me later that 
he was unable to help me any longer because he is also a North Korean Saeteomin and 
found it hard to settle down in South Korea. I assumed that she might have been 
disappointed with me and other North Korean Saeteomin but she showed no sign of it. 
It is difficult for me to change my identity because I like it and even can not change it 
because North Korean Saeteomin had been socialized to fit into the North Korean 
social life of Juche ideology. However, I felt that I changed my mind toward South 
Koreans whenever Mrs. Kim has helped, visited and embraced me.
619
  
Yang was educated in Juche ideology since she had been born and was taught 
that South Koreans were her enemies. Kim was taught that North Koreans were evil 
and must be destroyed. However, Kim repented for her sin in regarding Yang as an 
untruthful person and then she embraced Yang. This has made Yang’s attitudes change 
toward South Koreans. Yang says:  
When my first daughter had an ear operation, some teachers of the BSCFP visited there 

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in the first place to take care of my daughter. At that time I could not pay hospital bills 
for my first daughter’s operation because of my failing multilevel sales but they paid 
for everything. When my first daughter was operated on for the second time the CW 
paid everything again. Furthermore, they always warmly embrace me whenever I go to 
the church to join the BSCFP, which makes me feel comfortable. In fact, I intended to 
commit suicide because I failed in my business and my daughters were seriously sick, 
what’s worst, and I had no money for the hospital. Nobody else inquired after my 
welfare. However, whenever I met them in the church they not only inquired after my 
welfare but also embraced me and consoled me. I would have committed suicide 
unless they had embraced, consoled and helped me in the church.
620
   
 Kim’s embrace saved Yang’s life. Recently Yang met another North Korean 
Saeteomin female who has leukaemia. Yang invited her for dinner several times and 
encouraged her not to lose hope and kept taking care of her. She has led her to the 
BSCFP. It is something Yang had never experienced before. This indicates that Yang 
has begun to make room in her mind for the other, overcoming her CS socialization 
which regarded non-family as of no regard. In so doing, she is not becoming a CW, 
but a fully Christian Saeteomin.    
 
The two persons used to perceive each other as evil or enemies. However, when 
one embraces the other they make space in the other’s mind for being able to help. 
This results in a community, which can live together in peace. More similar cases to 
the above one have been found in the BSCFP.                                
 
Case 3: Hwang Gwang-sung  
 
Hwang Gwang-sung is a Christian Wolnammin male and a teacher in the BSCFP. 
He has been attending Youngnak Presbyterian Church since 1976 and met about 20 
North Korean Saeteomin during the eight years since he volunteered for the BSCFP. 
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He states,  
It is only by the love of God that North Korean Saeteomin are changed. It is impossible 
for human beings to be able to change them. The North Korean Saeteomin I met have 
disappointed me. I might have given up teaching them but I tried to follow Jesus on the 
cross. It is they who had lived in the society in which Christianity was not allowed at 
all for over half a century before they came to South Korea. Conservative Christians 
are anxious about the enormous expenses of unification which South Koreans would 
have to pay when the two Koreas are unified. They do not like that the number of 
North Korean Saeteomin has sharply increased because of the tax burden. This brings 
about rejection toward North Korean Saeteomin, which makes South Koreans difficult 
to accept them. Frankly I used to have the same perspective as they have. However, the 
love of God is not a deal but unconditional love. It influenced me to accept North 
Korean Saeteomin. I firmly believe that Christians who know they are loved by God 
are able to embrace them without any conditions. On a personal level, I was in tears 
when I washed their feet with my hands. At that time I repented for my sin in not 
trusting them, I really forgave them and then I was able to embrace them. They also 
were impressed with my washing their feet and embracing them. In fact, encountering 




This statement shows the creation of space in Hwang’s mind for accepting the CS 
under the influence of Jesus’ love, which has made him volunteer for the CS.                                      
 
Case 4: Kim Gyeong-suk 
 
Kim Gyeong-suk is a Christian North Korean Saeteomin female. She was born in 
North Korea in 1961 and escaped North Korea in 1998 and entered South Korea in 
2003 via China and Cambodia. In 2003 she joined the BSCFP and she studied 
theology in Youngnak Women’s Seminary for two years. She wrote a sermon titled 
Salangui Neungryeok (The Power of Love) based on James 2:1-13.  
In North Korea, I suffered from the destructive power of discrimination because my 
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family descended from a purged class in the social system of North Korea. The 
discrimination brought about violence rooted in resentment and anger in my mind, 
which led me to deep spiritual darkness. I hated and discriminated against others more 
than I suffered. It was natural that I should discriminate against others according to 
wealth or social class or academic ability etc. At that time I had no pangs of conscience 
at all. However, after I came to South Korea, one day I began to feel that God touched 
my mind and approached me with His unlimited love. When I stood before the 
presence of the Lord for the first time I realized that I was able to confess that I am a 
sinner. I came to know the afflicted sinner and came to see my mangled and emaciated 
mind. However, God accepted me and embraced me. He made me know how much 
God loves me and how much I have been loved so far, filling my mind with his love 
fully. In fact, I had a favourite proverb which I learnt in North Korea; ‘Be cautious of 
your close friend, stop her/his speech because she/he deprives of your liver.’ I had kept 
the proverb in my mind for over forty years. However, I was able to very slowly 
carefully open my mind to other schoolmates in Youngnak Women’s Seminary and 
have a real relationship with them…
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She encountered the love of God, which had a significant influence on her change 
of attitudes toward others. At last she was able to embrace others. Bang Su-ja who 
was a teacher of Kim in the BSCFP witnessed that Kim began to accept Bang as if 




Bang asserts that her personality significantly changed after accepting the Lord, 
which resulted in opening up to others, which indicates that she began to make space 
in her mind for others.  
Kim wrote another sermon titled Yongseoui Jinjeonghan Uimi (The True Meaning 
of Forgiveness) based on Genesis 50:15-21:  
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…the hardest thing is forgiveness. In North Korea I was educated by the principle of 
‘Revenge is as good as your struggle,’ and had lived in accordance with it before I 
escaped from North Korea. However, when I became a Christian I had extreme 
difficulty in understanding the commandment ‘Love your enemy.’ I struggled with 
bitter anguish. I thought that I might as well leave the church than forgive enemies. I 
was never able to forgive them at all. I consulted a pastor about the matter and defied 
the pastor’s teachings of Jesus. However, the pastor held my hands and embraced me, 
whispering into my ear that judgment would be by God. Moreover, the Christians who 
knew me continued to embrace me whenever I struggled with this commandment. 
Under the influence of their embrace I was able to get out of the difficulty more and 
more. …My burning thoughts of revenge dissipated, making space in my mind to 
accept others, even enemies … True forgiveness gave me a sense of belonging and 
intimacy in relation to the community of the church...
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The confessional substance of her sermon represents significant evidence for the 
possibility of repentance, forgiveness and making space for the other even if they are 
enemies, which results in establishing a community in which the CS can live in peace 
with the CW.   
 
These four cases of embrace open up the obvious possibility for constructing a 
community which can live in harmony. The people interviewed experienced God’s 
love which leads to tremendous change in their outlook brushing aside decades of 
indoctrination and were able to see the other for the first time as brothers and sisters in 
Christ. 





                      
The hypothesis with which this chapter began was that there is the fundamental 
necessity for making space by repentance and forgiveness of the CW to embrace the 
CS in order that Tong-i (unity in diversity) of the two communities may be 
constructed in the church. In conclusion we must return to this hypothesis and ask 
whether or not it is confirmed by the evidence that has been examined in our 
application of the concept of embrace of Volf to the context of the Korean Peninsula 
and Youngnak Presbyterian Church. 
 
First of all, Volf places emphasis on creating a space for embracing the other by 
being obedient to the self-giving of Jesus on the cross and God’s reception of hostile 
humanity into divine communion. This chapter described the concept of embrace 
according to Volf. A space for embracing others is created not only when persons 
distance themselves from their culture and their membership in it (without rejecting 
either) but also when one forgives the other. The outstretched arms of Christ are a 
symbol of the creation of this space into which all of humanity is welcome. Second, 
Volf insisted that victims and oppressors need to repent from different sins and 
forgiveness is the only route to get humans out of struggle in order to make a space 
for embracing the other. Finally, he placed emphasis on the fact that God’s embrace of 
humanity on the cross was an act of covenant with humanity.   
However, the hypothesis was weakened by criticisms: obedience to make room 
for otherness was considered an unfair requirement of the weak in the partial social 
structure and it is difficult to apply ‘making space for embracing otherness’ to a group.  
 

As a response to the criticisms I presented the embrace policy of Lim Dong-won 
and demonstrated how embrace can be applied to a multi-religious context. Lim 
Dong-won moved the concept of embrace to the community level when he 
constructed South Korea’s famous Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. The Policy 
brought about exchanges, co-operation, assistance and family reunions. The core of 
flexible dualism of the embrace policy is in the separation of politics and economy. 
This resulted in an operation in which a space for embracing the North widens, 
creating far more space in the Korean Peninsula for encounter and embrace than 
previous policies. This policy is based on the biblical perspectives of Lim. He 
produced the principles of the embrace policy based on Romans 12:17-21: 
reconciliation and cooperation comes from repentance, forgiveness, respecting the 
enemy, and accepting the enemy as partner. 
However, the embrace policy faced criticism in South Korea, which weakened the 
hypothesis once more. I demonstrated that criticism came from people who were not 
prepared to make space in the South Korean people for accepting the North Korean 
people and Kim Jong-il’s regime because they grew up within an ideology of anti-
communism and thus do not trust the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il’s regime. 
In a paradoxical sense, it shows us that the embrace policy cannot succeed in South 
Korea unless people are ready to create space by repentance and forgiveness. It 
represents the importance of the necessity of space and this realisation actually 
strengthens the hypothesis of this chapter. 
 
While lack of willingness to embrace may be not contrary to other religious 
traditions, embrace should be part of the Christian tradition. However, negative 
response to the embrace policy appeared in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, as in 
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others. The church still adheres to the anti-communist ideology and refuses to help the 
Northern regime. This indicates that there is no room for the other: spiritually 
speaking. On the other hand, in terms of the dimension of the humanitarian view, the 
church contributed to support for North Korea, a support based still on the assumption 
the other must change and, moreover, a support which may elevate the giver in his/her 
own eyes. These two sides co-exist within the church, which not only creates tension 
but also points to the necessity of a new dimension of mission toward North Korea. If 
the church continues to adhere rabidly to anti-communism, the church will be unable 
to make room to embrace the CS, and those who adhere to anti-communist ideology 
will continue to criticize the humanitarian aid to North Korea. This critically 
challenges the thesis in this chapter.  
  This chapter has suggested that the church should repent from its sins: it failed to 
love the North Korean people as brothers and sisters in Jesus Christ; it remained silent 
on the big social issues; it has inequitably forced the CS in a dominant-weak structure. 
Repenting from these will enable the church to create space to embrace the CS. This 
chapter also shows us that the CS should repent from regarding the CW as their 
enemies.  
Most importantly, this chapter attempted to show cases of embrace experienced 
in the BSCFP in the church. These cases reveal that being confronted with God’s love 
is a powerful experience and through struggle, repentance and mutual forgiveness 
becomes possible. Describing and publicizing this process, it will certainly affect 
people’s thinking and hopefully changes will begin to occur more frequently. The 
personal accounts of embrace strengthened the hypothesis.  
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Conclusion to Part Three     
          
 In part three, I investigated the hypothesis that the CW can construct a catholic 
community in diversity with a courteous attitude towards the Juche ideology. By 
applying the principles of fulfillment theology together with Miroslav Volf’s concept 
of embrace the construction of a harmonious catholic community becomes possible in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church. 
      First of all, Volf puts emphasis upon openness as an external mark of 
catholicity of any Christian community. I pointed out that the CW need an open 
attitude in place of hostility toward Juche ideology. Second, we saw Moltmann’s 
arguments for “Other is only known by other” or “the acceptance of others creates 
community in diversity.” I pointed out that the CW should regard the CS by these 
principles and learn about the Christian Saeteomin identity from the CS. Then they 
could more easily accept the differences without destroying the Christian Saeteomin 
identity as Jesus Christ identified himself with children, sinners and tax collectors etc. 
The examples of individuals who experienced embrace points to the possibility of the 
application of Volf and Moltmann’s argument in the church. 
In addition, I introduced the concept of Tong-i, which I suggested should replace 
the concept of Tong-il based on Moltmann’s ideas. Tong-il refers to unification, but 
Tong-i specifies the main characteristic of unification: it is unification in diversity, 
through accepting the diverse identities of the two communities. Tong-i is achieved 
when the two communities are able to form a harmonious community.  
I demonstrated in Chapter 5 that some CW reveal a more open attitude toward 
Juche ideology seen in the textbook used at special Bible classes attended by the CS. 
The theological basis for this more inclusive approach lies in fulfillment theology and 
	
its missiological application. According to fulfillment theology every religion has a 
kernel of truth which points to and can be built on by the Christian Gospel. 
Indigenous religious ideas similar to Christianity may be amplified and cultivated by 
the missionary before leading the people to the full knowledge of the Gospel. Thus, 
the textbook uses examples from religious Juche ideology which are compatible with 
Christian doctrine. In turn, Saeteomin feel that their identity is less threatened.  
According to Volf humans are able to create space for embrace by repentance and 
forgiveness, following the divine self-giving of Christ on the cross. Those three 
elements of repentance, forgiveness and making space to embrace the other are also 
the key principles of Lim Dong-won, the architect of the Sunshine Policy. Lim, 
through this biblically based policy, was able to achieve a previously impossible level 
of openness between North and South Korea. He was admired by Koreans and the 
wider world alike. 
However, there was a limitation to the application of the concept of embrace in a 
multi-religious society in which biblical standards cannot be enforced and also to its 
application in Youngnak Presbyterian Church whose leadership finds it hard to shed 
their anti-communism. These limitations challenge the hypothesis put forward in this 
thesis according to which it is possible to create a harmonious catholic community 
comprising of members of diverse identity. Rather, it indicates the method but accepts 
that, unless the will is there, this step to a full Christian life for all concerned will not 
be taken. 
Nevertheless, the individual cases of embrace described in Chapter 6 show that 
the hope for achieving a harmonious catholic community should not be cast aside just 
yet. The personal accounts of acceptance and embrace made possible by God’s love 
points to the profound attitude change among Christian Wolnammin and Saeteomin 

members, who were able to repent and forgive and embrace the other. Taking this into 
account, the thesis of this study is supported by Volf, Moltmann and Lim, as well as 
those Wolnammin and Saeteomin individuals who were able to transcend the 
boundaries of their own socialized identity in order to engage in a relationship with 
members of the other group.    
Future research should focus on how these successful embrace stories of the 
church can be built upon in order to change the attitude of the whole congregation of 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church and then even the people of the Korean Peninsula.  

Conclusion    
 
In Part one it was demonstrated that in spite of the fact that both groups share the 
same geographic origin i.e. Northern Korea, due to the political circumstances of the 
Korean peninsula they lived in societies of contrasting ideologies which influenced 
their perception regarding each other as enemy or monster. Essentially they have 
become two ethnic groups with different ideology, language use and inter-personal 
relations. In Part two, I described what happened when members of the two 
communities encountered each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church: while they 
would not see the issue of ethnic identity as one of homogeneity or heterogeneity, that 
was the basis of the problem. The difficulties they experienced led to disappointment 
and exclusion. In Part three the content of the NSTCL textbook was analysed. The 
author of the textbook took the missiological position of fulfilment theology evident 
in their courteous attitude towards Juche ideology but not all members agreed with 
this approach. Finally, evidence was obtained regarding the ability of the CW to create 
space by repentance and forgiveness to embrace the CS.  
Examples of personal stories of embrace were also cited to demonstrate the 
hypothesis of the thesis. There is indeed a way in which North and South Korean 
Christians can harmoniously coexist in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, embracing 
each other unconditionally as brothers and sisters in Christ. Although the present 
study was limited insofar as it only sought to explore possibilities within Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church there is a chance that the method for which I argue may be 
applied to other communities whether outside the church in the Korean Peninsula or 
elsewhere.The following summary sets out crucial issues. 
 

First, the emergence and development of two contrasting ideologies, anti-
communist ideology of the CW and Juche ideology of the CS, influenced the 
formation of the ethnic identities of the two groups. The research data (interviews and 
historical overview) back up this argument well, though the implications of this, that 
any reunification (as in the two Germanies) would be rather more different on the 
ideological level than the economic, cannot be discussed further here. The onset of the 
anti-communist ideology of the CW occurred when they lived in Northern Korea and 
was a reaction to the emergence of a serious anti-Christianity movement led by the 
communists which partly stemmed from the reaction to the missionaries’ behaviour of 
avoiding socio-political issues during Japanese rule. Since then the anti-communist 
ideology of the conservative Christian Wolnammin developed further and was made 
stronger by various factors, including the suffering caused by communists during the 
post-liberation period and the Korean War. Later on, anti-communist education and 
the national evangelical campaign continually strengthened the anti-communist 
ideology of the CW. 
In contrast, the emergence of the word Juche after liberation was an expression of 
yearning for independence from foreign powers. The socio-political aspect of Juche 
ideology emerged officially in 1954 to strengthen Kim Il-sung’s power against his 
foreign backed rivals. Once Kim Il-sung secured power, Juche ideology developed a 
philosophical aspect. The main elements of it were the creation of a ‘socio-political 
organism’ which consists of the leader, the Party and the masses. Finally, Juche 
ideology transformed North Korea into a nation of monotheism with its own religious 
doctrines, rituals and community, which made Juche ideology a monolithic 
ideological system. 
With regard to the unique behaviour and perception of the two groups formed by 

contrasting ideologies, the CW perceive the Saeteomin automatically as monsters, 
liars etc. and stigmatize them, suspecting them to be spies, unfaithful and so on. For 
their part, the CS indoctrinated by the socio-political, philosophical and religious 
Juche ideology, were socialized to act and think automatically in accordance with the 
principles of Juche ideology. In a society of one organism, the instructions of the 
leader provided them with criteria for their thinking and acting. In particular, the 
theory of ideological remoulding impacted on their perception of fellow humans: 
distinguish friend from foe, burning hatred for their enemies such as South Koreans 
etc. It was concluded that the contrasting ideologies created two unique sets of 
perception patterns and behaviours while communities lived in different societies for 
over half a century.  
             
 Second, the heterogeneous ethnic identity of the CW and the CS became obvious 
when material, verbal and behavioural symbols were analysed. 
The expectation regarding the interaction of the two groups which was initiated in 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church from 1998 with fraternal love was that the two 
communities would be able to construct a homogenous community because they came 
from the same territory. They thought that by being together again in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church they would be able to recover their lost identity as one people 
and one culture.  
However, the difficulties they faced once together in Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church discouraged them from seeking each other’s company and they blamed the 
other group for the failure. They were unable to interpret each other’s material and 
verbal symbols and behaviour patterns. For instance the CS found it hard to wear 
Western clothes because they had been taught that it corrupts them. At the same time 

the CW regarded the consumption of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes as corrupting. 
The two communities ended up hurting members from the other group by refusing to 
accept their customs and the rationale for their existence. Consequently exclusion 
ensued. 
Regarding verbal symbols it turned out that decades of separation affected 
language and many expressions were used in a different register or became extinct. 
Moreover, conventions evolved differently: North Koreans spoke abruptly and had a 
very direct manner, which bemused the CW who were taught to be polite and reserved. 
They did not realize that decades of military mobilization required by the North 
Korean state would leave its mark on the communication style of the CS. Instead the 
CW concluded that the CS were simply rude. Moreover, when the CS expressed their 
disapproval in their direct manner of the American military presence in South Korea 
many Christian Wolnammin believed that only spies and communist could say such 
terrifying things. At the same time the CS found the CW to be irreverent because the 
latter liberally used expressions which North Koreans use only in relation to their 
leader. The CS were also expected to learn all the many foreign words and informal 
expressions incorporated in the South Korean vocabulary during the decades of 
division, while their favoured word of address was dismissed by the CW. It became 
clear as the study progressed that the two communities faced serious linguistic 
problems despite sharing the same “mother tongue” which only added to mutual 
disappointment and discouragement. 
Differing notions of acceptable behaviours exacerbated the already tense 
atmosphere. While the CW regard smiling, praising and greeting as appropriate polite 
behaviour, the CS preferred to show their strength and straightforwardness by not 
doing these things. Another area of contention was promises. These the CS did not 

feel obliged to keep because they were not familiar with the concept. At the same time, 
they easily accepted Christian Wolnammin assistance be it financial or spiritual 
because they had already been used to be dependent on the Party’s handouts and 
‘ideological’ wellbeing. The ease with which the CS accepted help was interpreted by 
the CW as the CS’ inability to succeed independently.  
Most importantly, the CS socialized by the principle of the ideological remoulding 
of Juche ideology, regarded South Koreans as enemies and found it difficult to make 
friends with the CW, let alone Americans in South Korea. In contrast, the CW 
regarded Saeteomin automatically as monsters, liars etc. and stigmatized them 
because of the influence of anti-communism. Consequently, members of the two 
communities became suspicious of each other’s motives. The misinterpretations of 
verbal or behavioural manifestations invariably originate in the contrasting 
ideological background of the two communities. 
The greatest obstacle of mutual understanding, however, was that the CW demanded 
and expected the CS to give up their identity and become just like the CW. For the 
CW Juche ideology was the ideology of the devil which needed to be fought and 
defeated at all costs. This thinking is evidenced by their stance on the reunification of 
the Korean Peninsula: they expect it to happen through crushing the Northern Regime 
and advancing the Gospel of Jesus Christ among the people, replacing evil Juche 
ideology with the Gospel in the hearts and minds of the nation. To the CS this seems 
to be a Gospel of violence to their soul. 
 However, the CS felt unhappy with giving up their identity and becoming like the 
CW or South Koreans: they realized in South Korea that their Northern identity was 
completely different. The depth of desperation was uncovered in one of the interviews 
in which the Christian Wolnammin interviewee expressed his wish to send all 
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Saeteomin back to the North and some Christian Saeteomin expressed the feeling that 
they would actually be happier in North Korea. The recipe for mutual exclusion was 
followed and the meal was almost ready even though nobody would have regarded it 
tasty. Something had to be done, something with a good theological basis that enables 
the two communities to come together and exist in harmony. It seems that the CW had 
to find a way to embrace their Saeteomin brothers, which certainly involves a more 
accommodating attitude toward Juche ideology. But how can the ideology of “the 
devil” be made at least a little bit acceptable?  
In Part three I attempted to answer this question and to outline a plan of action 
based on the ideas of Moltmann and Volf who gave a theological account of a 
successful embrace within the church community.   
The implications of Moltmann’s principle of “Other is only known by the other” and 
“the acceptance of others creates community in diversity” is that the CW have to get 
to know the CS by engaging with them and by putting aside their own anti-
communism.  
 The author of NSTCL textbook used to teach Saeteomin in Youngnak Presbyterian 
Church about Christianity took an inclusive stance in accordance with the theological 
position of the Fourth Commission of the 1910 World Missionary Conference. I 
expect that the more the CW accept and cultivate the fulfilment theology as their 
missiological position, the less antagonistic their attitude towards religious Juche 
ideology may be.  
Volf’s theological reflection on exclusion and embrace consists of four stages: 
repentance, forgiveness, space and embrace. His concept of embrace was modelled on 
Jesus Christ’s self giving on the Cross. However, this principle cannot readily be 
applied in a multi religious context because one cannot require non-Christian 

repentance and forgiveness based on a religion they do not know or accept. Moreover, 
Volf expects both the oppressor and the victims to repent from their sins and forgive, 
which victims might find difficult. He insists, however, that space for embrace can 
only be created by completing all the stages. However, Volf has a problem if the 
violence is ideological and socialized, related to the integrity of the other: Christians 
need time to realize that the socialized violence is incompatible with Christian life and 
they should begin to repent when they realize it. Steven Lukes points out socially and 
culturally patterned behaviour of people who are socialized to have to act and think 
automatically as they face certain curcumstances, defining that it is the three 
dimensional power.
625
 For example, the CW would too easily regard the CS as spies 
or agents when they found the CS’ verbal or behaviour patterns to be different from 
theirs, which offended the CS’s minds. Volf overlooked this particular aspect of 
violence. Erving Goffman also explains a stigma which is produced when observers 
assume a person possesses an attribute that makes him/her different from them, purely 
because they belong to a category of persons thought to be thoroughly bad, or 
dangerous, or weak.
626
 Stigmatizing the stranger may do violence to him because it 
can offend him, and it certainly does not treat him as an individual. According to 
Goffman, the stigma stems from perception socialized by “the means of categorizing 
persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members 
of each of these categories.”
627
 The CW tended too easily to regard the CS as spies 
and agents when the CS acted differently from the CW or used words that the CW 
have not used, such as Dong-mu (comrade) etc., by which the CW automatically 
stigmatize the CS. In order to escape any identity conflict, the CW need to be 

Steven Lukes, Op.Cit., pp. 26-28.
Erving Goffman, Stigma, Op.Cit., p. 12 
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changed: they must understand the CS’s identity socialized by Juche ideology: they 
must interpret the CS’s socialized, structured and patterned verbal and behaviour 
symbols in the light of “Thick Description” of Glifford Geertz.    
Lim Dong-won who constructed South Korea’s renowned Sunshine Policy toward 
North Korea attempted to apply the embrace policy to the multi-religious context of 
Korea. His attempt succeeded insofar as he was able to create the conditions for 
reunions of divided families, business cooperation and tourism. The pinnacle of his 
efforts was reached when the leaders of North and South Korea met for the first time 
and then once more. However, the embrace policy faced criticism from those who 
were not prepared to accept the North Korean people and Kim Jong-il’s regime 
unconditionally.  
Predictably, the conservative and anti-communist Youngnak Presbyterian Church 
responded negatively to Lim’s embrace policy because they believed that Juche 
ideology had to be defeated before any plans of reunification could go ahead. They 
were unable to begin the stages of repentance and forgiveness. I believe that 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church needs to repent from their hatred toward North Korea, 
its people and its regime, from not treating the Saeteomin as their equals, which 
created a dominant-weak power structure in which the weak were expected to 
conform, and from remaining silent on social and political matters during the years of 
anti-democratic rule in South Korea. The CS need to repent from the hatred toward 
South Koreans.  
However, in neither Volf nor Lim’s scheme is the space for social, personal and 
theological reflection before the process begins, that is, the issue has surely to be 
named before it is worked though. However, as long as the South Korean government 
anti-communist education makes such discussion seem “unpatriotic”, even 

	
approaching the issue becomes difficult. In the Youngnak Presbyterian Church context, 
it would be possible to appeal to the Christian core of the community life but even this 
can be seen as a political challenge. 
In chapter 6 I described a few cases of individual efforts toward acceptance and 
reconciliation. In all cases both parties, of their own volition, were able to repent from 
their past sins and forgave their counterpart. We witnessed a transformation in attitude 
and behaviour which the interviewees contributed to their experience of God’s 
unfailing love. The CW and the CS involved embraced each other creating a catholic 
community. I believe that each time individuals embrace each other this catholic 
community grows.    
Therefore, it could be concluded that a) it was extremely difficult for the two 
groups to embrace each other because they had lived in societies of contrasting 
ideologies for over half a century and their respective identities were influenced 
accordingly; b) in reality, both groups created potential exclusion in their community 
while encountering each other in Youngnak Presbyterian Church, realizing that it was 
difficult to live together in the same place; c) however, some Christian Wolnammin’ 
hostile attitude towards Juche ideology changed and as a result they became able to 
embrace Saeteomin by repentance and forgiveness. The only possibility for a catholic 
community lies in the embrace process and the more members get involved in it the 
larger this community becomes. 
   
This study could contribute to Youngnak Presbyterian Church and other Korean 
churches who face the same issues as Youngnak Presbyterian Church. The creation of 
a harmonious catholic community is possible when 
1. the two communities can escape from the myth of homogeneity and admit their 


heterogeneity; this would also be the case in a caste, class or colour context of shared 
nationality. 
2. the South Korean members can put aside their hostility toward Communism and 
Juche ideology and focus on the similarities between Juche ideology and Christian 
doctrine in order to lead Saeteomin to Christ; this involves moving beyond the “letter 
of the Law”, the given text, to the spirit of Christ. 
3. In addition, it may necessary that all the churches, as victims and oppressors, 
should repent from their sins committed as a result of ideologies and should forgive 
each other in order to be able to embrace each other.  
The findings and results of this study could assist South Korean Christianity to 
approach the North Koreans in a non-threatening way if and when the two Koreas are 
reunified in order to reduce the conflict among Koreans arising from their use and 
interpretation of symbols and behaviour. Besides, they could help over ten million 
divided families in Korea to reduce the shock caused by differences when they meet 
each other. On a personal level, the findings of the present study will help me when I 
encounter my own eldest brother whom I have never met and who still is alive.  
Further research is needed in describing how the cases of embrace in Youngnak 
Presbyterian Church can extend to other churches and even to the multi-religious 
context of Korea and indeed to observing and recording the process of “coming 
together as equals” in Youngnak Presbyterian Church itself, and other churches of its 
persuasion.  
Future investigation may focus on exploring ways of facilitating and managing a 
reunification process in Korea by looking at the example of Germany. A justification 
for that research is that the issue of inter-Koreans’ integration is more important than 
the issues surrounding political unification. A plethora of academic outcomes are 


published on the issue of unification from political, economic, military aspects 
whereas the research of different ethnic identity of the people of two Koreas is weak 
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